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Executive summary  2 
The report investigates how structural features of, and cyclical developments in, residential real 
estate (RRE) markets in the EU may affect financial stability and how related risks can be 
addressed. The report is structured in four main sections covering: (i) an analysis of the structural 
features of RRE markets in Europe, (ii) the historical experience in Europe as regards financial stability 
risks emerging from the real estate sector, (iii) an investigation into the possible role of structural 
features of RRE markets in such risks, and (iv) the policy instruments that can be used to address the 
risks stemming from residential property markets.  
i) Analysis of the structural features of RRE markets 
The structural features of RRE markets can be usefully grouped into demand-side, supply-side 
and institutional factors. Demand-side factors include household income, credit availability and 
interest rates, home ownership rates, and demographic factors. Supply-side elements encompass 
factors such as residential investment, housing construction and construction costs. Institutional factors 
include housing taxes and subsidies, mortgage contract features (e.g. variable vs. fixed rate contracts), 
as well as foreclosure and insolvency procedures.  
The report shows how EU Member States differ widely in terms of these structural features. For 
example, in the Netherlands and Estonia, housing taxes decrease the marginal cost of acquiring a 
house, while in France and Greece they increase the costs substantially; in Sweden the average 
mortgage maturity is more than 40 years, while in Hungary it is only 15 years.  
ii) Historical experience of RRE markets and financial stability risks 
The report develops a conceptual framework of how the housing market, real economy and 
financial sector are interlinked. Tight links tend to reinforce feedback loops between the financial 
sector and the real economy. Structural features of national RRE markets may further amplify or 
dampen the transmission channels.  
Several indicators relevant for a financial stability analysis of RRE markets are explored 
conceptually and empirically. An existing ESRB database is used to identify real estate-related 
banking crises, with the report also exploring several measures of the depth of a crisis. The report 
identifies possible indicators that might be particularly relevant during the build-up of financial stability 
risks in RRE markets and investigates how they behaved prior to the recent financial crisis. Different 
indicators may be useful depending on the phase of the real estate cycle. Possible early warning 
indicators of a real estate boom include cyclical indicators of credit and/or real estate prices, combined 
with their corresponding structural indicators (such as bank credit-to-GDP and price-to-rent ratios); 
relevant indicators for the bust phase include decreases in loan supply and house prices, and rising 
non-performing loans and bankruptcy rates. Finally, the similarities and differences between the most 
recent crisis and the real estate-related banking crises of the 1990s are explored.  
The analysis of real estate indicators has highlighted that comparable high-quality data on 
some key metrics for financial stability monitoring and policy-making are still not available. The 
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expert group therefore recommends that harmonised definitions of key indicators, such as LTV, 
LTI, DTI and DSTI, be developed, at least for monitoring and cross-border comparison 
purposes. These harmonised indicators should not prevent national authorities from continuing to use 
indicators based on their own definitions to accommodate national specificities.  
An analysis of the time-series behaviour of key cyclical real estate-related indicators around 
crisis events leads to some interesting conclusions. Crises tend to be preceded by lower funding 
costs, better access to credit, rising debt levels and an underestimation of risks. Risks and 
vulnerabilities accumulate in the form of external imbalances, booming construction activity, excessive 
bank credit growth, higher private sector leverage, and overvalued RRE prices.  
iii) Structural features of RRE markets and financial stability risks 
The analysis points to sharp differences across countries both in the incidence and depth of 
RRE-related crises. The report provides a first analysis of the potential interplay between 
structural and cyclical features of European RRE markets and financial stability risks using 
both graphical and econometric analysis. Structural market features may increase vulnerabilities 
before real estate-related banking crises and can exert an amplifying or dampening effect when the 
crisis materialises. However, the role of structural features of real estate markets in shaping the real 
estate cycle and how they affect financial stability is difficult to assess.  
The report finds preliminary empirical evidence that structural features do matter for financial 
stability. Initial results highlight the role of structural features, such as high LTV ratios, a favourable tax 
treatment of housing and high levels of bank leverage, in increasing the vulnerability of countries to real 
estate-related distress events. Empirical work suggests that high shares of new lending granted at a 
variable rate, by contrast, are associated with a lower probability of upcoming distress, though this 
result is likely to depend crucially on the evolution of the interest rate environment.  
While structural market features may indirectly influence cyclical developments in the build-up 
phase, they are likely to directly influence the depth of a crisis. Imbalances and structural 
developments during the upturn phase are perhaps more likely to affect resilience to a negative shock, 
rather than influencing the likelihood of that shock occurring. Future research would be needed to 
analyse more closely the depth of real estate-related banking crises, and the role of cyclical and 
structural characteristics in shaping the impact of crises.  
iv) Policy instruments to address financial stability risks 
Real estate macroprudential instruments can be grouped into those tackling three “stretches”, 
notably relating to borrowers’ income, the underlying collateral backing loans and banking 
system resilience. In recent years, instruments related to income stretch (LTI and DSTI caps, 
affordability requirements, amortisation requirements), collateral stretch (LTV caps, amortisation 
requirements), and banking system stretch (sectoral capital requirements) have been introduced in a 
number of Member States.  
The report provides guidance on the design and use of instruments drawing both on analytical 
work and emerging experience across countries. A careful design of instruments is crucial for 
enhancing their effectiveness and avoiding any potential unintended consequences. The report 
discusses specific detailed design features of each instrument such as the definition of variables and 
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exemptions and suggests ways to deal with potential pitfalls in the use of instruments. It also discusses 
the trade-offs between fixing and adjusting instruments over the financial cycle. While fixing 
instruments may create a more predictable environment for the targeted institutions and minimise the 
risk of inaction bias and implementation lags, it carries the risk that the settings of instruments do not 
keep pace with new market developments and may create a “comfort zone” for policy-makers. Member 
States’ implementation of measures differs along most dimensions, and the only relatively recent 
introduction of measures in most cases means that the evidence for determining “best practice” is still 
relatively scarce. 
A combination of instruments seems likely to be the most suitable response to vulnerabilities 
stemming from excessive credit growth and leverage related to RRE lending. In this way, 
different channels through which systemic risks may build up or unfold can be addressed and any 
circumvention of the rules is made more difficult. Capital-based instruments may be the most effective 
in directly enhancing resilience, whereas restrictions related to income and collateral stretches are 
comparatively more effective in curbing the financial cycle. Income stretch instruments are likely to be 
the most constraining in the build-up phase, whereas a collateral buffer also contributes to system 
resilience in a downturn. In practice, a combination of instruments, even if not applied simultaneously, 
is the rule rather than the exception, in particular for collateral and income stretch instruments. 
When deciding on the appropriate level of an instrument, a range of different potential 
calibration methods can be used, potentially in combination. These might range from practical 
exercises benchmarking experience against other countries to more academic approaches. Expert 
judgement is likely to be needed given the complexity involved in fully grasping the systemic risks and 
the uncertainty surrounding the likely impact of the instruments. 
Finally, policies influencing structural characteristics of RRE markets themselves might 
positively contribute to financial stability. The apparent role of structural characteristics of markets 
in explaining different crisis experiences across countries also points to a broader policy conclusion: 
that rather than tackling emerging cyclical imbalances in markets through macroprudential intervention, 
policies influencing structural characteristics of RRE markets might positively contribute to financial 
stability. This might be a useful topic for further work. 
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This section presents an overview of the structural features of residential real estate markets 
across EU Member States, noting some major changes between the pre-crisis (2007-08) and 
post-crisis period (2012-13). Section 1.1 reviews the importance of housing market developments for 
the wider economy. Section 1.2 describes a range of supply and demand characteristics that may help 
to explain house price dynamics across countries. Section 1.3 discusses the role of institutional factors 
with a particular focus on taxation and the structure of national mortgage markets. Section 1.4 
concludes with the results of a statistical clustering exercise of EU countries based on their structural 
features. 
1.1 The importance of housing markets for the economy 
Real estate plays a significant role in the economy and can have a material influence on 
developments in the financial system. The growth of advanced economies has always required 
substantial investments in infrastructure, including capital expenditures on RRE and CRE. In addition, 
the rise in households’ disposable income over the past decades has led to an increased demand for 
owner-occupied housing. The associated need for long-term financing of construction, development 
and the subsequent resale of real estate has typically been met by bank loans. In fact, a large fraction 
of the global growth in bank balance sheets over the past decades has been attributed to increased 
mortgage lending (Jorda et al., 2014). As such, developments in real estate markets have been 
significant drivers of the evolution of the financial system (ECB, 2009). 
The systems to meet housing demand differ significantly across Member States, but generally 
encompass rental (both privately and socially provided) and owner-occupied housing. Housing 
satisfies a fundamental human need and has wide social effects, which translates into a high 
politicisation of the sector.  
Price changes translate into shifts in the value of the housing stock, which represents a 
significant proportion of the fixed assets in an economy (ECB, 2009; Iacoviello, 2011). As a 
consequence, developments in the housing sector can affect the valuation of a broad range of financial 
assets and may, through a financial accelerator mechanism, cause systemic problems in the financial 
sector and affect the whole economy. In particular, exposures to the real estate sector have extended 
beyond the banking system, with for example mortgage-backed assets being sold to investors in other 
sectors. On the other hand, the financial sector itself may also be an important source of tensions and 
volatility in the residential sector.2  
                                                          
1  Prepared by a team coordinated by Karin Wagner (Oesterreichische Nationalbank)/Alexander Schmidt (Deutsche Bundesbank) 
and comprising Calliope Akantziliotou (Bank of Greece), Jelena Cirjakovic (Banka Slovenije), Marine Dujardin (Banque de 
France), Gerard Kennedy (Central Bank of Ireland), Jacek Laszek (Narodowy Bank Polski), Adriana Lojschova (European 
Central Bank), Krzysztof Olszewski (Narodowy Bank Polski), Peter Pontuch (European Commission), Piotr Sliwka (Komisja 
Nadzoru Finansowego, C.S.Wyszynski University), and Jakob Winstrand (Sveriges Riksbank). 
2  See the cases of the US subprime crisis and Sweden in the 1990s.  
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Possible changes in household and firm behaviour are additional interaction channels that go 
beyond the financial system. Households’ expenditure on housing services typically accounts for 15-
35% of their income.3 Additionally, the large wealth effects of house price changes can affect the 
borrowing capacity of private households and will influence their consumption-saving decisions (HM 
Treasury, 2003 and Case et al., 20124), and the strength of this effect might depend on the structure of 
the credit market (ECB, 2003). On the other hand, fluctuations in housing demand will influence 
activity, particularly the construction sector. While the housing construction sector usually contributes 
on average 3-6% of GDP, it has a large cyclical component and can reach double-digit values during 
boom periods and much lower in busts.5 Therefore, the macroeconomic effects of developments in the 
RRE market have to be considered as well.   
1.2 House price dynamics and their determinants 
The empirical literature on the determinants of house prices is vast. It explores a broad set of 
determinants – considered in this section – including: 
 demand-side determinants: household income; credit availability and interest rates; ownership 
rates and the rental market; demographic factors;  
 supply-side determinants: residential investment, housing construction and construction 
costs. 
1.2.1 Demand-side determinants 
1.2.1.1 Disposable income 
Disposable income is typically positively correlated with house prices. Algieri (2013) examines 
real house prices in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, the UK and the US from 1970 to 
2010 and finds that long-run per capita income elasticity varies between 0.64 (Germany) and 1.69 
(UK). Similarly, Claussen (2012) states that 62% of the rise in house prices in Sweden since 1996 can 
be explained by the increase in real disposable income, with household real financial wealth 
accounting for only 8%. Hiebert and Roma (2010) also stress the important role of income differentials 
in explaining city-level house price dispersion in Germany, France and the US. 
1.2.1.2  Credit availability and interest rates 
Credit availability and interest rates are found to be key determinants of house prices, but there 
is no clarity on the size of the impact. Increases in interest rates may lead to a fall in housing 
demand, and short-term falls in prices (e.g. Xu and Tang, 2014) – with the ultimate price adjustment 
                                                          
3  Source: EU SILC. 
4  Based on US data, Case et al. (2012) calculate that an increase in real housing wealth – comparable to the pre-crisis period 
from 2001 to 2005 – would push up household spending by a total of about 4.3%. A decrease in real housing wealth 
comparable to the crash period from 2005 to 2009 would lead to a drop of about 3.5%. 
5  E.g. Spain and Ireland during the mid-2000s (source: Eurostat). 
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depending on the response of housing supply to price falls (HM Treasury, 2003). In addition, an 
increase in long-term interest rates may make other fixed income assets more attractive relative to 
residential property investment, reducing the demand for the latter, which in turn lowers house prices 
(Adams and Roland, 2009).  
1.2.1.3 Home ownership rates and the importance of rental markets 
Higher disposable income and lower interest rates improve home affordability and influence the 
choice of owning or renting real estate. Empirically, there is a link between home ownership rates 
and average house price changes. Chart 1 suggests that countries with high home ownership rates 
experienced larger increases in house prices in the run-up to the global financial crisis, while prices 
tended to fall more sharply thereafter. 
Chart 1 
Home ownership rates and average house price changes  
in the periods 2005-07 and 2008-14 by country6 
(percentage) 
 
 
Source: Eurostat and EU SILC. 
Notes: The house price index is calculated as the average of house price indices for the period 2005-07. 
 
The link between ownership rates, the rental market share and rental market regulation might 
come from the fact that balanced ownership and rental markets may be a stabilising factor for 
property markets. Ownership rates vary substantially – from 53% in Germany to 90% in Lithuania. 
Differences in ownership rates may in turn be explained by different structural features such as tax 
                                                          
6  The house price index is calculated as the average of house price indices for the period 2005-07. Source: Eurostat and EU 
SILC.  
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incentives, the cost of owner-occupying vs. renting (price-to-rent ratio), demographics and factors 
associated with the transition to a market economy (for central and eastern European countries). The 
share of rented dwellings has decreased since the 1980s in most Member States (ECB, 2003). 
Nevertheless, in some countries the private rental sector remains large. Furthermore, the size of the 
social rental sector plays a crucial role and can be highly influenced by policy-makers. The share of 
social housing differs a lot across Europe – while it is quite high in SI, EE, MT and FI (around 17%), it 
is low in some countries such as SE, DK and NL. These latter countries are also those providing some 
form of mortgage interest tax relief as a means of encouraging home ownership (see Section 1.3.1.1). 
They are also those with the highest share of owners holding a mortgage or a loan in the EU. 
Chart 2 
Tenure choice 
Distribution of population by tenure status, 2013 
(percentage) 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, NL 2012, Statistics Netherlands 
 
Rental markets are subject to various frictions. Cuerpo et al. (2014) constructed an indicator 
reflecting the degree of regulation in the rented housing market (Chart 3). Factor analysis identifies two 
dimensions in rental market regulation. The first reflects frictions in rent-setting (e.g. rent controls), the 
second, frictions affecting the tenant-landlord relationship (e.g. rules about deposit requirements, 
eviction rules and duration of contracts).  
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Chart 3 
Composite indicator of regulatory frictions of rent control and tenant-landlord relationships, 
2013 
                                       Higher frictions                             Higher frictions 
 
  
Source: Calculations based on Cuerpo et al. (2014). 
Notes: The indicators refer to the private segment of the rental market. Data for CY represent the housing segment 
of pre-2000 dwellings. 
 
1.2.1.4 Demographics and migration 
Demographic factors and migration can have a strong impact on the aggregate demand for 
housing. A key indicator is the household formation rate, which depends on the age composition and 
behavioural aspects of the population, and varies over time and regions. Demographic as well as 
behavioural factors usually have a nationwide impact, but can have strong regional biases, which might 
give rise to regionally different house price dynamics.  
Growth in the number of households is affected by migration. In turn, there tends to be a close 
link between migration (from abroad and inter-regional) and employment opportunities. Moreover, 
income differentials increase the relative attractiveness of certain regions, which fuels additional 
demand for housing in such areas. The importance of this demand channel in part depends on 
residential mobility. For example, Caldera, Sánchez and Andrews (2011) find for OECD countries that 
lower transaction costs, more responsive housing supply, lower rent controls and tenant protection, as 
well as higher current income, tend to increase residential mobility. Chan (2001) and Ferreira et al. 
(2010) find that after a housing bust, highly leveraged households are typically less mobile due to low 
or negative housing equity. 
As such, (expected) income differentials and migration effects can give rise to strong supply and 
demand imbalances, in particular in urban and metropolitan areas where, as a result, house prices 
tend often to grow much more strongly than in the rural areas.  
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1.2.2 Supply-side influences 
Residential investment, housing construction activity and construction costs can have a 
significant effect on house prices. Over recent decades, housing investment has grown rapidly in 
many countries, with low interest rates being one of the driving factors. If house prices rise faster than 
construction costs, it can be rational for individuals or construction companies to invest in new 
dwellings. The extent of this supply effect can differ depending on national regulations and the 
availability of specialised workers (Giuliodori, 2004). For example, booms in housing investment have 
been responsible for increased employment, with the construction sector accounting for more than 
20% of all employment gains since 2000 in the US, FR, ES, DK, NO, SE, IE and GR (OECD, 2007). 
Chart 4 (right panel) shows that countries with negative house price changes had to deal with stronger 
declines in residential investment and more pronounced increases in unemployment. Hence, changes 
in house prices can generate significant spillover effects, affecting the wider macroeconomy. 
Chart 4 
Changes in house prices, residential investment and unemployment 
(percentage) 
 
  
Source: Eurostat 
 
1.2.2.1 Housing supply price elasticity 
The dynamics of house prices are affected by the price elasticity of housing supply. In areas 
with low supply responsiveness, house prices tend to increase more after a positive demand shock 
than in areas with high supply responsiveness (Andrews et al., 2011). With high supply responsiveness 
the risk of overbuilding increases, which might amplify a fall in housing prices if demand subsequently 
weakens (Glaeser et al., 2008). Supply responsiveness tends to vary across geographical areas, 
depending on physical and regulatory factors. For example, estimates by Caldera et al. (2011) of the 
long-run price elasticity of new housing supply in OECD countries vary between 0.146 and 2.014 
(Table 1). Similarly Murphy (2004) explores the impact of planning restrictions on housing supply. The 
author lists various studies from the UK and US showing that post-war estimates suggest a value for 
the long-run elasticity of supply between 0 and 1 for the UK, where planning restrictions are generally 
tight, and between 6 and 13 for the US, where planning restrictions are generally loose (Meen, 1996; 
Malpezzi and MacLennan, 2001; White and Allmendiger, 2003).  
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Housing supply is usually more inelastic in the short run than in the long run. For example, 
Bacon et al. (1998) find that house completions are relatively unresponsive to price changes in the 
short run compared with in the long run. For the same reasons that it can vary between countries 
(Gattini and Ganoulis, 2012), supply responsiveness can also differ between regions within countries 
(Saiz, 2010; Bacon et al., 1998). Such differences could be a factor explaining the geographically 
divergent responses of house prices to demand shocks. Chart 4 shows levels of residential investment, 
which in the EU was on average 5.7% of GDP pre-crisis and 3.5% post-crisis. The left panel shows 
that the change from pre-crisis to post-crisis quite clearly corresponds to house price changes. 
Table 1 
Estimates of long-run price elasticity of new housing 
supply, average residential investments in % of GDP and 
construction cost index for new residential buildings 
Country 
Estimates of 
long-run price 
elasticity of new 
housing supply* 
Average 
residential 
investments in 
% of GDP** 
Average 
construction 
cost index, new 
residential 
buildings*** 
AT 0.234 4.9 85.2 
BE 0.315 5.7 95.5 
BG  2.8 88.6 
CH 0.146  99.7 
CY  7.9 83.6 
CZ  3.4 91.9 
DE 0.428 6.0 94.9 
DK 1.206 4.6 87.9 
EE  3.6 91.3 
ES 0.452 8.0 83.3 
FI 0.988 5.7 88.7 
FR 0.363 5.8 89.2 
GR  7.4 90.5 
HU  3.6 88.5 
IE 0.631 7.1 97.2 
IT 0.258 5.1 87.0 
LT  2.5 93.4 
LU  2.9 94.1 
LV  2.7 85.0 
MT  4.9 94.2 
NL 0.186 5.2 94.0 
NO 0.486  89.6 
PL 0.442 1.5 91.7 
PT  5.6 93.5 
RO  1.6 77.8 
SE 1.381 3.1 82.6 
SI  3.4 82.9 
SK  2.7 79.1 
UK 0.395 4.6 78.7 
US 2.014   
 
 
* Estimates of the long-run price elasticity of new housing supply where 
new supply is measured by residential investment.  
Source: Caldera Sánchez and Johansson (2011) 
** Average residential investment in % of GDP, 1995-2014, where available. 
Source: Eurostat  
*** Average construction cost index, new residential buildings 1995-2014, 
where available. Source: Eurostat.  
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1.2.2.2 The role of expectations 
Expectations of future prices are also an important house price determinant. In times of turmoil 
with large negative shocks to house prices, pessimistic house price expectations may arise, which can 
increase the possibility of longer and more pronounced boom-bust periods, given the effect self-
fulfilling expectations can have on house prices (ECB, 2009).  
1.3 Institutional factors 
House price developments can also be affected by a broad set of institutional and other 
regulatory factors. For instance, the political system can influence the housing market through social 
housing policies and rental market regulation or affect the responsiveness of housing supply to 
demand shocks through construction regulation (Gyourko and Molloy, 2014). On the other hand, 
government regulations can influence housing demand, e.g. via tax policies (see Section 1.3.1). The 
availability of credit as well as the institutional features of mortgage markets (see Section 1.3.2) might 
be additional factors affecting housing demand. 
1.3.1 Housing taxes, subsidies and transaction costs  
Taxes can be a key factor in shaping incentives for the housing and mortgage market. Property-
related taxes can have a direct effect on private agents’ incentives for choosing a particular housing 
tenure (ownership vs. renting), may affect how transactions are financed (extent and type of 
borrowing), and may affect the supply of housing assets to the market. Empirical literature points to the 
importance of housing-related taxation for house prices (Kuttner and Shim, 2013).  
Most taxes affect housing markets via the demand channel, acting on the cost of buying, 
owning, financing or selling the asset. Measures affecting the property owner are reviewed in the 
first part of this section. However, taxation may also have an impact through other channels, such as 
taxation of construction activity or taxation of rental incomes, which may in part also affect housing 
supply; these measures are discussed in the second part of the section.   
1.3.1.1 Taxation measures affecting home ownership demand 
It is important to assess the tax treatment of housing holistically, as different tax measures may 
affect households’ incentives in various ways. As well as considering the impact of housing taxes 
relative to other investments, housing taxation needs to be considered also from the angle of its effect 
on borrowing as it modifies the effective cost of financing through mortgage interest tax relief. 
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Moreover, leveraging of other investments is usually less easy to achieve. All these factors can create 
a further bias towards taking on a high level of mortgage debt.7   
Recurrent property taxation 
Recurrent property taxes are typically payable by the house owner and therefore increase the 
cost of home ownership. By acting on the incentives to own a house, these taxes can have a 
significant effect on broader housing market dynamics.8 Recurrent property taxes are usually levied on 
the value of the property, in practice the cadastral value. At present, the economic importance of this 
revenue source is relatively small. This is in most cases a result of tax rates being low and/or the 
cadastral values being outdated and not representative of the market value of the assets (OECD, 
2011). A few Member States (e.g. NL and LU for principal residences) tax so-called imputed rents, i.e. 
dwelling services enjoyed by an owner-occupier from their asset.  
For the EU as a whole, revenue from recurrent property taxes remained fairly stable between 
2002 and 2011. Average revenues as a share of GDP are estimated between 1.2% and 1.3% of GDP 
and only in 2012 was there an upward shift to 1.5% of GDP. In 2012, recurrent property taxes ranged 
across countries from 0% to 3.4% of GDP. Due to policy changes in some euro area countries in 2013 
and 2014 recurrent property taxes have increased further (Table 2), showing a shift of the tax burden to 
recurrent property tax.9 Other property-related taxes10 – affected strongly by housing market valuations 
– moderately increased up to 2008, decreased afterwards and in 2012 stood at a lower level than in 
2002. For the EU as a whole, adding other property-related taxes to the recurrent property taxes, 
average revenue as a share of GDP in 2012 amounted to 2.1% of GDP. 
Chart 5 
Revenues from property taxes as a % of GDP, 2012 and 2008-12 
(percentage) 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
                                                            
7  See for instance Krelove (2012). 
8  In some cases, the recurrent property tax is instead payable by the resident of the dwelling, especially when this tax is intended 
to finance the provision of local services. 
9  Garnier et al. (2014). 
10  Other related property taxes include various taxes such as transaction-based taxes and taxes on inheritance, gifts and other 
property items. 
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Table 2 
Property tax changes adopted from mid-2013 to mid-2014 
 Statutory rates Base or special regimes 
Increase GR, IE, IT, CY CY, ES, HR, UK 
 LT, NL, RO  
Decrease GR, IT EE, LV, MT 
 
 
Source: European Commission (2014a) 
Notes: The table encompasses property tax changes implemented or adopted 
from mid-2013 to mid-2014 including temporary changes. Property tax 
measures are reported individually and are not consolidated based on their 
budgetary impact. If the initial measure was a temporary property tax reduction 
for a given period, the decision to extend this measure is reported as a 
decrease and vice versa. 
 
Transaction-based property taxation 
Transaction-based housing taxes lead to a one-off cost at the moment of the transaction, thus 
increasing the cost of home ownership. Unlike recurrent taxes, however, they also have the effect 
of discouraging transactions. This might lead to a less efficient allocation of the housing stock, and may 
hamper labour mobility (Johansson et al., 2008). There is significant heterogeneity across Member 
States in transaction tax rates (Table 3). At one end, Belgium has a rate well above 10%, while at the 
other end several countries do not apply any transaction taxes.  
Table 3 
Tax rates on real estate transactions, 2014 
Tax level Country 
≥10%  BE 
5-9% DE, FR, ES, LU, HR, IT, MT, PT*, UK* 
<5%  AT, GR, IE*, NL, SI, FI, CZ, DK, LV, PL, SE, HU 
None  EE, SK, BG, LT 
 
 
Source: European Commission (2014a) 
* indicates a progressive or multiple rate structure; no rate indicated for RO. The top rate in UK of 7% applies to 
properties above GBP 2 million. In IT some rates may apply to cadastral values rather than transaction values. 
Moreover, a 2% rate applies to the main residence of first-time buyers. In DE the rate is set by the federal states 
(“Länder”) with rates ranging from 3.5% to 6.5% and a median rate of 5%. In PL a 2% rate applies to the sale of 
immovable property, which is VAT exempt. CY has suspended the application of the transfer tax (levied at 
progressive rates, with a top rate of 8%) until 2016. In IE a multiple rate structure is in operation, with 1% on 
properties valued up to EUR 1 million and 2% on the balance above this.   
 
Capital gains taxes on housing 
Capital gains taxes may favour housing investments over other types of investment. Some 
Member States exempt principal residences from capital gains taxes; others grant an exemption from 
capital gains taxes (or a reduction thereof) after a certain holding period. Such an exemption is typically 
not granted to other types of investment. Finally, some countries enable the capital gains tax liability to 
be deferred. Recent reforms in this area include the introduction of capital gains taxes in Greece, as 
well as in the UK for non-residents. 
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Mortgage interest tax relief 
Several Member States provide some form of mortgage interest tax relief to encourage home 
ownership. Table 4 shows that ten Member States had granted some tax relief to mortgage holders as 
of 2013, with two of them, SE and NL, being in the highest category. Mortgage interest tax relief can be 
compatible with a neutral tax system, provided that imputed rents and capital gains are appropriately 
taxed, i.e. identically to other investment returns. However, this is rarely the case, leading to biased 
incentives towards debt-financed housing investment. This tax advantage might be capitalised into 
house prices.11 
Table 4 
Extent of mortgage interest tax relief for new mortgages, 2013 
Mortgage 
interest tax relief Country 
None AT, CY, FR, DE, IE, HU, IE, LV, LT, MT, PL, PT, RO, SK, SI, ES, UK 
Bounded and limited BG, CZ, EE, IT, LU 
Bounded BE, DK, FI 
High or unbounded NL, SE 
 
 
Sources: European Commission and OECD 
 
Several reforms to mortgage interest tax relief have taken place in the recent past. For example, 
ES, GR, IE and PT discontinued mortgage interest tax relief on new mortgages from 2013 (PT one 
year earlier). More gradual and/or moderate reductions of tax deductibility have been adopted in EE, 
DK, FI and NL (in the latter case together with linking deductibility with the requirement to amortise fully 
loans over a 30-year maturity).  
Assessing overall tax incentives for home ownership 
It is useful to assess the overall effect of taxation on incentives for house purchase using an 
aggregate indicator. For this purpose, one can use the estimated contribution of housing taxation to 
the marginal cost of investing in owner-occupied housing, as developed by the European Commission 
(2014) based on Poterba (1992) and Poterba and Sinai (2008). Chart 6 shows that the contribution of 
housing taxes to the marginal cost of owner-occupied housing investment in 2014 ranged from -7% of 
the cost (i.e. taxation reduces the actual cost of housing investment) to +33% of the cost (i.e. taxation 
increases the cost of housing investment). Compared with the pre-crisis period, significant reductions 
in the tax support for owner-occupation have been implemented in CZ, DK, ES, FI, GR, IT and PT, 
which means that they would be positioned further to the left in that earlier period.12 The chart therefore 
confirms the very heterogeneous role played by taxation as regards its contribution to the overall cost 
of investment in housing. 
 
                                                          
11  Ibid.  
12  See also the evolution of a simpler aggregate indicator in European Commission (2014b). 
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Chart 6 
Contribution of housing taxes to the marginal cost of owner-occupied housing (% of the cost 
before housing taxes), 2014 
 
 
Source: European Commission (2014a) 
 
1.3.1.2 Other taxes affecting the housing market 
Taxation of rental income 
Taxation of rental income affects the incentives to supply housing assets on the rental market. 
Too high tax rates relative to other investments may discourage the provision of this tenure type. This 
may lead to reduced housing construction if rental dwellings are a significant part of the housing 
market. On the other hand, too low tax rates on rental assets may lead to overinvestment at the 
expense of other types of investment. Chart 7 compares the tax incentives for renting a dwelling using 
the Global Property Guide’s estimated tax rate applicable to a non-resident small private investor.13 
The higher end of the distribution of EU Member States is represented by AT, ES, FI and SE. UK, LV, 
CY, GR and LT are at the lower end of the distribution with very low rental taxation.  
                                                            
13  Only a calculation for non-residents is available from this data source.  
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Value-added tax on construction work  
VAT rates applicable to the construction of new buildings can affect housing supply. Depending 
on the elasticity of demand, changes in the level of VAT on construction can impact quantities and 
pass through into the price of new dwellings and thereby indirectly affect the price of existing dwellings. 
VAT rates for new construction vary markedly across the EU. The lowest rates as of 2013 were in IT, 
ES and IE, whereas the highest rates were observed in HU, DK, SE, RO and FI. In the recent period 
there has been a general tendency towards increases in the VAT rate on new construction.  
1.3.2 Characteristics of national mortgage markets 
This section examines the structural features of mortgage markets in the EU, with an emphasis 
on the situation before and after the financial crisis. The main cross-country differences and 
similarities are also highlighted. Mortgage markets play a major role in housing markets, since owner-
occupied housing constitutes a household’s largest financial outlay, and generally requires extensive 
debt financing in the form of a mortgage. In addition, increased deregulation and a greater focus on 
efficiency have seen housing finance markets change dramatically in recent decades (Andrews and 
Caldera Sánchez, 2011).   
Chart 8 
Highest VAT rates applicable to new 
construction 
(percentage) 
 
 
Sources: European Commission. 
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Chart 7 
Tax rate on average rental income 
 
(percentage) 
 
 
Source: Global Property Guide. 
Note: Calculated for comparable annual rental income 
for personally directly owned property by non-
residents with no other local income and no mortgage 
financing. 
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1.3.2.1 Outstanding mortgage lending and flows 
The stock of mortgage loans to households across the EU stood at just over EUR 6 trillion, 
equivalent to 45% of EU GDP, at the end of 2013 (Table 5). This was approximately 25% higher than 
the 2008 figure, which accounted for 37% of GDP. While the value of outstanding mortgages increased 
between the outbreak of the crisis and 2013, the year-on-year rate of growth in the stock had begun to 
slow as of late 2010, turning negative in mid-2013.14 This may have been a symptom of household 
deleveraging and the steady flow of mortgage redemptions, as well as lower levels of gross mortgage 
lending compared with the immediate pre-crisis years. 
The growth in mortgage markets varied significantly across countries in the years from 2008 to 
2013 (Chart 9). Some countries experienced increases in mortgage lending (e.g. UK, CY, BE, SE and 
GR), while mortgage markets in a handful of Member States contracted noticeably (IE, DK, LV and 
EE).  
Mortgage lending is particularly concentrated in the larger economies. Cumulatively UK, DE, FR 
and ES accounted for almost two-thirds of the stock of outstanding EU mortgages in 2013 (Table 5). By 
contrast, the 13 smallest mortgage markets combined made up 2.5% of the total. 
1.3.2.2 Mortgages and household lending 
Household participation in national mortgage markets is heterogeneous across the EU. Home 
ownership rates are generally higher in many of the EU’s newest Member States (see Section 1.2.1), 
but properties there tend to be owned outright rather than with a mortgage. Data presented in Chart 2 
show that no more than 10% of households in those countries held a mortgage in 2013. At the opposite 
end of the scale, at least 40% of households in the Benelux and Nordic countries were servicing a 
mortgage on their homes.  
Mortgage lending tends to account for a large portion of household debt in northern and 
western European countries, whereas a number of central and eastern European countries lie 
at the lower end (Chart 10). Post-communist policies aimed at privatising dwellings, whereby 
occupants of state-owned apartments were given the opportunity to purchase their dwelling at 
advantageous terms, may help explain the latter. Data for end-2013 show that mortgage lending made 
up over 85% of total household loans in NL, DK, UK and EE, whereas for RO, BG, HR and HU the 
figure was less than 50%. The fraction of total household lending accounted for by mortgages has not 
changed much in the majority of countries since the financial crisis.  
                                                          
14  According to ECB Statistical Data Warehouse (SDW) data, the year-on-year rate of growth in the stock of lending for house 
purchases was up 9.4% in November 2010, but down 1.6% in July 2013.   
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1.3.2.3 Mortgage interest rate types and foreign currency mortgages 
Prevailing interest rate type 
Interest rate arrangements on mortgages across the EU vary widely. In most countries borrowers 
can choose either fixed or variable rate mortgages. The crisis appears to have had little impact on 
preferences as far as outstanding mortgages are concerned (Table 5). The fixed rate system, whereby 
interest rates are locked in for a period of at least five years, has traditionally been favoured in DE, DK, 
NL, FR and BE. In other Member States, variable interest rate loans tend to dominate. In these 
markets, interest rates can be adjusted periodically within a 12-month period (depending on the 
contract), with refinancing/interest rate adjustments normally based on the interbank rates for the 
corresponding maturity (ECB, 2009).15  
The proportion of new mortgage lending at variable rates can be quite fluid depending on 
factors such as the rates on offer and borrowers’ expectations of future interest rates. The most 
obvious change between the pre- and post-crisis periods is in GR, where the share of variable rate 
loans in new mortgage lending increased from 28% to 96%. Other countries showing a significant, 
albeit less dramatic, increase in the share of new variable rate mortgages are IT, AT, SI and LT, 
whereas HU, ES and UK present the opposite evolution.  
                                                          
15  In some countries, variable rate loans may also be linked to other reference rates (T-bills, prime rates, swap rates, or LIBOR for 
countries where some housing loans are denominated in a foreign currency). 
Chart 10 
Household mortgage lending as a 
percentage of total household loans: 2008 
vs. 2013 
(percentage) 
 
 
Sources: ECB (SDW), Eurostat and national 
authorities. 
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Chart 9 
Household mortgage lending: 2008 vs. 2013 
 
 
(percentage of GDP) 
 
 
 
Sources: ECB (SDW), Eurostat and national 
authorities. 
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Foreign currency mortgages 
In markets where mortgage loans are provided in a foreign currency (FX), unhedged 
households can be exposed to exchange rate risk16. In general, FX mortgages are more common 
in central and eastern European markets. Data from 2007 show that 90% of the outstanding stock of 
housing loans in RO was denominated in a foreign currency (ECB, 2009). Other countries where the 
share was relatively high (37% to 55%) were BG, HU and PL, while levels were also significant in some 
Baltic States (EE and LV) and euro area member countries (GR, CY, AT and SI).  
FX loans remain a major feature of post-crisis EU household lending in some Member States.17 
At end-2013, approximately 70% of outstanding household loans in LT were denominated in a foreign 
currency, while the shares in RO and HU were approximately two-thirds and a half respectively; the 
share in BG, PL and AT was over 20%. In contrast, for the majority of other EU Member States the 
share of foreign currency household lending was less than 5%.  
Loans denominated in Swiss francs (CHF) are especially popular in a number of Member States. 
In HU they account for 60% of total household lending, and in PL and AT they make up one-quarter of 
household borrowing. The exchange rate of the CHF vis-à-vis the local currency may increase the risk 
of these loans (see the case study on FX mortgages in PL in Annex 1).  
1.3.2.4 Loan-to-value ratios, mortgage maturities and method of redemption 
Average LTV ratios 
Cross-country LTV comparisons are hampered by the variety of definitions and ways of 
compiling data across Member States. Depending on the country, LTV ratios are based on the 
outstanding stock of mortgages, LTV ratios are recorded at the time of loan origination or LTV ratios 
are exclusively those applicable for first-time buyers or owner-occupied housing (Table 5).  
The CRD IV defines high LTV lending as lending where the loan accounts for more than 80% of 
the value of the underlying collateral. Average LTV ratios for six of the sample countries at hand 
(NL, FI, AT, FR, UK and CY) were at or above this level in 2013, while eight others (PL, LT, RO, DE, 
GR, IE, SK and SE) were above the sample average of 70%. LTV ratios were the lowest in EE, SI, CZ, 
ES, HU and IT, with average values of below 60%.   
In the majority of countries (18 out of 27), average LTV ratios have fallen since the financial 
crisis. In the markets where the typical LTV has declined, the average decrease has been around 11 
percentage points.   
                                                          
16  The actual FX risk depends on the volatility of the underlying FX rate (note that Bulgaria has a fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis the 
euro). 
17  Based on ESRB data showing (i) FX loans as a share of total household loans and (ii) CHF loans as a share of total household 
loans. 
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Loan maturity and amortisation 
Longer-dated mortgage products can be obtained in the EU.18 Member States were surveyed on 
maximum mortgage maturities in 2013. 30-year mortgage terms were available in BE, HR, DK and LU; 
terms of 35 years were available in IT and IE. CY, EE, LV and LT had a 40-year maximum, while SE 
was the market with the longest reported mortgage maturity at 54 years.  
In most Member States, mortgages are repaid over a period of 20 to 30 years (Table 5). SE not 
only has the maximum mortgage maturity available, it also has the longest average mortgage maturity 
(around 41 years). Typical mortgages in HU appear to be the shortest at 15 years, while average 
maturities are also less than 20 years in FR, SI and LV.   
Amortising mortgages (the repayment of monthly instalments made up of capital and interest 
payments) was the most common repayment arrangement in the majority of countries in the 
pre-crisis period (ECB, 2009). Post-crisis data on the percentage of non-amortising (in the first year) 
new mortgages were received from a small number of countries (HU, LU, NL, PT, SE and NO). The 
differences between these countries are large. In LU, for instance, 6% of new loans are originated on a 
non-amortising basis in the first year of the mortgage, compared with 46% in SE. In general, a smaller 
percentage of these loans are being originated in the current environment, particularly in NL, where 
they have gone from accounting for over one-third of new loans to less than 10%.  
  
                                                          
18  Pre-crisis data from 2007 show that mortgages of up to 40 years were offered in BE, IE, GR, IT, LU, RO, EE, LT, LV and MT 
and 50-year housing loans could be obtained in ES, FR, SE and PT. In a limited number of cases, 60-year mortgages were 
available (in FI), though they accounted for a very small market share (ECB, 2009). 
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Table 5 
Selected mortgage loan characteristics (2013) 
Country 
Value of outstanding 
residential mortgage 
loans (EUR mn) * 
Prevailing type of 
interest rate on all 
newly issued 
mortgages ** 
Share of variable 
rate mortgages in 
newly issued 
mortgages *** 
Average LTV ratios 
for newly issued 
residential 
mortgages (%) **** 
Typical mortgage 
maturities (years) 
***** 
UK 1,457,248 V 22.6 75.0 24.6 
DE  1,019,370 MF 16.0 (75) (30.0) 
FR 881,742 LF 6.9 83.8 18.6 
ES 606,380 V 67.9 57.5 22.7 
NL 544,416 LF 23.2 88.7 29.7 
IT 361,565 V 79.8 58.3 21.9 
DK 233,499 LF 31.7 96.0 30.0 
SE 263,300 S 60.2 70.9 41.2 
PT 106,592 V 91.6 64.4 29.0 
BE 164,723 LF 6.8 62.3 20.0 
FI 88,314 V 97.0 70.4 21.6 
AT 87,622 V 80.0 (70.5) - 
IE 83,403 V 85.0 67.7 26.4 
PL 80,663 V 100.0 79.2 26.3 
GR 71,055 V 95.9 73.0 - 
CZ 31,686 SF 37.9 - - 
LU 23,389 V 68.8 62.5 20.6 
SK 15,304 - - 71.0 - 
HU 11,246 V 52.7 57.8 15.0 
RO 9,107 V 93.0 75.7 24.5 
HR 8,059 - - - - 
EE 5,901 V 97.0 50.5 22.6 
LT 5,892 V 81.0 78.0 21.0 
SI 5,307 V 98.5 55.0 18.5 
LV 5,073 - 96.8 65.4 16.2 
BG 4,515 - - 63.1 - 
MT 3,302 V - 70.0 - 
         
EU 28 6,178,673      
      
 
 
Sources: ECB (SDW), Expert Group on Real Estate questionnaire and ESRB Handbook on Operationalising Macro-prudential 
Policy in the Banking Sector. 
* Lending for house purchases data from the SDW for all countries except UK, DK, NL, BE, RO, LT, GR and SI, which were 
provided by national authorities.  
** Similar to ECB (2009), “V” represents mortgage loans with variable interest rates extended at floating rates or with an initial 
period of rate fixation of up to 1 year. If the interest rate on the majority of outstanding mortgages in a country is longer than 
1 year, the loans are considered fixed and are further broken down into “SF” = short-term fixed (over 1 year and less than 5 
years initial rate fixation), “MF” = medium-term fixed (over 5 years and less than 10 years initial rate fixation), or “LF” = long-
term fixed (over 10 years initial rate fixation).  
*** EMF (Hypostat), ECB and national authorities. Data for Italy refer to Q1 2014. 
**** LTV data were collected via a questionnaire circulated by the Expert Group on Real Estate. Data for DK are approximated 
by total debt relative to home value of the median first-time buyer in 2012 and thus also include any other debt not secured 
by the home as collateral. Data for UK and NL cover only mortgages for owner-occupier housing. Data for GR, SK and MT 
are sourced from Chapter 3 of the “ESRB Handbook on Operationalising Macro-prudential Policy in the Banking Sector”. 
Data for FI and BG refer to mortgages issued in Oct. 2014 and Q4 2013 respectively. Data for DE are a best estimate 
based on various non-representative data sources. Data for AT are a best estimate based on EBA stress tests. 
***** Typical maturity data were collected via a questionnaire for the purpose of this report. German data are a best estimate. 
 
 ESRB 
Report on residential real estate and financial stability in the EU, December 2015 
Structural features of residential real estate markets 29 
1.3.2.5 The importance of refinancing through asset-backed securities 
Housing loans in a number of EU Member States are financed directly via specific instruments 
such as mortgage covered bonds (MCBs) and RMBS19 (ECB, 2009). The use of covered bonds as 
a funding instrument had been a well-established practice in countries such as DE and DK, before 
increasing in popularity amongst mortgage lenders in other European countries in the early 2000s. At 
the end of 2013, five countries (DK, ES, SE, FR and DE) accounted for three-quarters of the MCB 
market.  
The value of the MCB market has grown steadily since the financial crisis, reaching EUR 1.8 
trillion in 2013, up from EUR 1.3 trillion in 2008, although a strong decline in gross issuance in 
recent years has yielded negative net issuance (Bindseil, 2015). While the list of countries where the 
issuance of MCBs is popular has remained relatively unchanged, there have been some notable 
developments. For instance, in IT the market increased to almost 20 times its 2008 size. Similarly, the 
FI, AT and GR markets were also substantially bigger. There were four countries where the value of 
outstanding MCBs fell in the period 2008-13. The largest declines were in DE and UK, which were 
down by EUR 17 billion and EUR 13 billion respectively (Chart 11).  
Securitisation is an alternative mortgage funding technique, but its development has not been 
universal across the EU due to differences in national legal structures and banking cultures. 
Prior to the financial crisis, the issuance of RMBS was particularly common in countries where there 
was a strong demand for mortgages (UK, NL, ES, IT, IE and BE). Together, these countries 
accounted for over 90% of the EUR 1.1 trillion of outstanding RMBS in 2008, with 43% made up by 
the UK market alone. 
The value of outstanding mortgage securitisations has been falling across Europe since 2010, 
reaching approximately EUR 860 million by the end of 2013. Nevertheless, RMBS remain a 
significant feature of mortgage markets in NL, IE and BE20.  
                                                          
19  The main difference between MCBs and RMBS is that the former are retained on an institution’s books. Thus, should the assets 
in the cover pool be insufficient to cover investor claims, the issuer of a covered bond may be required to add assets to the cover 
pool to meet any shortcomings. In contrast, losses in an RMBS asset pool are typically borne by the security holder rather than 
the issuer. 
20  Most RMBS in Belgium are self-financed and therefore remain on banks’ balance sheets.  
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1.3.2.6 Foreclosure and insolvency procedures 
Bankruptcy and foreclosure procedures are important for bad debt resolution and provide 
information on the degree of consumer protection and bank recourse. There are marked 
differences in the typical duration of foreclosures – which can be considered as a proxy for the 
efficiency of the procedure.21 The average time needed to complete the process across Member States 
was just over two years, ranging from a minimum of two months in Finland to a maximum of 132 months 
in Cyprus (ECB, 2009) (Table 6). The most common foreclosure method is the judicial procedure.  
A cross-country comparison of personal insolvency rules is hindered by the limited availability 
of information for some countries and other important differences - such as the requirement to 
seize assets or future income. Nonetheless, a broad assessment can be made based on 
predominantly qualitative information from the questionnaire used for the purpose of this report. While 
personal insolvency procedures for individual debtors have a long history in AT, FR, NO, BE, DE, CZ, 
DK, NL, LV, EE, UK and SE, they have been recently introduced in IE, IT, LT and SI. Conversely, in 
HR, FI, GR, HU, PL and RO individual debtors are not eligible for a personal insolvency procedure 
(Chart 13). Despite ongoing attempts to attain global convergence in the design of personal bankruptcy 
regulations, significant differences still exist.  
 
 
                                                          
21  The duration of foreclosure procedures (in months) refers to the average duration taken for the completion of the foreclosure 
procedure, including the completion of court proceedings, the sale of the asset and the distribution of proceeds to the creditors.  
Chart 12 
Scale of the outstanding residential 
mortgage-backed securities market (2013) 
 
 
Source: Association for Financial Markets in Europe 
(AFME). 
 
 
Chart 11 
National mortgage covered bond markets 
(2013) 
 
 
Sources: ECB and EMF (Hypostat). 
Note: Size of circle represents the share of total 
mortgage covered bonds accounted for by each 
country. 
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1.4 Clustering of countries based on their structural features 
Clustering analysis can be used to illustrate how countries might be grouped based on 
similarities in the structural characteristics of their housing and mortgage markets. Clustering is 
a method of grouping whereby subjects within a cluster share broadly similar characteristics, while 
differences between clusters are maximised. This statistical method is purely data-driven and requires 
complete data for all variables used. It is not aimed at identifying clusters of countries to imply ex ante 
ordering according to risk levels or the propensity to undergo a crisis. It is possible that some clusters 
with different structural set-ups may exhibit comparable levels of risk.   
The work on clustering has some limitations as noted below. But the group decided to report on its 
work for two reasons. First, it is a promising approach which can simplify analytical work on links 
between structural characteristics and housing market dynamics. Brief references to clusters are 
therefore included in Section 2 on real estate developments and Section 4 on instruments. Given the 
data limitations and consequent uncertainties about the robustness of clustering results, the approach 
is not used in the empirical work of Section 3. Second, since the clustering technique has been used in 
previous empirical work in this area (including by the BIS), the group was of the view that it was 
worthwhile to report on its findings to support any future work by the ESRB in this area. 
Variables in the clustering exercise were chosen with two criteria in mind. First, these variables 
should be relevant structural drivers of housing markets. Second, data availability should be complete 
or quasi-complete. The selected variables were the household gross debt-to-income ratio, home 
ownership rates, residential investment (in % of GDP), the contribution of housing taxes to the marginal 
cost of owner-occupied housing, the highest VAT rates applicable to new construction, the typical LTV 
Table 6 
Foreclosure procedures: pre- & post-crisis 
 
(months) 
 
Source: Data from 2007: EMF, European Commission 
and National Authorities. Data from 2012 is sourced 
from the National bank of Belgium 
 
Chart 13 
Availability of personal insolvency 
procedures: pre- & post-crisis 
 
 
Sources: Own questionnaire. 
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typical maturity of mortgage loans. Since this methodology requires complete information for all 
variables used, missing data were imputed using an approach described in Annex 2.  
The clustering procedure is inspired by the approach of Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004). Initial 
variables were converted to binary variables (0/1 values) according to whether the variable is above or 
below a threshold level. The median value was used as the threshold. The clustering is implemented 
using Ward’s method and a distance measure suited for binary data (matching measure).  
The clustering was performed for the pre-crisis period and five clusters were identified22 (see 
boxplot in Table 7). 
 
Chart 14 
Boxplots of five clusters, pre-crisis characteristics 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
22  Within a cluster, a high variance might occur due to the relatively low number of variables in comparison to the number of 
clusters. Nevertheless, countries in the same cluster may be quite different. 
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Table 7 
Means of variables in each cluster, pre-crisis characteristics (2007/2008) 
(% per year) 
 
LTV-
Ratios 
Gross-
debt-to-
income 
Home-
owners 
Contribu-
tion of 
taxes to 
marginal 
cost of 
housing 
Highest 
VAT to 
new 
construc-
tion 
Share of 
variable-
rated 
mortgage 
loans 
Residen-
tial 
invest-
ment in 
% of GDP 
Typical 
maturity 
of loans 
Cluster 1 GR, IT, FR, BE 70.7 72.0 70.8 25.6 17.4 24.0 6.0 19.9 
Cluster 2 AT, PT, SE, DK, NL, DE 74.2 153.5 64.8 10.2 21.5 47.1 4.9 32.7 
Cluster 3 LU, PL, CY, FI, UK   81.2 106.1 70.6 14.5 18.3 76.1 4.5 22.8 
Cluster 4 EE, IE, ES, MT  65.5 128.7 80.7 6.8 14.1 84.5 5.9 33.1 
Cluster 5 CZ, SK, HU, RO, SI, BG, LT, LV 77.0 45.5 86.8 3.9 19.4 72.8 2.8 20.6 
 
Cluster 1 countries tend to have mid-range LTVs and shorter loan maturities. Indebtedness and home 
ownership are lower. Taxation is high on home ownership, while VAT on construction is moderate. 
Higher housing supply and a limited share of variable rates are further characteristics. 
Cluster 2 countries show high indebtedness, likely related to longer maturities, while LTVs are 
moderate. Owner-occupier taxation is moderate, while VAT on construction is higher.  
Cluster 3 countries have somewhat higher indebtedness, likely driven by higher LTVs, while 
maturities are mid-range. Taxation on home ownership as well as VAT on construction are somewhat 
higher.  
Cluster 4 countries show high indebtedness jointly with longer maturities, while the LTVs are lower. 
This is combined with high home ownership, whereas taxation on both home ownership and 
construction is low. The share of variable rate loans is high.  
Cluster 5 countries, essentially covering central and eastern European countries, show low 
household indebtedness despite quite high LTVs. This could be signalling a concentration of 
indebtedness in a smaller part of the population. The maturities are rather short. Low taxation on home 
ownership goes hand in hand with high home ownership. Housing supply is low.  
As a last step, the clustering is complemented with a qualitative assessment of the likely 
changes in cluster membership in the post-crisis period. Moderate changes in structural features 
do not seem to suggest a change in cluster for most countries. There are three possible exceptions. 
For EE, the shortening of typical maturities, reduction of household indebtedness, and increase in 
construction VAT indicate a move to cluster 5. In the post-crisis period, LV shows an increase in 
taxation of home ownership and construction, as well as in the share of variable rates, bringing it closer 
to cluster 3. Finally, the reduction in LTVs and increased construction VAT in UK could lead to a move 
to cluster 1. The following table summarises the variables’ means in each cluster. For ES, a substantial 
tightening in the tax treatment of real estate (evidenced by increasing VAT rates and the elimination of 
exemptions for house purchases) and a large share of variable rate mortgages (which was found to 
decrease the probability of financial distress) suggest a situation perhaps closer to cluster 2. 
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Table 8 
Means of variables in each cluster, post-crisis characteristics (2012/2013) 
 
LTV-Ratios 
Gross-
debt-to-
income 
Home-
owners in 
% 
Contribu-
tion of 
taxes to 
marginal 
cost of 
housing 
Highest 
VAT to new 
construc-
tion 
Share of 
variable-
rated 
mortgage 
loans 
Typical 
maturity of 
loans 
Cluster 1 GR, IT, FR, BE 69.4 84.1 71.4 27.2 18.4 47.4 19.9 
Cluster 2 AT, PT, SE, DK, NL, DE 72.1 158.9 64.3 10.0 22.2 54.3 29.2 
Cluster 3 LU, PL, CY, FI, UK 77.7 121.7 73.3 16.6 20.0 74.3 22.9 
Cluster 4 EE, IE, ES, MT 61.7 125.9 77.7 9.9 15.4 78.0 24.9 
Cluster 5 CZ, SK, HU, RO, SI, BG, LT, LV 65.2 45.4 86.7 7.6 21.8 72.8 18.8 
 
This simple exercise reveals some commonalities in the structural features of housing markets 
across countries. However, the analysis also reveals that a non-negligible degree of heterogeneity 
remains between countries within a given cluster. In part, this might be due to the absence of other 
important variables, such as the share of non-amortisable loans, or differences in definitions and data 
coverage. While the results of the cluster analysis should be taken as an illustration of a potential 
avenue for future work, the results so far imply that country-level differences need to be duly 
recognised when developing macroprudential policies. 
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This section describes the time-series characteristics of a large number of indicators related to 
European RRE markets, focusing on how developments in this sector have affected financial 
stability. Section 2.1 establishes a conceptual framework mapping potential channels between RRE 
developments and financial stability. It identifies key indicators24 to analyse transmission channels and 
maps them to the different phases of the financial and economic cycle. Drawing on this framework and 
indicators, Section 2.2 presents a detailed graphical analysis of the time-series characteristics of RRE 
markets in the EU. Section 2.3 goes on to explore the characteristics of real estate-related crises in 
terms of length and depth.  
2.1 Channels between residential real estate developments and financial 
stability: conceptual framework 
2.1.1 General framework 
The most recent and past financial crises have demonstrated that developments in the RRE 
market may have severe repercussions on the financial system and the real economy.25 The 
importance of housing in households’ wealth, the contribution of construction activity to GDP growth, and 
the fact that investment in housing is typically bank-financed, imply that developments in RRE markets 
can have a significant impact on other economic sectors. 
The tight links between the RRE market, the household and production sectors as well as the 
financial sector may reinforce potential adverse feedback loops between the financial sector 
and the real economy. Depending on the role of housing for the different economic sectors, the 
interactions between the RRE market and key macroeconomic agents may differ, and important two-
way effects may exist (Chart 15). Households and construction firms represent the demand and supply 
sides of the housing market. As noted in Section 1, they are key determinants of house price 
developments which, in turn, have a significant impact on their balance sheets and affect their 
consumption and investment decisions. To the extent that both supply and demand for housing depend 
on the availability of credit, the financial sector also plays a key role in housing market developments. 
In turn, house price dynamics can have an impact on the stability of the financial system, given their 
effects on collateral values and on banks’ credit risk. 
                                                          
23  Prepared by a team coordinated by Florentine Hopmeier/Victor Savin (European Commission) and comprising Rita Basto 
(Banco de Portugal), Wanda Cornacchia (Banca d’Italia), Sándor Gardó (European Central Bank), Darius Kulikauskas (Lietuvos 
bankas), Mara Pirovano (Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique) and Hanna Putkuri (Suomen Pankki – 
Finlands Bank). 
24  The ESRB Occasional Paper No. 8 by Ferrari, Pirovano and Cornacchia (2015) on “Identifying early warning indicators for real 
estate-related banking crises” served as a basis for this section. 
25  See e.g. World Economic Forum (2015) for country case studies, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) for global evidence, and Mian and 
Sufi (2014) for the recent US subprime crisis. 
 
Section 2 
Historical experience in the EU of financial stability risks 
related to the real estate sector23 
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These interactions imply that risks originating in the real estate sector can have a systemic 
impact and a pro-cyclical nature. Financial system vulnerabilities tend to accumulate during the 
upswing phase of the cycle. Perceived lower credit risk and easier access to finance contribute to rapid 
credit expansion and to increased demand for housing, putting upward pressure on house prices. The 
resulting higher collateral values further favour the demand for, and supply of, credit. These self-
reinforcing dynamics can result in speculative bubbles. In contrast, during the downturn phase, tighter 
credit conditions, higher risk aversion and corrections in house prices may impact the resilience of 
financial institutions and depress economic conditions. 
 
Chart 15 
Nexus between the housing market and the economy 
 
 
 
The transmission of risks originating in the real estate sector can be amplified by structural 
features such as those set out in Section 1. Factors such as the elasticity of housing demand and 
supply, the importance of private sector FX debt and the heavy reliance of banks on short-term wholesale 
funding can reinforce the effect of the feedback loop between real estate price fluctuations and the real 
economy. Furthermore, banks’ funding models can have a large impact on the stability of the financial 
sector and on its sensitivity to changes in the macrofinancial environment. 
This warrants a more detailed examination of the interlinkages between the relevant economic 
sectors and the structural characteristics which may affect the various transmission channels 
(Chart 15). In general, real estate risks are transmitted to other sectors of the economy through changes 
in house prices, which affect households’ and firms’ balance sheets and banks’ exposures to these 
sectors. The underlying drivers of RRE prices are the factors affecting demand and supply. 
Demand for RRE is mainly driven by households. Housing serves two main functions: first, it satisfies 
the basic need for shelter and, second, it constitutes an asset in which available wealth is invested. The 
choice of purchasing a property is strongly influenced by factors such as households’ disposable income 
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and the availability of funding, but also by the available alternative, i.e. the rental market. Therefore, as 
discussed in Section 1, rental market regulation, the flexibility of rental contracts, judicial protection of 
owners and tenants and the rental price are also important in shaping the demand for home ownership. 
Given the importance of housing for households’ wealth, house price variations are accompanied by a 
significant wealth effect.  
Real estate developments and mortgage loan conditions affect consumption. For most 
households, a mortgage loan is necessary to purchase a home. In addition, as houses are used as loan 
collateral, changes in prices can also have an impact on access to credit. The resulting wealth effect can 
affect consumption, with a significant macroeconomic impact. The fact that mortgage debt is often the 
main liability of households creates a tight feedback loop between households and the financial sector. 
Changes in credit conditions can have an important income effect with implications for overall 
consumption. 
Construction provides a major contribution to investment and growth. The flexibility of the 
construction sector to adjust to changing market conditions in the expansionary phase of the credit cycle 
may determine the impact of rising housing demand on house prices. During an upturn, an elastic 
(inelastic) housing supply might contain (strengthen) the rise in house prices. During a downturn, an 
eventual excess of supply may amplify the house price correction. Like households, construction firms 
rely on credit to finance their activities, which may add to the financial sector’s overall exposure to the real 
estate sector. A drop in house prices and its effect on the value of collateral and on the rate of default in 
the construction sector can therefore undermine the resilience of financial institutions. 
The financial sector is therefore exposed to credit risk. This can crystallise in the event of a rise in 
non-performing loans. In this case, as mortgage loans are collateralised with houses, a decrease in house 
prices can lead to higher LGDs.  
The policy and regulatory framework can have a significant impact on the interplay between the 
RRE market and the economy. Monetary policy, by setting the reference interest rate, affects banks’ 
funding costs and, thereby, credit conditions. Fiscal policy influences the real estate market through the 
tax regime for immovable property, as discussed in Section 1. The prudential policy framework (either 
micro- or macroprudential) determines the resilience of financial institutions to adverse shocks and can 
have an impact on the credit cycle and on banks’ lending standards. 
2.1.2 Mapping indicators to the different stages of the cycle 
To gauge the need for macroprudential policy intervention, policy-makers need to rely on 
relevant information, including a reliable set of indicators. These indicators should help to identify 
the build-up of systemic risks and/or to assess the banking system’s shock-absorption capacity.26 
Furthermore, indicators can play an important role in determining whether and when to tighten or release 
available macroprudential instruments, as discussed in Section 4. They may also help to identify the most 
suitable macroprudential instrument(s) under given circumstances. 
To allow for a proper assessment, the indicator set used needs to be comprehensive, 
combining data from the macroeconomic, credit, real estate, banking and structural areas, in 
                                                          
26  See Wolken (2013). 
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both time-series and cross-sectional dimensions. The usefulness of different indicators may vary 
with the phase of the economic, financial and real estate cycle (Chart 16), depending on whether they 
are early warning, coincident or lagging in nature. In general, the set of indicators used to guide the 
implementation or the tightening of instruments differ from those useful when deciding upon the release 
or removal of macroprudential instruments. In the latter case, lagging indicators (e.g. non-performing 
loans, debt service ratio) may be more important. 
Chart 16 
Phases of the economic, financial and policy cycle and selected related indicators 
 
 
 
2.1.2.1 The boom phase 
Several indicators from different sectors of the economy may signal exuberant developments. A 
typical upturn/boom phase is characterised by robust macroeconomic expansion (GDP and 
employment growing), strong credit growth accompanied by a surge in consumer, real estate and other 
asset prices, as well as a general increase in leverage.  
A formal analysis is needed to identify the best early warning indicators. Drehmann et al. (2011), 
IMF (2014a, 2014b) and Wolken (2013) identify the indicators that may be useful in different phases of 
the crisis to guide the use of macroprudential instruments. With a specific focus on the real estate 
sector, ESRB Occasional Paper No. 827 applies several statistical techniques to select the indicators 
with the best early warning properties in the run-up to real estate-related banking crises. This set of 
variables seeks to maximise the probability of correctly identifying an upcoming crisis, while minimising 
the probability of issuing false alarms. Table 9 illustrates the ten best early warning indicators identified 
                                                          
27  Ferrari, Pirovano and Cornacchia (2015).  
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in the above-mentioned paper, together with the threshold values above which a “warning” signal is 
issued. 
 
Table 9 
The ten best early warning indicators of a crisis 
Indicator Threshold 
Probability of missing 
a crisis 
Probability of issuing 
a false alarm 
Nominal RRE price-to-income gap (1) 13.975 0.35 0.12 
Nominal RRE price-to-rent gap (1) 6.950 0.26 0.24 
Nominal RRE price gap (2) 5.24 0.28 0.23 
Real RRE price gap (2) 13.86 0.42 0.08 
Real NFC credit growth 11.02 0.38 0.18 
Nominal total credit-to-GDP gap (2) 6.46 0.20 0.31 
Real total credit growth 6.76 0.14 0.42 
Nominal HH credit to GDP gap (2) 2.77 0.25 0.33 
Nominal bank credit-to-GDP gap( 2) 2.91 0.17 0.42 
Real bank credit growth 8.78 0.28 0.30 
 
 
(1) The gap is calculated as the deviation from the mean 
(2) The gap is calculated as the deviation from the backward-looking trend with lambda = 400,000. 
 
The indicators best signalling the imminent occurrence of a real estate-related banking crisis 
relate to excessive developments in RRE prices and credit. When indicators are combined in a 
bivariate or trivariate setting, the best combinations are a structural indicator of real estate price 
overvaluation (RRE price-to-rent ratio) combined with cyclical indicators of excessive cyclical credit or 
real estate price developments.28 These results are broadly confirmed within an econometric setting, 
controlling for wider macrofinancial indicators such as inflation and the level of short-term money 
market rates. Here, the best-performing early warning model includes variables such as credit growth 
(both broad credit and sectoral credit to households and non-financial corporations), the level of total, 
bank and household credit-to-GDP ratio as well as the RRE price-to-rent ratio.  
2.1.2.2 The bust phase 
Asset valuation and credit risk channels best explain the linkages between the housing market 
and financial stability in a downturn/bust phase (Chart 17). 
 
                                                          
28  The representatives of some countries, in particular France, call into question the use of the price-to-rent ratio as a measure of 
overvaluation. 
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Chart 17 
Transmission channels in a downturn phase 
 
 
Source: Based on MAS (2011). 
 
Asset valuation channel: A steep fall in house prices implies a decrease in the value of property. For 
households owning a property, this means that their perceived wealth decreases and, to the extent the 
property is mortgaged, this also renders their debt burden larger and more difficult to manage. Also, a 
decline in RRE prices makes investment in housing less attractive and will thus lead to reduced 
construction activity. For banks, the fall in collateral value, and thus the liquidating value that banks can 
obtain in case of a default, increases the risk of RRE lending. In addition, banks’ profitability could be 
adversely affected as provisions and impairment charges increase on mortgage loans. 
Credit risk channel: A steep fall in house prices may induce households to curb their consumption given 
the perceived negative wealth effect. This can adversely affect the production sector, which faces lower 
demand and therefore reduces employment and investment. Thus, borrowers in both the household and 
production sectors become riskier: the increase in unemployment (and thus fall in wage income) coupled 
with a rise in corporate defaults reduce banks’ asset quality. Therefore, banks will curtail their lending 
activity and impose more stringent credit standards on both households and non-financial corporations, 
since borrowers’ PDs increase.  
2.2 Effects on the economy 
Developments in the real estate sector affect the economy through various channels. A sharp 
decrease in RRE prices leads to a fall in consumption and construction activity. Lower house prices 
have an effect on banks’ balance sheets due to banks’ exposure to mortgage credit and any 
investment fund holdings. Given the negative income effect, an increasing number of households 
become unable to service their debt, leading to an increase in NPLs. The losses incurred by banks 
result in a further decline in lending, also beyond the real estate sector, and thus hamper overall 
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economic activity. In addition, the drop in construction activity may lead to higher unemployment and 
lower growth. In cases where taxes from construction-related activity make up a large share of fiscal 
revenue, government finances would be adversely affected as well. The negative wealth effect on 
households sets in motion a downward spiral of falling RRE prices. As indebted households suffer from 
falling income and increasing unemployment, they curtail spending on both consumption goods, 
perhaps in part to seek to avoid defaulting on their borrowing, and housing. As the demand for housing 
falls, RRE prices are reduced even further.  
In recent years, several Member States have experienced banking crises stemming from the 
real estate sector. In the context of earlier work on real estate instruments by the IWG, a database on 
real estate-related banking crises was compiled for the EU Member States. 16 countries did not 
experience any real estate-related banking crisis, while nine of the remaining 12 experienced one crisis 
and three (DK, SE, UK) two crises, resulting in altogether 15 real estate-related banking crises (Chart 18). 
These crises mostly occurred in the early 1990s and during the recent global financial crisis (Chart 19). 
Real estate-related crises can vary according to the real estate segment they originate from, i.e. 
residential, commercial or both. In the dataset at hand, only two crises are classified as “only residential 
real estate-related”, while the remaining ones are labelled as “both residential and commercial”. 
 
  
The ESRB database builds on the ESCB Heads of Research (HoR) Group’s banking crises 
database. The latter defines a banking crisis as one with significant signs of financial distress in the 
banking system as evidenced by bank runs on relevant institutions or losses (NPLs above 20% or bank 
closures affecting at least 20% of banking system assets) or significant public intervention with the aim of 
avoiding the realisation of losses in the banking system. The HoR database was narrowed down by the 
IWG Expert Group on CCBs by (i) excluding crises that were not systemic, (ii) excluding systemic banking 
crises that were not associated with a domestic credit/financial cycle, and (iii) adding periods where 
domestic developments related to the credit/financial cycle could well have caused a systemic banking 
crisis had it not been for policy action or an external event that dampened the financial cycle. The 
resulting database was further adjusted on the basis of the expert judgement of members of the IWG 
Chart 19 
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Number of real estate-related crises by 
country 
 
 
Source: Survey by the IWG Work Stream on Real 
Estate Instruments 
 
0
1
2
A
T
B
E
B
G
H
R C
Y
C
Z
D
K EE F
I
FR D
E
G
R
H
U IE IT LV LT LU M
T
N
L
P
L
P
T
R
O SK S
I
ES SE U
K
During 2007 financial
crisis
 ESRB 
Report on residential real estate and financial stability in the EU, December 2015 
Historical experience in the EU of financial stability risks related to the real estate sector 42 
Work Stream on Real Estate Instruments, in order to reflect only systemic banking crises stemming from 
the real estate sector. 
The ESRB database is an important source of information for this section. It allows for an 
analysis of developments in key variables in the run-up to crisis events and during tranquil periods. In 
the next sections, the time-series evolution of a wide set of indicators for the sample of EU Member 
States is examined, using data from public databases (ECB, OECD, BIS, Eurostat) or data from ad hoc 
requests for the purpose of this report.29 Since the literature on the 1980s/1990s real estate-related 
crises is vast, the focus here is mainly on the most recent crisis. However, a short review on the 
1980s/1990s crises is presented in Box 2. In the charts below, periods of real estate-related banking 
distress are represented by grey shaded areas. 
2.2.1 Housing market developments 
RRE price growth: House price movements can have an impact on credit, consumption and overall 
economic activity through their effect on collateral, household wealth and the profitability of real estate 
investments. House price dynamics depend on factors affecting demand and supply conditions. The 
deviation of house prices from these fundamentals can signal speculative bubbles. RRE prices are pro-
cyclical. During a boom, demand for housing is stimulated by rising employment and wages and wider 
access to credit. By contrast, downturns negatively impact real estate prices as demand for housing from 
new buyers is low and the probability that borrowers will default on their existing mortgages increases. 
These developments may be reinforced by increased foreclosures, as more and more properties are put 
on the market by banks to recover defaulted loans. 
Chart 20 depicts the median growth rate of RRE prices in countries which experienced a crisis in 
conjunction with the global financial turmoil and in those that did not. In the run-up to the global 
financial crisis, both crisis and non-crisis countries tended to experience positive growth in RRE prices, 
but this was more pronounced in the former group. When the crisis hit, RRE prices were strongly 
affected, reverting to negative growth in both groups of countries. The real estate price drop was more 
pronounced in countries directly hit by the turmoil: the median real estate price growth for these 
countries at the peak of the crisis settled at -12%. 
 
                                                          
29 Use is also made of indicators compiled in the context of an earlier data collection exercise led by the IWG Expert Group on 
CCBs, which also underlies the analysis presented in ESRB Occasional Paper No. 8 (2015). 
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RRE price-to-income ratio: This indicator measures how RRE prices relate to households’ disposable 
income, thus conveying information about housing affordability. Data on the real estate price-to-per 
capita disposable income ratio is provided by the OECD, in the form of an index based in 2010. The 
comparability of the raw index across countries is limited as indexing the ratio to the same base year 
for different countries assumes that all countries simultaneously reached a situation of equilibrium.30 
Therefore, Chart 21 depicts the evolution of the RRE price-to-income gap, defined as the deviation of 
the index from its backward-looking trend.31 This indicator is pro-cyclical. It increases prior to a crisis as 
house prices grow faster than average per capita disposable income, and reverts abruptly after the 
onset of the crisis. Furthermore, it shows more pronounced upswings in the run-up to real estate-
related turmoil in crisis countries compared with the non-crisis peers.  
RRE price-to-rent ratio: This indicator is useful to assess whether the growth in RRE prices in an upturn 
makes investing in real estate more profitable.32 The indicator, constructed by the OECD by dividing the 
index of nominal house prices by the index of nominal rental prices, is a measure of the relative cost of 
purchasing a real estate property versus renting it. An increase of this index is inversely related to the 
incentive to purchase a real estate asset. For occupants, renting the property becomes more preferable 
as rental prices fall relative to purchase prices, but for buy-to-let investors, the income they receive by 
renting out the property falls relative to the acquisition price. When using the indicator, conclusions have 
to be drawn with caution. First, due to its simplicity, the equilibrium level of the ratio is sensitive to 
structural changes. Second, when the rental market is small or highly inefficient (e.g. owing to rent 
                                                          
30  In addition, ratios based on index series do not allow for the quantification of actual valuation levels in interpretable units 
(Dujardin, Kelber and Lalliard, 2015). 
31  The gap is obtained by subtracting from the series its long-term trend, computed with a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with a 
parameter lambda set to 400,000. 
32  The theoretical basis for the use of this ratio lies in the housing market no-arbitrage condition, introduced by Poterba (1984).  
Chart 21 
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Chart 20 
Evolution of real RRE prices (annual 
growth rate) 
(percentage) 
 
 
Source: OECD data and own calculations. 
 
–20
–15
–10
–5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Interquartile range non-crisis
Interquartile range crisis
Median non-crisis
Median crisis
 ESRB 
Report on residential real estate and financial stability in the EU, December 2015 
Historical experience in the EU of financial stability risks related to the real estate sector 44 
regulation), the ratio may not be stationary. Third, an apparent appreciation in purchase or rental prices 
may reflect the higher quality of such dwellings. Finally, with regard to the price-to-income ratio, issues 
arise related to the choice of base year and the quantification of actual valuation levels when comparing 
the raw index. 
Chart 22 shows the evolution of the RRE price-to-rent gap, expressed as a percentage deviation of the 
ratio from its backward-looking trend.33 The difference in the median evolution of the price-to-rent gap 
between crisis and non-crisis countries is significant. In the run-up to the crisis, the ratio grew 
considerably above trend values in countries directly hit by the 2008 financial crisis, reaching its peak in 
2007. Since the onset of the crisis, the indicator has reverted back to values significantly below trend in 
crisis countries. Furthermore, after the initial impact of the crisis, crisis countries exhibited negative gaps 
for a protracted period. In non-crisis countries, the evolution of the index is very different: in fact, the 
median of the gap lies well below that for crisis countries in the run-up to the crisis, and does not show 
any abrupt reversal since the beginning of the turmoil. 
 
 
                                                          
33 The data have been sourced from the OECD. The raw index is based in 2010, and the backward-looking trend has been 
computed using an HP filter with parameter lambda equal to 400,000. 
Chart 23 
Household credit-to-GDP gap 
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2.2.2 Households 
Household credit-to-GDP gap: This indicator is defined as the deviation of the household credit-to-
GDP ratio from its long-term trend. High levels indicate excessive growth in credit to households in 
relation to GDP growth and a potential build-up of excessive leverage. This variable has generally been 
higher and reached its peak before the onset of the crisis in crisis countries (Chart 23). However, 
several non-crisis countries have also registered a positive household credit-to-GDP gap before other 
countries’ crises. Developments not markedly different between crisis and non-crisis countries suggest 
a common component in RRE prices and credit cycles. 
Gross debt-to-income ratio of households: This indicator is defined as total liabilities divided by 
gross disposable income, with the latter adjusted for the change in the net equity of households in 
pension fund reserves. The indicator provides information on the extent to which debt can be paid back 
from the flow of income rather than the stock of assets, and thereby about households’ potential need 
to deleverage.34 Households with high ratios are more sensitive to shocks and therefore more likely to 
default should these shocks materialise.35  
Debt levels are very heterogeneous across countries (Chart 24), ranging from around 50% (IT, SK, SI, 
PL, LT) to around or even above 200% (DK, IE, NL) in 2012. For newer EU Member States, debt levels 
remain relatively low despite a sharp increase post-2004 which can be explained by a “catching up” 
effect. Also, in most other EU economies, household debt rose substantially prior to the global financial 
crisis, which can be explained by factors such as low interest rates and financial deregulation. Further 
cross-country heterogeneity can be explained by structural features of domestic real estate markets, as 
outlined in 0. Since the bulk of household debt is composed of mortgage debt, cross-country patterns 
for mortgage debt resemble those for total household debt.36 It is noteworthy that the countries with the 
highest mortgage debt-to-income ratios37 (Chart 25) were among those which experienced the deepest 
real estate-related crises (see Section 2.3.2). This confirms the important role of household leverage as 
an amplifier during real estate crises.  
 
                                                          
34 Statistics Paper Series, No. 2, ECB, April 2013. 
35 Mian and Sufi (2014) highlight the role of excessive household debt in the US financial crisis and recession. 
36 Statistics Paper Series, No. 2, ECB, April 2013. 
37 Computed as total outstanding residential loans over the disposable income of households by the European Mortgage 
Federation. 
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Household debt service ratio (HDSR): This ratio measures the debt servicing burden of households. 
The ratio used here results from ECB calculations and is computed following the technique used by 
Drehmann and Juselius (2012). Debt service costs (i.e. the aggregate credit stock multiplied by the 
average lending rate) are divided by income, taking into account the average remaining maturity of the 
stock. The indicator conveys information on bank policies on lending for housing purposes: in an 
upturn, banks tend to grant loans with high HDSRs, since rising levels of income and wealth sustain 
the debt servicing capacity of borrowers. However, high HDSRs inherited from good times can be 
dangerous in a downturn, since they make households more vulnerable to income shocks. Moreover, 
countries with higher HDSRs face potentially more severe second-round effects as households have to 
reduce consumption to a larger extent to service debt after an income shock.38 Therefore, this indicator 
might be useful to explain why some countries experienced a real estate-related crisis, while others did 
not, in spite of similar pre-crisis developments in RRE prices and credit. In fact, countries registering 
rapid credit and RRE price growth but characterised by lower HDSRs are less sensitive to negative 
income shocks and less subject to severe second-round effects. 
Chart 26 presents the evolution of median HDSRs39 in crisis and non-crisis countries. In crisis 
countries, the ratio exhibits a rising pattern before the onset of the crisis. Since borrowing for house 
purchase is usually characterised by long maturities and amounts that are multiples of households’ 
annual income, the ratio tends to decrease only slowly after the crisis onset. Furthermore, after the 
onset of the crisis both the numerator and the denominator of the ratio decreased. While the turmoil 
negatively affected household income, the easing of monetary policy put downward pressure on the 
                                                          
38  Drehmann and Juselius (2012) also find that a debt service ratio (DSR) tends to increase rapidly 1-2 years prior to a systemic 
banking crisis and to fall off in its wake. Furthermore, a higher DSR significantly increases the severity of a recession as 
measured by the relative fall in output from the peak to the following trough. 
39  The HDSR data series were obtained from the dataset used for ESRB Occasional Paper No. 5 entitled “Operationalising the 
countercyclical capital buffer: indicator selection, threshold identification and calibration options”, June 2014. 
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Chart 24 
Household gross debt-to-income ratio 
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average lending interest rate. Moreover, for the majority of non-crisis countries, the ratio stood well 
below the median level reached by crisis countries even several years after the stress period. 
 
Household loan demand: The evolution of household demand for loans for house purchase follows 
similar patterns for both crisis and non-crisis countries (Chart 27). From 2003 to early 2007 loan 
demand followed a slightly increasing trend for most countries, which reversed after 2007, when loan 
demand by households fell by up to 80% (in particular in PL, NL and FR). After a recovery phase 
starting in 2010 with non-crisis countries recovering faster and better than crisis countries, demand 
dropped again in early 2012. Although demand has been increasing overall since then, most likely 
driven by the low interest rate environment, the latest data (Q1 2015) show a diverging trend between 
crisis and non-crisis countries, with household loan demand following a clear upward trend for non-
crisis countries, while demand remains weak for crisis countries.  
2.2.3 Financial sector 
Flow of household loans40: The evolution of mortgage loans to households follows a similar pattern for 
most crisis countries: a steady increase prior to the global financial crisis followed by a sharp drop after 
the outbreak (Chart 28). This pattern may be explained by loose credit standards amid abundant funding, 
increasing house prices and rising housing demand, with the drying-up of global liquidity and banks’ 
increasing risk aversion ultimately leading to a bursting of the bubble. The flow of new mortgage loans 
remained muted for several years thereafter given both demand-side (e.g. deteriorating income and 
                                                          
40  ECB SDW (balance sheet indicators). 
Chart 27 
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employment prospects, debt servicing problems) and supply-side (e.g. higher risk aversion, falling 
collateral values) factors. Countries with a predominance of floating rate mortgages and relatively short-
term fixed rate mortgages (e.g. UK, NL) may be exposed to a higher degree of cyclicality given their 
sensitivity to interest rate changes. 
 
 
Household residential mortgage non-performing loans: Both the stock and flow of NPLs increase 
following a real estate-related crisis (see Section 2.3.2), albeit with some time lag as some households 
may have recourse to financial buffers to cope with the immediate impact of the crisis (Chart 29). Given 
the systemic nature of the recent crisis, NPLs have also increased in countries which did not 
experience a real estate-related crisis. However, NPL figures should be interpreted with caution, since 
there was until recently no commonly agreed definition for NPLs. Also, there is very limited availability 
of data regarding breakdowns of NPLs by loan purpose, but, in general, delinquency rates for 
consumer credit tend to rise faster than those for housing loans; moreover, loans denominated in 
foreign currencies may tend to be more vulnerable given often unhedged positions. 
Risk weights for residential mortgage loans used by IRB banks: According to EBA data on a 
sample of banks, median RWs for residential mortgage loans steadily increased in the pre-crisis years, 
to reach their maximum in 2008 (Chart 30) reflecting mainly banks’ higher risk perception. Since 2008, 
RWs have been decreasing again. However, it is worth noting that the cross-country dispersion of RWs 
is high across all LTV buckets, indicating that banks apply different RWs to mortgages with similar 
LTVs (Chart 32). This holds in particular for 2012, when RWs for the LTV bucket 85-100% ranged from 
Chart 29 
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8% to 101%. The charts below – in particular the one showing country-specific RWs (Chart 31) – 
should, however, be interpreted with caution given data limitations.41 
 
 
Chart 32 
Median, minimum and maximum risk weight by LTV bucket 
(percentage) 
 
 
 
Loan-to-value ratios: LTV ratios show a wide dispersion across the EU, as well as very different 
trends. While for some countries the LTV ratio has increased over time, for others it has fallen 
gradually (Table 10). However, these trends should be treated with caution given the data issues 
highlighted in Box 1. It should also be taken into account that the LTV indicator may lose its information 
                                                          
41  Data on RWs for residential mortgage loans, aggregated by country, have been received from the EBA. The sample includes 43 
banks across 14 different jurisdictions and each bank has portfolios from up to ten countries. The EBA report highlights the use 
of different definitions for similar concepts. Sometimes they reflect country-specific features, but overall the definitions are 
usually bank-specific.  
Chart 31 
Median risk weight by country across all LTV 
categories 
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Chart 30 
Median risk weight by LTV bucket 
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content when it is used as a macroprudential instrument.42 Section 4 discusses cases where countries 
have introduced a binding LTV limit. 
Table 10 
LTV ratio on new residential mortgage loans  
(%) 
 2007 2010 2013  2007 2010 2013 
AT - - 70.5 (1) IE 62.9 69.2 67.7 
BE 68.6 64.6 62.3 IT 64.4 61.1 58.3 
BG - 63.4 63.1 (2) LT 80.3 76.6 78.0 
CY - - - LU - 67.2 62.5 
CZ - - - LV - 68.9 65.4 
DE - - 75.0 (3) MT - - 70.0 (8) 
DK (4) 95.0 93.0 96.0 (5) NL (9) 75.7 83.8 88.7 
EE (6) 54.0 56.2 50.5 PL (10) - 77.1 79.2 
ES 63.5 57.5 57.5 PT 68.9 65.8 64.4 
FI - - 70.4 (7) RO - 69.3 75.7 
FR 78.0 83.5 83.8 SE 68.6 71.0 70.9 
GR - - 73.0 (8) SI (11) 61.0 57.0 55.0 
HR - - - SK - - 71.0 (8) 
HU - 66.0 57.8 UK (9) 80.3 73.3 75.0 
  
 
(1) Best estimate based on EBA stress tests. 
(2) Data refer to the fourth quarter.  
(3) Best estimate based on various non-representative data sources.  
(4) Total debt relative to the home value of the median first-time buyer, i.e. including debt not secured by the home as 
collateral. 
(5) 2012 data.  
(6)  Calculation of the average LTV includes mortgage loans to households for buying, building or renovating residential 
property.  
(7) October 2014 data, based on ad hoc survey.  
(8) Data sourced from Chapter 3 of the “ESRB Handbook on Operationalising Macro-prudential Policy in the Banking Sector”.  
(9) Owner-occupied housing data.  
(10) LTV of new mortgage loans for first-time home buyers.  
(11) Up to 2011, the LTV ratio refers to new housing loans backed by real estate collateral (survey data). From 2012 onwards, 
the LTV ratio refers to new housing loans secured by all collateral, not only by real estate collateral. 86% of total collateral 
is real estate collateral. 
 
 
Box 1  
Data limitations 
A number of the indicators used in this section have limitations that need to be kept in mind in 
the analysis of the data. 
NPLs: NPLs are typically calculated as the ratio of the stock of NPLs to total loans, and can be 
computed for RRE and CRE. Cross-country analysis of NPL ratios is hindered by: 
 the heterogeneous definition of NPLs across countries: the methods used to identify NPLs 
differ in terms of the taking into account of the value of the collateral and guarantees received. 
                                                          
42  See Goodhart, C.W.L. (1984). 
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Some banking groups do not classify as impaired those NPLs for which, considering the 
collateral and guarantees available, they do not expect to book losses in the future. By contrast, 
other groups identify impaired positions exclusively on the basis of the borrower’s 
creditworthiness, even when ample collateral and guarantees are available, with the result of 
higher NPL ratios. 
 the length of credit recovery procedures: the length of credit recovery procedures varies 
considerably across countries; this could extend the period during which NPLs remain on banks’ 
balance sheets and push up the NPL ratio. 
On 21 October 2013 the EBA published its technical standards for non-performing exposures and 
forbearance. The category of NPEs includes all loans classified as “impaired” and “defaulted” under 
IAS 39 and the CRR, whether or not they are backed by collateral or guarantees. The supervisory 
definition of default includes exposures more than 90 days past-due. The classification follows the 
debtor approach, meaning that all exposures to a debtor should be recognised as impaired when at 
least one of them is recorded as non-performing. At the end of December 2014 the first harmonised 
NPEs were collected through the new FINREP (reporting framework for financial information) 
templates with data referring to September 2014. Through the new templates, comparable NPL data 
should be available from September 2014 onwards. 
As a result the analysis in this report on the NPL ratio for the past years is affected by the following 
weaknesses: (i) the NPL ratio does not reflect the current trend in credit quality, since it is a ratio of two 
stock values. The flow of NPLs in relation to the stock of loans at the end of the previous quarter would 
have been a better indicator, if only it had been available for a significant number of countries; and 
(ii) since the data were collected based on national definitions of NPLs, the cross-country comparability 
is limited. 
LTVs: As already highlighted in the ESRB Handbook (Box 3.4, p. 70), the analysis of the LTV ratio is 
constrained by: 
 difficulties in obtaining data: most national authorities rely on surveys, since there is no 
available database. Some authorities are not able to provide any data. The table presented in 
the ESRB Handbook on the LTV ratio for residential mortgage loans was a first major effort at 
the European level to fill this data gap; 
 significant heterogeneity in the underlying statistics with regard to LTV definitions and the 
methodologies for collecting and aggregating the data.  
Moreover, if a borrower has more than one loan and these loans are with several banks, the LTV is 
difficult to calculate in a correct way. Similar problems arise for the LTI, DTI and DSTI indicators. 
For the purposes of this report, new LTV data have been collected. For countries that were not able to 
provide 2013 LTV data, country aggregates based on a sample of banks (available from the 2014 EBA 
stress-test results) have been used. 
The LTV ratio is an important indicator not only because it provides information on the stance of 
lending policies, but also because macroprudential actions have been undertaken in a number of 
countries using the LTV ratio as an instrument. Therefore, the lack of data on LTV ratios and the 
heterogeneity of the definitions of LTV ratios across countries limit the extent to which this indicator can 
be used as an input to evaluate the emergence of systemic risk, as well as the comparability of the 
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implementation of macroprudential policy actions across countries (see Section 4). Seeking more 
complete and harmonised information on this indicator across countries should therefore be a priority 
for the future. 
Additional data gaps include: construction sector NPLs, covered bond yields and RWs. 
It is therefore recommended that harmonised definitions of key indicators, such as LTV, LTI, 
DTI and DSTI ratios, be developed at least for monitoring and cross-border comparison 
purposes. Similarly to the credit-to-GDP gap for the countercyclical capital buffer43, these harmonised 
indicators should not prevent national authorities from calculating analogous indicators using their own 
definitions tailored to national market specificities. Harmonised definitions would at least provide a 
common basis for comparing information across banks and countries. The Anacredit project could 
provide the building blocks for the aforementioned harmonised and comparable key indicators, but this 
will in principle only be the case for the euro area countries. 
 
Lending standards for mortgages: The variation of lending standards for mortgages provides 
insights into banks’ risk perception and the supply of loans (Chart 33). Lending standards gradually 
eased from 2003 to 2007, reflecting benign market conditions and low risk perceptions. Following the 
onset of the crisis in 2008, lending standards tightened for all countries, albeit with varying intensity. 
The tightening was particularly strong for crisis countries (PT, ES, IE) and less pronounced in non-
crisis countries. After a short easing phase from 2010 to early 2012, standards tightened again with the 
onset of the sovereign debt crisis. Since then, lending standards have remained tight without easing 
back to pre-crisis levels. 
Interest rate spread on mortgages: Interest spreads - the difference between the interest rates on 
mortgage loans and banks’ cost of funding - steadily decreased from 2003 until the outbreak of the 
crisis (Chart 34). This may be due to increased competition and benign financing conditions, in part 
reflecting an underestimation of risks. Following the bursting of the credit and real estate bubbles in 
many countries, spreads on mortgages increased sharply, reflecting higher funding costs as well as 
increased risk aversion. This was true for all countries, but crisis countries appear to have been 
affected even more. 
 
                                                          
43  See Recommendation of the ESRB of 18 June 2014 on guidance for setting countercyclical buffer rates, (ESRB/2014/1), OJ C 
293, 2.9.2014. In particular, Recommendation B requires authorities to measure and publish, on a quarterly basis, a 
standardised credit-to-GDP gap ratio; the recommendation nevertheless allows authorities to use additional measures of the 
credit-to-GDP gap if the standardised one does not adequately reflect the specificities of national economies. In this case, 
national authorities are requested to justify the need to deviate from the standardised credit-to-GDP gap. 
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Share of loans granted in foreign currency: Excessive foreign currency lending may cause 
significant systemic risks in the event of unexpected downward exchange rate pressures. The share of 
loans granted in foreign currencies was overall higher for crisis countries than for non-crisis countries 
(Chart 35), and it increased after the start of the crisis. For some non-euro area countries (HU, LT, 
BG44, PL, RO), the share of loans granted in foreign currency soared from already high levels 
irrespective of whether these countries experienced a real estate crisis or not. While higher shares of 
foreign currency lending cannot, in themselves, be associated with higher probabilities of real estate-
related crises, they can amplify the depth of crises, mainly through the effect of exchange rate 
fluctuations on the debt burden. Annex 1 discusses the Polish experience with foreign currency loans. 
 
                                                          
44 Bulgaria has a fixed exchange rate regime vis-à-vis the euro.  
Chart 34 
Spread on mortgages  
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Sources: ECB and own calculations. 
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Chart 33 
Variation of lending standards for mortgages 
(diffusion index) 
(percentage) 
 
 
Sources: ECB and own calculations.. 
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2.2.4 Production sector 
Contribution of the construction sector to GDP:45 The flexibility of the construction sector to adjust 
to market conditions may be important in explaining why some Member States did not register a strong 
increase in house prices, despite a significant increase in the demand for mortgages and for housing. 
In the run-up to crisis events, the contribution of the construction sector to aggregate economic activity 
typically increased (Chart 37). For example, in ES and IE the construction sector experienced a 
protracted boom until it peaked at 12% and 11% of GDP, respectively, in 2006. In LV and HU the 
construction boom happened more swiftly, within just two years. In countries that did not suffer a real 
estate crisis - except for BG and RO - the construction boom was far less pronounced, with stable or 
slightly increasing values of the ratio. 
Contribution of dwellings to gross fixed capital formation: The evolution of this indicator shows the 
increase in construction activity in an economic upturn (Chart 38). This is particularly noteworthy in ES 
and IE, while the upward trend in other real estate-related crisis countries (i.e. FI, DK, LV, SI) is of minor 
magnitude. In non-crisis countries this indicator is much smoother on average, albeit with a great 
divergence across countries. 
                                                          
45 Further details on the construction sector are presented in the twin ESRB Report on Commercial Real Estate and Financial 
Stability in the EU. 
Chart 36 
Evolution of covered bond yields (5-year 
tenor) 
(percentage) 
 
 
Sources: Bloomberg, Datastream and own 
calculations. 
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Chart 35 
Share of total loans granted in foreign 
currency  
(percentage) 
 
 
Sources: ECB and own calculations. 
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Unemployment rate: Unemployment rates dropped in the run-up to the crisis, led by the overall 
economic boom (Chart 39). While differences in unemployment rates across the EU also depend on 
country-specific labour market structures, fluctuations tend to be more indicative of the position of a 
country in the economic cycle. While most countries’ unemployment rate remained fairly stable until 
2007, ES, LV and LT experienced more pronounced decreases in unemployment, reaching record 
lows in 2007. In non-crisis countries, with the exception of the central and eastern European 
economies which were undergoing a period of important structural transformation, unemployment rates 
did not drop so significantly in the run-up to the recent crisis. 
 
Chart 38 
Evolution of GFCF dwellings  
 
(percentage of GDP) 
 
 
Sources: Eurostat, national authorities and own 
calculations. 
0
2
4
6
8
10
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Interquartile range non-crisis
Interquartile range crisis
Median non-crisis
Median crisis
Chart 37 
Evolution of the construction sector’s 
value added  
(percentage of GDP) 
 
 
Sources: Eurostat data and own calculations. 
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Chart 39 
Unemployment rate  
(percentage) 
 
 
Sources: Eurostat data and own calculations. 
 
2.3 Length and depth of real estate-related banking crises 
2.3.1 Characteristics of real estate-related banking crises in the EU 
Several Member States experienced episodes of real estate-related banking distress which not 
only differ in the timing of their occurrence, but also in the length and severity of their effects 
on the economy. This section explores the characteristics of these crises and relates several 
indicators to their depth and impact on countries’ economic performance. Table 11 provides a detailed 
overview of the real estate-related crisis periods and their length as reported in the previously 
mentioned real estate crisis database. The dataset identifies crises which occurred in the 1990s (Box 2) 
or during the recent global financial crisis.  
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Table 11 
Real estate-related banking crises in the EU 
Country Start of crisis End of crisis Real estate-related 
Number of  
crisis quarters 
Austria    - 
Belgium    - 
Bulgaria    - 
Croatia    - 
Cyprus    - 
Czech Republic     
Denmark Q1 1987 Q4 1993 CR 28 
 Q3 2008 Ongoing CR 19 
Estonia    - 
Finland Q3 1991 Q4 1995 CR 18 
France Q3 1993 Q4 1995 CR 10 
Germany    - 
Greece    - 
Hungary Q3 2008 Ongoing CR 19 
Ireland Q3 2008 Ongoing CR 19 
Italy    - 
Latvia Q4 2008 Q3 2010 CR 8 
Lithuania Q4 2008 Q4 2010 CR 9 
Luxembourg    - 
Malta    - 
Netherlands Q3 2008 Ongoing CR 19 
Poland    - 
Portugal    - 
Romania    - 
Slovakia    - 
Slovenia Q1 2008 Ongoing R 21 
Spain Q2 2009 Q1 2013 CR 16 
Sweden Q3 1990 Q4 1993 CR 14 
 Q3 2008 Q4 2010 R 10 
United Kingdom Q3 1990 Q3 1994 CR 17 
 Q3 2007 Ongoing CR 23 
 
 
Source: Survey by the IWG Work Stream on Real Estate Instruments for the work related to Chapter 3 of the “ESRB Handbook on 
Operationalising Macro-prudential Policy in the Banking Sector” (2014).  
Notes: R = purely RRE crisis; C = purely CRE crisis; CR = RRE and CRE crisis. The table provides a snapshot as at mid-2013, i.e. 
when the survey of the IWG Work Stream on Real Estate Instruments was conducted. Accordingly, the status of countries with 
“ongoing” real estate crises might have changed since then, i.e. the crisis may have ended in those countries. 
 
Box 2  
The 1990s real estate-related crises: stylised facts and comparison with the 2008 crisis 
According to the ESRB database on real estate-related banking crises in the EU, five countries 
(DK, FI, FR, SE and UK) experienced a real estate-related banking crisis in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. The earliest real estate-related crisis occurred in Denmark, lasting for seven years from 
Q1 1987. Subsequently, Sweden and the United Kingdom experienced a crisis which started in both 
countries in Q3 1990. While in Sweden it lasted for two and a half years, in the UK it lasted for three 
years longer. Finland and France experienced real estate crises starting in Q3 1991 and Q3 1993, 
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respectively, and lasting for four and a half and two and a half years. Norway, a non-EU country, also 
experienced a banking crisis at around the same time (1988-93) as the other Nordic countries.46 
There are significant similarities and differences between the recent crisis and the crises of the 
early 1990s in the Nordic countries, France and the UK. In terms of the similarities, both crisis 
episodes are characterised by typical credit and asset price cycles and the materialisation of 
vulnerabilities in real estate markets. Both crisis periods were also preceded by increased cross-border 
capital inflows, lower funding costs and better access to credit. This was spurred by financial market 
deregulation in the early 1980s and financial innovation and integration in the early 2000s. Risks and 
vulnerabilities accumulated in the form of external imbalances, booming construction activity, excessive 
bank credit growth, higher private sector leverage, higher debt service burdens and overvalued RRE 
prices (see charts below). 
The 1990s crises were less synchronised than the recent crisis with respect to their start and 
duration. The outbreak of these crises varied from 1987 in Denmark to 1993 in France, while the 
recent financial crisis affected almost all countries simultaneously. Furthermore, in the 1990s 
corrections in RRE markets preceded a wider economic crisis for some countries. In Finland, for 
example, the drop in RRE prices started around six quarters before the start of the crisis. The length 
and end date of the crises has also shown some variation (e.g. in Denmark the crisis lasted seven 
years, while in Sweden it lasted three and a half years). 
The 1990s crises were, in part, triggered by country-specific factors. For example, a diverse 
range of shocks hit the Nordic countries: the loss of the Soviet export markets (FI), the exchange rate 
mechanism currency crisis (FI, SE) and energy prices (NO).47 By contrast, the onset of the recent crisis 
was triggered by a common shock with a global systemic impact. 
The costs and severity of the crises varied. The 1990s crises in Finland, Sweden and Norway were 
among the most severe ones in advanced economies prior to the recent crisis, while the crises in 
Denmark, France and the UK were comparatively milder.48 With the exception of Finland, where real 
GDP dropped by 10% over the period 1991-93,49 the costs of the 1990s crises were less severe in 
terms of output losses compared with the recent crisis. However, with the exception of Denmark, the 
cumulative fall in nominal RRE prices was much larger and the bank credit-to-GDP ratio was much 
higher during the 1990s crises than during the recent crisis (Table 12). The costs in terms of 
unemployment were broadly similar in the two crisis episodes. The costs in terms of financial sector 
support are difficult to estimate, but were substantial in both episodes. In Denmark the two largest 
insurance companies and a number of smaller banks collapsed, and the central bank had to guarantee 
the deposits of the second-largest bank. The Finnish banking sector received capital injections from the 
government. 
Another difference between the two episodes is related to the pace of economic recovery, in 
particular for Finland, Sweden and the UK where real GDP growth rates had rebounded strongly 
already by 1994 (to 3.9% in FI, 4.1% in SE and 4.5% in UK). By contrast, economic activity in the 
hardest-hit countries remained relatively muted in the aftermath of the recent crisis. 
                                                          
46  Moe, Solheim and Vale (eds.) (2004). 
47  World Economic Forum (2015). 
48  Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
49  OECD data. 
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Finally, the 1990s crises were more regional with limited cross-border effects. In the 1990s the 
behaviour of most variables showed more marked differences between crisis and non-crisis countries. 
In the wake of the recent crisis, higher credit growth and rising RRE prices, and a fall thereafter, were 
observed in most of the non-crisis countries as well. This may be due to the fact that broader and 
deeper financial markets have reinforced the linkages and contagion risks between the financial sector 
and the real economy both within and across countries.  
 
 
In the context of the recent global crisis, ten Member States reported a real estate-related 
banking crisis starting between Q3 2007 and Q2 2009. While many Member States labelled the 
recent financial crisis as “real estate-related”, the global nature of the recent crisis has to be taken into 
account. The crisis had its roots in the collapse of the US subprime mortgage market but quickly spilled 
over to many countries worldwide, the real estate markets of which were negatively affected by the 
sudden drying-up of liquidity in financial markets and the contraction of credit and economic activity. 
Chart 43 
Bank credit to the private sector-to-GDP gap 
(percentage) 
 
 
Sources: BIS and Expert Group on Real Estate. 
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Chart 42 
Debt service ratio 
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Chart 41 
Real RRE prices (annual growth rate) 
(percentage) 
 
 
Sources: ECB and Expert Group on Real Estate. 
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Chart 40 
Price-to-income ratio (annual growth rate) 
(percentage) 
 
 
Sources: ECB and Expert Group on Real Estate. 
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Against this backdrop, many Member States reported a banking crisis in the context of the global crisis, 
even if not specifically related to real estate. In addition to the countries reporting a real estate-related 
banking crisis described earlier, four countries (CY, FR, GR, PT) signalled a banking crisis that 
coincided with the global financial turmoil, while 12 countries reported banking crises occurring earlier 
than the global financial crisis. Six countries (AT, BE, LU, MT, PL, SK) did not report any crisis for the 
observation period. 
There are important differences across countries concerning both the length and depth of real 
estate-related crises. While countries such as LV, LT and SE overcame the crisis within two years, in 
other countries (e.g. DK, HU, IE, NL, SI50 and UK) the crisis lasted much longer and was often still 
ongoing when the crisis database was compiled in 2013. The length and depth of real estate-related 
crises can also be gauged by looking at indicators of economic activity and real estate prices.  
During the latest crisis, countries which did not experience any sort of banking crisis or those 
which faced a non-real estate-related crisis also saw downward corrections in real estate 
prices. For example, Poland, without experiencing any type of crisis, registered 13 quarters of house 
price contraction, while in Greece, where the banking crisis was not classified as real estate-related, 
property prices have dropped for over four years. This illustrates the tight links between the financial 
sector and the housing market, as well as the extent to which adverse events in the banking sector can 
quickly spill over to the real estate sector, or vice versa. Furthermore, countries that experienced a real 
estate-related crisis suffered a more protracted period of GDP loss. But even those countries that did 
not report a real estate-related banking crisis (e.g. HR, IT, PT) or any sort of distress event (e.g. BE) 
incurred real GDP losses, albeit of much shorter length. One notable exception to this general pattern 
is Sweden during the 2007-13 crisis period, which exhibited positive developments in both real estate 
prices and in other macroeconomic indicators. This may be explained by the inherently non-domestic 
nature of the crisis in Sweden: in this country, banking distress was caused by Swedish-based 
international banks suffering from credit losses on residential real estate in foreign countries (namely, 
Denmark and the Baltic countries). 
2.3.2 Measuring the depth of real estate-related banking crises 
Selected indicators during crisis periods can provide insights into the depth of real estate-
related crises (Table 12).51 On average, countries which experienced a real estate-related crisis 
suffered significant losses in the real economy and the housing and financial sectors. Losses experienced 
during the most recent crisis also exceed those suffered during the earlier crisis period in the 1990s. 
RRE prices generally decreased. This occurred in crisis countries during both the earlier and the 
latest crisis periods but for the recent crisis the decline was much more pronounced (-7.3% vs. -2.9%). 
In the earlier crisis period, all crisis countries experienced falls in RRE prices, ranging from -1.6% (FR, 
UK) to -6.5% (FI). During the real estate-related stress periods coinciding with the global financial 
                                                          
50  The real estate sector in Slovenia experienced a crisis accompanied by a significant fall in real estate prices in the last years, 
but the roots of the banking crisis were not purely real estate-related, as they also involved the corporate sector. Household 
indebtedness and stocks of non-performing loans remained low throughout the crisis and up to now. 
51  Crisis periods are divided according to whether a crisis occurred during the 1990s or in conjunction with the recent global financial 
crisis. Averages of indicators pertaining to crisis countries are computed over the period from the first to the last crisis quarter specific 
to each country. To provide a means of comparison, averages for non-crisis countries are computed over the broad crisis periods of 
crisis countries, including all quarters since the start of the earliest crisis (Q1 1987 and Q3 2007, respectively) up to the last crisis 
quarter in the period considered (Q4 1995 and Q1 2013, respectively). 
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crisis, average decreases in RRE prices in crisis countries were larger than in other countries. While 
countries like IE, LV and LT saw double-digit decreases in house prices (peaking at -27.7% in LV), in 
other countries the average correction was less pronounced (e.g. DK, NL, SI, ES). Due to direct 
contagion or indirect transmission, even countries where the turmoil was not related to real estate 
developments experienced decreases in RRE prices, most notably RO (-10.2%), GR (-4%) and to a 
smaller extent IT (-0.2%). 
Real estate activity declined. In both crisis periods, crisis countries experienced larger declines in 
real estate activity than countries not affected by real estate-related turmoil (Table 12). During the 
recent crisis, the number of housing starts settled at an average of 43.5 thousand units in crisis 
countries, compared with 64.1 thousand units in countries not affected by real estate-related turmoil. 
As a consequence of the stronger decrease in demand, the contribution of dwellings to GDP 
decreased in crisis countries: on average, over the recent crisis, gross fixed capital formation of 
dwellings settled at 4% in crisis countries versus 4.7% in non-crisis countries.  
Banking sector asset quality deteriorated. Crisis events impact the banking sector mainly through 
increased default rates, lower collateral values and increased loan loss provisions. While banks’ asset 
quality was severely affected in real estate-related crisis countries, most notably in LV and IE (Table 
12), NPLs to households increased considerably in non-crisis countries as well (e.g. BG, GR, IT). As a 
result of heightened credit risk and mounting credit losses, as well as of the overall drying-up of market 
liquidity, credit granted by the banking sector broadly decreased (Table 12), despite sometimes 
considerable public capital injections. While real estate crisis countries such as HU, IE, LV, LT and ES 
saw the largest contraction in credit, negative growth in bank credit (expressed as a percentage of 
GDP) was also experienced by non-real estate-related crisis countries (e.g. BE). 
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Table 12 
Average of selected indicators during real estate-related crisis periods 
Country Nominal RRE price 
growth 
Housing starts 
(thousands of 
units) 
GFCF dwellings 
(percentage of 
GDP) 
NPLs of 
households 
(outstanding) 
Bank credit to GDP 
growth 
Corporate 
bankruptcies 
Real GDP growth Consumption 
growth 
 1990s 
crisis 
2008 
crisis 
1990s 
crisis 
2008 
crisis 
1990s 
crisis 
1990s 
crisis 
1990s 
crisis 
1990s 
crisis 
2008 
crisis 
2008 
crisis 
2008 
crisis 
2008 
crisis 
1990s 
crisis 
2008 
crisis 
1990s 
crisis 
2008 
crisis 
Austria n.a. 5.2% 47.29 n.a. 5.7 4.5 n.a. n.a. 4.9% 0.9% 2.0% 1.6% 2.8% 0.8% 6.9% 3.1% 
Belgium 7.4% 3.7% 42.09 44.37 5.8 5.9 n.a. 1.1% 5.7% -2.8% 0.8% 1.3% 3.8% 0.6% 6.4% 3.1% 
Bulgaria n.a. n.a. n.a. 20.80 n.a. n.a. n.a. 9.0% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -1.1% 1.2% n.a. 5.5% 
Croatia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.7% 23.1% 2.9% n.a. n.a. n.a. -1.4% n.a. 1.5% 
Cyprus n.a. n.a. 7.26 8.55 7.1 6.4 n.a. n.a. 10.4% 8.7% n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.5% n.a. 3.5% 
Czech Rep. n.a. 2.7% 19.22 34.10 2.5 4.0 n.a. 2.5% 1.7% 6.5% n.a. 5.0% n.a. 0.7% n.a. 4.8% 
Denmark -2.2% -4.5% 18.47 13.86 3.5 4.4 n.a. 0.4% 2.4% -0.6% n.a. 1.2% 1.1% -1.0% 4.1% 1.5% 
Estonia n.a. n.a. 0.80 3.17 2.4 3.8 n.a. 2.9% n.a. -0.5% n.a. 0.1% 2.5% 0.4% n.a. 2.6% 
Finland -6.5% 2.9% 40.70 27.50 4.9 6.5 n.a. 0.5% -4.3% 4.2% 0.8% 0.2% 0.0% -0.2% -0.7% 3.7% 
France -1.6% 1.3% 316.16 369.68 5.4 6.2 n.a. 1.2% -2.6% 3.0% n.a. 1.6% 1.6% 0.5% 3.4% 1.8% 
Germany 3.7% 2.8% 551.19 n.a. 7.1 5.4 n.a. n.a. 3.9% -0.1% n.a. n.a. 1.3% 0.9% 7.2% 2.3% 
Greece n.a. -4.0% 96.56 55.85 n.a. 4.6 n.a. 10.6% -0.5% 1.8% n.a. n.a. n.a. -3.9% n.a. 2.3% 
Hungary n.a. n.a. 39.92 22.54 7.8 3.8 n.a. n.a. -13.0% -2.1% n.a. n.a. n.a. -1.3% n.a. -0.8% 
Ireland 5.3% -13.7% 12.56 3.47 5.2 3.7 n.a. 12.1% 5.3% -9.7% 27.8% 66.0% n.a. -1.3% n.a. -2.7% 
Italy 9.6% -0.2% n.a. n.a. 5.7 5.5 n.a. 5.0% 5.9% 2.4% n.a. 0.2% 1.3% -1.2% 0.0% 1.0% 
Latvia n.a. -25.7% n.a. 1.52 1.7 2.7 n.a. 12.8% n.a. -3.3% n.a. 3.2% -10.6% -11.0% n.a. -11.3% 
Lithuania n.a. -16.7% n.a. 10.18 2.3 2.7 n.a. 5.2% 6.0% -4.3% n.a. 0.9% n.a. -6.2% n.a. -6.7% 
Luxembourg n.a. 2.8% 3.27 3.82 3.4 3.5 n.a. 1.5% 2.0% 6.1% n.a. 2.6% n.a. 0.2% n.a. 2.8% 
Malta n.a. n.a. 6.61 n.a. n.a. 3.3 n.a. n.a. 14.1% 4.3% n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.8% n.a. 3.7% 
Netherlands 6.3% -2.9% n.a. n.a. 5.6 5.0 n.a. 1.0% 5.1% 2.0% 0.3% 0.3% 2.9% -0.6% 6.3% 0.4% 
Poland n.a. n.a. 122.86 159.50 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.8% -4.5% 13.3% n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.6% n.a. 5.8% 
Portugal 10.0% 0.8% n.a. 22.33 7.4 3.6 n.a. 1.7% 4.2% 1.3% n.a. 6.9% n.a. -0.9% n.a. 0.0% 
Romania n.a. -10.2% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.2% n.a. 12.7% n.a. 0.9% n.a. 1.1% n.a. 2.4% 
Slovakia n.a. 3.3% 5.49 19.40 1.2 2.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. 7.0% n.a. n.a. -2.1% 2.8% n.a. 7.2% 
Slovenia n.a. -0.9% 6.17 5.50 3.4 3.4 n.a. 2.5% 28.1% 4.3% n.a. 7.7% 4.6% -1.2% n.a. 2.0% 
Spain 13.9% -6.5% 243.91 178.80 4.6 6.6 n.a. 2.9% 4.6% -4.8% n.a. 0.1% n.a. -1.3% 7.2% -0.3% 
Sweden -2.5% 3.8% 40.22 24.10 n.a. n.a. 0.3% 0.1% -1.7% 5.6% 2.3% 0.8% n.a. 0.1% n.a. 3.1% 
United Kingdom -1.6% 0.9% 198.78 131.20 3.1 3.5 4.5% 1.9% 0.1% -0.5% 0.7% 0.2% 1.6% -0.1% 4.4% 0.1% 
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Table 12 
Average of selected indicators during real estate-related crisis periods 
Country Nominal RRE price 
growth 
Housing starts 
(thousands of 
units) 
GFCF dwellings 
(percentage of 
GDP) 
NPLs of 
households 
(outstanding) 
Bank credit to GDP 
growth 
Corporate 
bankruptcies 
Real GDP growth Consumption 
growth 
 1990s 
crisis 
2008 
crisis 
1990s 
crisis 
2008 
crisis 
1990s 
crisis 
1990s 
crisis 
1990s 
crisis 
1990s 
crisis 
2008 
crisis 
2008 
crisis 
2008 
crisis 
2008 
crisis 
1990s 
crisis 
2008 
crisis 
1990s 
crisis 
2008 
crisis 
Average in RRE 
crisis countries 
-2.9% -7.3% 122.9 43.5 4.3 4.0 2.4% 4.3% -1.2% -1.3% 1.3% 8.9% 1.1% -2.4% 2.8% -1.5% 
Average in non-RRE 
crisis countries (b) 
8.0% 0.9% 80.3 64.1 4.6 4.7 n.a. 3.4% 5.9% 4.2% 7.7% 2.0% 0.5% 0.4% 5.7% 3.2% 
   
  countries reporting real estate-related banking crises 
  countries experiencing a non-real estate-related banking crisis 
  countries not experiencing any type of crisis in the time sample considered 
 
 
(a) Cells pertaining to countries reporting real estate-related banking crises are pink shaded; cells referring to countries experiencing a non-real estate-related banking crisis are coloured in purple; light blue 
cells refer to countries not experiencing any type of crisis in the time sample considered.  
(b) Non-crisis countries are countries that did not report the occurrence of a real estate-related banking crisis. Averages of indicators pertaining to crisis countries are computed over the period from the first to 
the last crisis quarter specific to each country. To provide a means of comparison, averages for non-crisis countries are computed over the broad crisis periods of crisis countries, including all quarters since the 
start of the earliest crisis (Q1 1987 and Q3 2007, respectively) up to the last crisis quarter in the period considered (Q4 1995 and Q1 2013, respectively). 
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Bank stock prices were rising during the build-up phase of the crisis but started to drop sharply 
in mid-2007 (Chart 44). The increases and decreases of bank valuations in the market followed a similar 
pattern across countries but the magnitudes differed. There is no major difference in developments 
between crisis and non-crisis countries. Hence, the behaviour of this indicator seems to be related not 
only the situation in the real estate market but also to the general financial and economic conditions. 
 
Chart 44 
Bank stock prices  
(index, 1 January 2012 = 100) 
 
 
Sources: Bloomberg data and own calculations. 
 
Real estate-related banking crises have significant spillovers to the real economy. Table 12 
presents the average impact of the crisis on the production sector (corporate bankruptcies), real GDP and 
consumption.  
On average, both crisis and non-crisis countries saw an increase in bankruptcies during the 
recent crisis (8.9% on average in crisis countries and 2% in non-crisis countries), but with significant 
cross-country variation. Among the crisis countries, IE experienced the highest average corporate 
bankruptcy rate during the crisis (66%), followed by SI (7.7%) and LV (3.2%). However, the global 
financial crisis severely affected the production sector of other European countries too. In PT, the average 
bankruptcy rate settled at 6.9%. 
Real GDP registered large declines (Chart 45). During the latest crisis period, in crisis countries real 
GDP, on average, declined by 2.4%, compared with the 0.4% average real GDP growth in countries 
without a real estate-related crisis. However, the global financial crisis led to significant real GDP losses 
also in economies where the banking crisis was not related to the real estate sector (e.g. GR, HR, IT). 
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During the 1990s crisis, not one crisis country registered negative real GDP growth over the crisis period. 
In the more recent crisis, some heterogeneity across countries can be observed. Furthermore, the 
severity of the crisis impact appears directly proportional to the economic expansion preceding the 
onset of the real estate turmoil. Countries experiencing a strong economic and consumption boom 
seem to face costlier crises. In this context, the complex nature of the most recent crisis has to be kept 
in mind, as well as the country-specific factors that might have amplified its impact. Countries not 
reporting the occurrence of any type of banking crisis all report, on average, low positive real GDP growth 
rates.  
A similar pattern can be observed for consumption. Countries facing real estate-related banking 
crises experienced, on average, lower consumption growth than their peers. However, while in the recent 
episode crisis countries suffered, on average, a decrease in consumption of -1.5% (compared with +3.2% 
in non-crisis countries), in the 1990s episode crisis countries on average saw +2.8%, with only FI 
registering a contraction in consumption of -0.7%.  
 
 
In the run-up to real estate-related crisis events, countries tend to exhibit pronounced negative 
current account balances (Chart 46). This implies a financing of the shortage of domestic savings with 
foreign savings. Protracted periods of reliance on foreign funds, particularly significant in the Baltic 
countries, HU, ES and IE, were later accompanied by a stronger impact of the downturn. At the same 
time, countries where domestic banks engage in cross-border lending or where lending is performed by 
subsidiaries in other jurisdictions can be exposed to contagion from negative real estate-related 
developments in other countries (e.g. Sweden during the latest crisis episode).  
Chart 46 
Current account balance  
(percentage of GDP) 
 
 
Sources: Eurostat and own calculations. 
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Chart 45 
Real GDP growth  
(percentage) 
 
 
Sources: Eurostat and own calculations. 
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State aid given to the financial sector is another indicator signalling the depth of a crisis. Given 
the systemic nature of the 2008 crisis, many financial institutions in the EU received government support. 
Member States that experienced a real estate-related crisis are among those with the highest state aid 
provided to the financial sector. In IE and ES, for instance, recapitalisation and asset relief measures 
peaked at 25% and 6% of GDP, respectively. Guarantees on liabilities and liquidity measures were 
particularly important for IE, NL and UK.  
The clustering analysis of Section 1 also provides some interesting insights as regards the role 
of structural features of countries in the depth of a real estate crisis. Chart 47 suggests that, on 
average, countries belonging to cluster 4 experienced the deepest real estate crisis, with the strongest 
fall in RRE prices and the bank credit-to-GDP ratio, as well as the highest share of corporate 
bankruptcies and of NPLs of households. Despite being characterised, on average, by low LTVs 
compared with the other clusters, countries in cluster 4 are characterised by low pre-crisis taxation on 
housing and construction VAT (the latter being the lowest across clusters), the largest share of new 
loans granted at a variable rate and the longest loan maturity (see Table 7 in Section 1).  
Cluster 2, on the other hand, seems to be the one which experienced the smallest losses from the 
recent real estate-related crisis: countries in this cluster exhibit, on average, positive RRE price growth 
during the crisis period, as well as the lowest levels of household NPLs and low corporate 
bankruptcies. Countries in cluster 2 present very different structural characteristics than cluster 4: a 
higher contribution of taxes to the marginal cost of housing is accompanied by the highest average 
level of VAT on construction and by a lower share of variable rate mortgage loans in new lending. 
While average loan maturities are not substantially higher, cluster 2 presents the lowest average share 
of homeowners in the economy (64.8% compared with 80.7% in cluster 4). It is interesting to note that 
both clusters include countries which experienced real estate-related banking crises: while cluster 2 
includes DK, NL and SE, cluster 4 comprises ES and IE. This seems to suggest that underlying 
structural features are important in affecting the resilience of countries to distress events and can act 
as amplifying channels for negative shocks. 
The insights drawn in this section suggest that both cyclical developments experienced in the run-up to 
real estate-related crises and structural features of real estate markets might have played a role in 
shaping the depth of downturns. To better characterise these relationships, further analytical work 
focused on exploring the characteristics influencing the depth of real estate-related crises would be 
highly desirable.  
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Chart 47 
Indicators describing the depth of the 2008 real estate crisis by cluster of countries 
 
 
 
Note: Values on the y-axis refer to the specific unit of each indicator, as indicated in the legend: while for indicators 
representing growth rates or shares the numbers on the y-axis refer to values within the [-1;1] interval (i.e. a value 
of 0.3 represents 30%), housing starts are expressed as millions of units (i.e. the value 0.3 refers to 300,000 
units). 
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3.1 Structural market features and financial stability risks: a general framework 
While Section 1 and Section 2 examine structural and cyclical features of RRE markets in the 
EU, this Section aims at bringing the two dimensions together and linking them to financial 
stability risks. The interplay between structural and cyclical features of real estate markets and the 
build-up of risk is, however, not straightforward.  
First, while structural features influence financial stability, there may be differences in how and 
where these effects materialise. Some features may act only indirectly through their effect on other 
structural variables, while others may have a more direct impact. For example, the tax deductibility of 
mortgage interest affects the incentives for mortgage financing and thereby households’ debt service 
ratio, which in turn is likely to influence PDs and the losses incurred by banks; in this case the debt 
service ratio has a direct effect on financial stability, while tax deductibility has an indirect effect. 
Furthermore, features such as interest rate sensitivity influence house price dynamics in the short term, 
while other features, such as the level and quality of residential investment, have a longer-term impact 
on the demand for and supply of housing (Tsatsaronis and Zhu, 2004).   
In addition, structural features can both increase vulnerabilities before a crisis and amplify the 
severity of a downturn. However, the specific role of structural features in the different phases of the 
cycle is not clear-cut. There are features that may both mitigate and amplify risks, depending on the 
state of the cycle. Indeed some structural features may increase the probability of a crisis occurring but 
reduce the impact of the crisis, or vice versa. For instance: 
 There are mixed views on the impact of the share of loans granted at floating versus fixed 
interest rates. While the prevalence of new floating rate loans may be viewed as amplifying 
the link between property prices and interest rates and hence increasing risks to financial 
stability, when the crisis occurred, countries like the UK were able to reduce mortgage 
foreclosures and the drop in consumption by lowering interest rates owing to the high portion 
of floating rate loans. Indeed, monetary policy tends to transmit quicker through the financial 
system when variable rate mortgages are prevalent. 
 Non-recourse lending may increase strategic defaults once the crisis has materialised, but on 
the other hand it may also encourage better borrower screening and a milder decline in 
lending standards pre-crisis. Strategic default may also lower borrowers’ incentives to 
maintain their properties, given that they can more easily walk away in case of declining 
house prices (IMF, 2011), which can mean that the negative externality of foreclosure is 
higher than it is with no strategic default.  
                                                          
52  Prepared by a team coordinated by Wanda Cornacchia (Banca d’Italia) and comprising Marine Dujardin (Banque de France), 
Mara Pirovano (Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique), Peter Pontuch (European Commission), Piotr Sliwka 
(Polish Financial Supervision Authority, C.S.Wyszynski University) and Rhiannon Sowerbutts (Bank of England). 
 
Section 3 
Links between national market characteristics and real 
estate risks52 
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Notwithstanding the difficulty in establishing a clear link between structural features of RRE 
markets and financial stability risks, several studies provide empirical evidence. A recent case 
study (Schneider and Wagner, 2015) analysing the housing market in Germany, Austria and 
Switzerland suggests that well-developed and regulated rental markets, low home ownership ratios 
and conservative lending standards can have a mitigating impact on financial stability risks, as these 
factors contribute to the stability of housing prices. By contrast, IMF (2011) finds that high government 
involvement in housing finance and high household leverage tend to exacerbate house price swings 
and mortgage credit growth, having a negative effect on financial stability.  
The relationship between housing finance and financial stability can in large part be explained 
by the feedback loops between the housing market and the real economy. The importance of 
these feedback loops is often directly tied to the features of the mortgage contracts (Tsatsaronis and 
Zhu, 2004). For example, as underlined by the lead-up to the 2007 financial crisis, mortgage equity 
withdrawal is a potential amplifier of the loop between house prices and consumption as households 
may “use their houses like an ATM”. The features of the mortgage contracts may also expose 
households to specific risks which are likely to indirectly impact banks and possibly financial stability: 
the use of FX mortgage loans increases the exchange rate risks borne by borrowers (IMF, 2011), while 
the length of mortgage contracts exacerbates the refinancing risk. The use of floating mortgage rates 
results in an increase of short-term interest rates’ influence on house prices. From a lender’s 
perspective, the accounting practices governing mortgage contracts may directly influence his/her 
appetite for exposure to real estate: while historical methods may exercise a countercyclical influence, 
methods based on current valuations may amplify the link between property prices and credit growth, 
resulting in mutually reinforcing imbalances.  
3.2 Empirical assessment of the links between structural market features and 
financial stability risks 
This section presents a graphical and econometric analysis on the interplay between structural 
real estate/mortgage market features and financial stability risks. The analysis builds on recent 
findings on early warning indicators for real estate-related banking crises presented in ESRB 
Occasional Paper No. 853.  
3.2.1 Assessing the predictive power of early warning indicators  
The Occasional Paper applies a signalling approach in both a non-parametric and a parametric 
setting to evaluate the predictive power of potential early warning indicators. This evaluation is 
performed on the basis of the trade-off between correctly predicting upcoming crisis events and issuing 
false alarms. The paper relies on data on real estate-related banking crises presented in Section 2. 
The dependent variable considered in the analysis, following the early warning literature, is a dummy 
indicator equal to 1 in periods that precede the onset of real estate-related banking crises by 5 to 12 
quarters. The variable therefore identifies the time horizon preceding banking crises related to real 
estate, relevant to a policy-maker for the (potential) timely activation of macroprudential instruments. 
                                                          
53  Ferrari, S., Pirovano, M. and Cornacchia, W. (2015), “Identifying Early Warning Indicators for Real Estate-related Banking Crises”, 
Occasional Paper Series, No. 8, ESRB. 
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Potential early warning indicators pertaining to the structural and cyclical dimensions of credit and 
house price developments, the macroeconomy, the construction sector and financial markets are 
considered, relying on quarterly data spanning from 1970 (where available) until 2013.  
The paper finds a superior signalling performance for a multivariate logit model featuring real 
total credit growth, the bank credit-to-GDP ratio, the price-to-rent ratio, the nominal three-month 
money market rate and inflation as explanatory variables. This model presents the best signalling 
performance in terms of AUROC (area under the receiver operating curve) and, in the following 
sections, is used as a starting point to gauge the importance of structural characteristics of European 
real estate markets/mortgage loans either in the emergence of vulnerabilities leading to banking crises 
or in influencing the depth of banking crises. 
3.2.2 Data on structural market indicators 
Structural cross-country differences arise not only on a cross-sectional basis but also over 
time (e.g. the share of floating rate mortgages can differ across countries and significantly over 
time). However, limited data availability on the variables of interest is a serious impediment to 
analysis. Unfortunately, time-series information on structural real estate and mortgage market features 
is rather scarce. Section 1 identified several indicators related to important characteristics of European 
RRE markets as well as indicators related to lending standards. However, this information is largely 
unavailable at a quarterly frequency and does not cover a sufficient number of time periods.  
Two alternative approaches have therefore been followed to exploit the available information on 
the structural characteristics of real estate markets.  
Under the first approach, time series on two structural variables, namely bank leverage54 and 
the debt service ratio, are used to analyse the role of structural features. More specifically, to 
facilitate the interpretation of the graphs but also of marginal effects and interaction terms in the 
econometric analysis, dummy variables representing the quartiles of the indicators’ cross-country 
distribution are computed. Given structural differences in the levels of bank leverage across countries, 
the quartiles for this indicator are computed based on a series obtained by subtracting the country-
specific mean from the original indicator and constructing quartiles based on deviations from the 
country-specific mean.55 In the econometric analysis these dummies, as well as their interaction with 
real total credit growth, are then added to the baseline logit model.  
Table 13 presents descriptive statistics on the explanatory variables featured in the reference logit 
model, as well as the two structural real estate indicators.  
  
                                                          
54  Bank leverage is defined as total assets divided by capital and reserves, and it is sourced from the ECB’s SDW.  
55  For the debt service ratio, the quartiles have not been constructed based on the deviation from the country-specific mean since, 
compared with leverage, the cross-country differences are less dependent on underlying structural factors.    
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Table 13 
Descriptive statistics on panel data 
Variable  Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum Observation 
Real total credit growth overall 6.021 8.997 -29.045 84.756 Total 3104 
  between  4.631 2.440 25.457 Countries 25 
  within   8.275 -35.599 65.320 T 124.16 
Bank credit to GDP overall 75.550 37.288 5.767 271.097 Total 2983 
  between  31.182 30.824 179.684 Countries 25 
  within   26.227 7.735 174.757 T 119.32 
Price to rent (dev. from mean) overall 0.000 21.436 -67.555 85.214 Total 2228 
  between  0.000 0.000 0.000 Countries 21 
  within   21.436 -67.555 85.214 T 106.095 
Three-month money market rate overall 7.246 5.384 0.000 36.740 Total 2901 
  between  2.553 3.604 13.842 Countries 24 
  within   4.928 -4.220 32.324 T 120.875 
Inflation overall 6.781 12.447 -6.005 303.279 Total 3497 
  between  4.787 2.883 24.632 Countries 25 
  within   11.735 -18.054 285.428 T 139.88 
Debt service ratio overall 0.187 0.160 0.010 1.078 Total 2844 
  between  0.132 0.060 0.742 Countries 25 
  within   0.059 -0.027 0.524 T 113.76 
Bank leverage overall 15.186 5.763 5.000 50.000 Total 1229 
  between  4.984 7.486 25.190 Countries 25 
  within   2.999 5.836 39.995 T 49.16 
 
Under the second approach, pre-crisis observations for a range of real estate and mortgage 
market structural characteristics presented in Section 1 are used to construct a set of dummy 
variables. In particular, for the graphical analysis four variables have been constructed for each 
structural indicator, based on the quartiles of its cross-country distribution. In Table 14 for each country 
a value of 1, 2, 3 or 4 indicates that the structural indicator belongs to the first, second, third or fourth 
quartile of its cross-country distribution.  
 
Table 14 
Graphical analysis: quartile indicators related to pre-crisis (2007-08) structural characteristics 
 
Average LTV 
ratios for 
residential 
mortgages 
Gross debt-to-
income (%) 
Contribution of 
housing taxes 
to the marginal 
cost of owner-
occupied 
housing 
Highest  
VAT rates 
applicable to 
new 
construction 
Share of 
variable rate 
mortgage loans 
in new lending 
(%) 
Typical 
maturity of 
mortgage loans 
(years) 
Country LTV Debtinc Taxmarg conVAT varmort matur 
AT 1 2 2 3 2 3 
BE 1 2 4 4 1 1 
CY 3 3 3 1 2 2 
CZ 4 1 1 2 1 2 
DE 2 3 2 2 1 3 
DK 3 4 3 4 2 3 
EE 2 2 1 1 3 4 
ES 1 4 3 1 4 3 
FI 4 3 1 4 4 2 
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Table 14 
Graphical analysis: quartile indicators related to pre-crisis (2007-08) structural characteristics 
 
Average LTV 
ratios for 
residential 
mortgages 
Gross debt-to-
income (%) 
Contribution of 
housing taxes 
to the marginal 
cost of owner-
occupied 
housing 
Highest  
VAT rates 
applicable to 
new 
construction 
Share of 
variable rate 
mortgage loans 
in new lending 
(%) 
Typical 
maturity of 
mortgage loans 
(years) 
Country LTV Debtinc Taxmarg conVAT varmort matur 
FR 3 2 4 3 1 1 
GR 2 2 4 2 1 1 
HU 2 1 3 3 4 1 
IE 1 4 2 1 3 3 
IT 1 1 4 1 2 2 
LT 3 1 1 1 2 2 
LU 4 3 2 1 4 1 
LV 4 2 2 1 3 2 
MT 1 3 1 1 3 4 
NL 4 4 1 2 1 3 
PL 3 1 4 4 4 2 
PT 2 3 3 4 4 4 
SE 1 4 3 1 4 4 
SI 1 1 1 3 3 1 
SK 3 1 2 2 3 1 
 
UK 3 4 4 1 1 2 
 
 
 
 
Note: The same caution on data as in the cluster analysis of Section 1 applies here. 
 
For each structural indicator, dummy variables indicate whether a country exhibits low or high values, 
based on whether the indicator falls above or below a selected percentile of its cross-country 
distribution. In Table 15 the dummy indicators equal 1 when the value of the respective indicator stands 
above the 66th percentile of the cross-country distribution (or below the 33rd percentile for indicators 
for which lower values imply potentially less conservative practices56). As we want to check early 
warning indicators, we take the indicators of Section 1 referring to the pre-crisis period (more precisely, 
to the years 2007 and 2008). As these data are likely not to apply to the 1990s pre-crisis period, we 
restrict the sample to consider only the most recent crisis period.  
  
                                                          
56  While a value of 1 of the dummies “LTV”, “debtinc”, “varmort” and “matur” implies that a country exhibits values for the indicator 
above the 66th percentile, a value of 1 of the dummy variables “taxmarg” and “convat” imply that the indicator value lies below 
the 33rd percentile of the cross-country distribution. 
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Table 15 
Econometric analysis: dummy indicators related to pre-crisis (2007-08) structural 
characteristics 
 
Average LTV 
ratios for 
residential 
mortgages 
Gross debt-to-
income (%) 
Contribution of 
housing taxes 
to the marginal 
cost of owner-
occupied 
housing 
Highest  
VAT rates 
applicable to 
new 
construction 
Share of 
variable rate 
mortgage loans 
in new lending 
(%) 
Typical 
maturity of 
mortgage loans 
(years) 
Country Cluster debtinc Taxmarg conVAT varmort matur 
AT 0 0 0 0 0 1 
BE 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CY 1 1 0 1 0 0 
CZ 1 0 1 0 0 0 
DE 0 0 0 0 0 1 
DK 0 1 0 0 0 1 
EE 0 0 1 0 0 1 
ES 0 1 0 1 1 0 
FI 1 0 1 0 1 0 
FR 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GR 0 0 0 0 0 0 
HU 0 0 0 0 1 0 
IE 0 1 0 1 1 1 
IT 0 0 0 1 0 0 
LT 1 0 1 0 0 0 
LU 1 1 0 1 1 0 
LV 1 0 0 0 0 0 
MT 0 0 1 0 1 1 
NL 1 1 1 0 0 1 
PL 1 0 0 0 1 0 
PT 0 1 0 0 1 1 
SE 0 1 0 0 0 1 
SI 0 0 1 0 0 0 
SK 1 0 1 0 0 0 
UK 0 1 0 1 0 0 
 
 
Note: The same caution on data as in the cluster analysis of Section 1 applies here. 
 
In the econometric analysis for both approaches, the left-hand-side variable, namely the dummy 
indicator identifying the relevant pre-crisis horizon, counts 120 pre-crisis observations for the 
25 countries considered. 
3.2.3 Graphical analysis 
Bubble charts are used to gauge the importance of structural market features in the emergence 
and depth of crises. Bubble charts are a variation of scatter charts in which the data points are 
replaced with bubbles and an additional dimension of the data is represented in the size of the bubbles. 
In the following charts, values on the x-axis represent the average real total credit growth over the pre-
crisis period (2004-06), while values on the y-axis represent alternatively the predictions of the 
“reference” logit model or the real GDP growth during the 2008 crisis (Table 12 in Section 2). Finally, 
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green, yellow, orange and red bubbles represent respectively the group of countries whose value of the 
structural variable considered lies in the first, second, third and fourth quartile of their cross-country 
distribution (see Table 14 for individual country data).  
The higher the average credit growth in the pre-crisis period, the higher the probability of a real 
estate-related banking crisis (Chart 48). This positive relationship is amplified by the level of the bank 
leverage ratio57 in the pre-crisis period: countries with the highest values for the bank leverage ratio 
(red bubble) are in the upper-right corner of the chart, whereas countries with a bank leverage ratio 
below its mean (green dashed bubble) are in the lower-left corner. Similarly, the higher is average 
credit growth in the 2004-06 period, the higher the GDP contraction during the 2008 crisis. This is all 
the more true, the higher the bank leverage ratio in the pre-crisis period.    
Chart 48 
The effect of the bank leverage ratio (2004-06) on the probability of upcoming real estate 
distress and on the depth of the crisis 
 
 
 
 
Households’ debt service ratio levels in the pre-crisis period do not seem to influence the 
probability of upcoming real estate-related banking crises (Chart 49). Although Member States 
with a high level of their debt service ratio (red bubble) experienced lower average credit growth in the 
pre-crisis period than countries with a very low debt service ratio (green bubble), the prediction of 
upcoming real estate distress is almost the same for the two groups of countries. Similarly, regarding 
the depth of the crisis, the debt service ratio level does not seem to explain the relevant GDP 
contraction - on the contrary, countries with a high debt service ratio experienced a mild contraction 
compared with countries with a low debt service ratio. 
                                                          
57  As indicated in Section 2.2, the quartiles of the bank leverage ratio are calculated in terms of their deviation from the country-
specific mean.  
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Chart 49 
The effect of households’ debt service ratio (2004-06) on the probability of upcoming real 
estate distress and on the depth of the crisis 
 
 
 
 
High LTV levels seem to amplify the vulnerability to real estate-related banking crises and the 
GDP contraction that follows (Chart 5058). Debt-to-income levels and loan maturity, by contrast, do 
not seem to have any relevant effect either on the prediction of a real estate-related crisis or on the 
depth of the crisis (Chart 51 and Chart 54).  
Housing taxation appears to be an important policy tool to mitigate the vulnerability to real 
estate-related banking crises and the GDP contraction that follows (Chart 52). Indeed, the higher 
the contribution of housing taxes to the marginal cost of owner-occupied housing and the VAT rates 
applicable to new construction, the lower the average credit growth in the pre-crisis period and 
consequently also the prediction of real estate distress and the GDP contraction during the crisis.  
The share of variable rate mortgage loans in new lending seems to have an amplifying effect on 
the vulnerability to real estate-related banking crises and the GDP contraction that follows. This 
is the case as long as the share is within a medium level, i.e. the third quartile (Chart 53). At high levels 
of the share of variable rate mortgage loans in new lending, the vulnerability to real estate-related 
banking crises and consequently also the GDP contraction seem instead to be mitigated, as explained 
in Section 3.1. 
                                                          
58  Chart 50 to Chart 50 are based on the quartiles of structural variables in the pre-crisis period presented in Table 14. 
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Chart 50 
The effect of the LTV ratio on the probability of upcoming real estate distress and on the depth 
of the crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 51 
The effect of households’ DTI ratio on the probability of upcoming real estate distress and on 
the depth of the crisis 
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Chart 52 
The effect of housing taxes on the probability of upcoming real estate distress and on the 
depth of the crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 53 
The effect of the share of variable rate mortgage loans in new lending on the probability of 
upcoming real estate distress and on the depth of the crisis 
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Chart 54 
The effect of households’ debt service ratio (2004-06) on the probability of upcoming real 
estate distress and on the depth of the crisis 
 
 
 
 
Chart 55 
The effect of maturity on the probability of upcoming real estate distress and on the depth of 
the crisis 
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total credit growth and of the structural indicator allows us to gauge their marginal contribution in 
explaining the probability of forthcoming distress events related to the real estate sector.  
The marginal effect of real total credit growth provides information on the extent to which 
structural market features reinforce cyclical developments in the run-up to a real estate-related 
crisis. A positive and statistically significant marginal effect of real total credit growth at high levels of a 
structural indicator implies that such a structural feature reinforces the effect of the cyclical dynamics. 
Box 3 briefly illustrates the econometric model as well as details of the calculation and an interpretation 
of marginal effects and interaction terms in non-linear models. 
 
Box 3  
Econometric estimation methodology 
The starting point of the analysis is the reference logit model resulting from ESRB Occasional Paper 
No. 8 on identifying early warning indicators for real estate-related crises. Specifically, the paper 
considers the following discrete choice (logit) model: 
Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝛼𝑖 , 𝑋𝐾,𝑖𝑡) = 𝐹(𝛼𝑖 + 𝑋
′
𝐾,𝑖𝑡𝛽𝐾) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 represents our response variable (taking the value 1 for observations 5 to 12 quarters before 
real estate-related banking crises and 0 otherwise), the matrix 𝑋𝐾,𝑖𝑡 = (𝑥1,𝑖𝑡 , … , 𝑥𝑘,𝑖𝑡) collects the 
potential explanatory variables (including a constant term) and the vector 𝛽𝐾 = (𝛽1, … , 𝛽𝑘) their 
corresponding regression coefficients. 𝐹(∙) represents a logistic function of the form 𝐹(𝑧) =
(1 + 𝑒−𝑧)−1, which maps the indicators to the predicted crisis probability.59 The best model, i.e. the 
one associated with the largest AUROC, features real total credit growth, the nominal bank credit-to-
GDP ratio, the (residential) real estate price-to-rent60 ratio, the three-month money market rate and 
inflation as explanatory variables. This model presents an AUROC of 0.95, a very low probability of 
missing crises (Type I error=2%) and a 20% chance of false alarms (Type II error). 
To better understand how to interpret interaction terms and marginal effects in non-linear regression 
models, consider the following non-linear model, characterised by a dichotomous dependent variable 𝑦 
and two independent variables (𝑥1 and 𝑥2) as well as their interaction. While 𝑥1 is continuous, 𝑥2 is a 
dummy variable. 
𝐸(𝑦|𝑥1, 𝑥2) = 𝐹(𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + 𝛽3(𝑥1 ∙ 𝑥2))= 𝐹(𝑧) 
where, in the case of the logit model, 𝐹(𝑧) represents the logistic cumulative distribution. Marginal 
effects represent the marginal contribution of each independent variable to the conditional expected 
value of 𝑦. While in a linear model marginal effects are straightforward and given by the regression 
coefficients 𝛽𝑖, in a non-linear framework the marginal effects of the two explanatory variables are 
given by the total derivative of 𝐸(𝑦|𝑥1, 𝑥2) with respect to the relevant 𝑥: 
                                                          
59  The logit models are estimated as population averaged regressions, so that 𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼. Since this model assumes independence 
over i and t, robust standard errors are used to take into account possible mis-specifications. 
60  Expressed in deviations from its mean. 
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𝜕𝐸(𝑦|𝑥1, 𝑥2)
𝜕𝑥1
=
𝜕𝐹(𝑧)
𝜕𝑥1
∙
𝑑𝑧
𝑑𝑥1
=
𝜕𝐹(𝑧)
𝜕𝑥1
∙ (𝛽1 + 𝛽3𝑥2) 
𝜕𝐸(𝑦|𝑥1, 𝑥2)
𝜕𝑥2
=
𝜕𝐹(𝑧)
𝜕𝑥2
∙
𝑑𝑧
𝑑𝑥2
=
𝜕𝐹(𝑧)
𝜕𝑥2
∙ (𝛽2 + 𝛽3𝑥1) 
This entails important implications. First, the marginal effect of 𝑥𝑗 is not constant, but it can vary with 
the specific values of 𝑥𝑗, even in the absence of interaction terms (cf. Figure 1). Second, even in the 
absence of interaction terms (𝛽3 = 0), the addition of a dummy variable shifts the curve: the marginal 
effect of 𝑥1 is influenced by 𝑥2, through 
𝜕𝐹(𝑧)
𝜕𝑥1
. Figure 1 represents such a case, assuming 𝛽2 > 0. In 
this case for a given value of 𝑥1, the marginal effect of 𝑥1 is higher when 𝑥2 = 1; when 𝑥2 = 1 and 𝛽2 >
0, 𝐹(𝑧) shifts to the left. Finally, the interaction term affects the steepness of the curve. Figure 2 
shows a case in which the marginal effect of 𝑥1 is different for different values of 𝑥1 and for different 
values of 𝑥2. 
Chart 56 
Logit model with a continuous explanatory variable and augmented with dummy 
 
 
 
Chart 57 
Logit model with a continuous explanatory variable, dummy variable and their interaction 
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Table 16 presents the results of the estimation of the reference logit model augmented, in turn, with 
one structural variable related to the real estate sector as well as its interaction with real total credit 
growth.61 
 
Table 16 
Results of logit models with structural indicators 
 Best OP logit 
Best OP + 
DSR 
Best OP + 
bank 
leverage 
Best OP logit 
(reduced) 
Best OP + 
DSR 
(reduced) 
Best OP + 
bank 
leverage 
(reduced) 
Real total credit growth 0.166*** 0.239*** 0.070* 0.146* 0.668*** 0.061 
Bank credit to GDP 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.053*** 0.044*** 0.060** 0.054*** 
RRE price to rent 0.037** 0.053** 0.057 0.056* 0.086* 0.057* 
Money market rate 0.426*** 0.566*** 0.950* 0.664 1.233* 1.041* 
Inflation -0.302** -0.379** -0.704* -0.307 -0.592 -0.709** 
DSR Q4  2.891*   15.876**  
DSR Q4*Real total credit 
growth 
 -0.177*   -0.668**  
Bank leverage Q4   -0.996   -1.182 
Bank leverage Q4*Real 
total credit growth 
  0.194**   0.207** 
Constant -10.224*** -12.790*** -11.968*** -10.726*** -29.372** -12.296*** 
Number of observations 1573 1473 617 607 607 607 
TPR 0.981 0.896 0.839 0.875 0.833 0.839 
FPR 0.203 0.143 0.070 0.163 0.158 0.078 
Relative usefulness 
(θ=0.5) 
0.778 0.753 0.770 0.712 0.675 0.761 
AUROC 0.947 0.953 0.955 0.912 0.896 0.953 
 
 
Significance code: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
Since the number of observations available for the structural indicators is smaller than that of the 
explanatory variables present in the baseline model, the estimation is run on two samples. The first 
three columns of Table 16 report the results of the estimation performed on the whole sample for which 
observations are available. The last three columns report the results of the estimation performed on a 
reduced sample, where the same observations are used for every logit model, thereby eliminating 
potential differences in results given by the different samples considered.  
Table 16 presents, in addition to the estimated regression coefficients, a battery of evaluation criteria 
for assessing the ability of the model to identify pre-crisis vulnerable periods. It is interesting to notice 
that, over the entire sample, adding structural real estate-related variables only slightly improves the 
predictive ability of the model. Indeed, both models including the debt service ratio and bank leverage 
exhibit a slight increase in AUROC compared with the baseline model: in both cases a lower true 
positive rate (TPR) can be observed, accompanied by a lower false positive rate (FPR). 
Focusing more specifically on the contribution of structural characteristics to explaining the probability 
of entering into a vulnerable pre-crisis period, more insights can be drawn by examining average 
                                                          
61  The specific feature of the Swedish real estate crisis (see Section 2.3.1) should not affect the results. As pointed out in ESRB 
Occasional Paper No. 8, the best-performing logit model identified in the paper is robust to changes in the composition of the 
sample: the out-of-sample exercise along the cross-country dimension (i.e. excluding from the sample the three countries that 
experienced two crisis periods – Denmark, Sweden and the UK) confirms the out-of-sample performance of the best logit model 
and the validity of the results also for countries not included in the estimation sample.     
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marginal effects.62 Table 17 shows the (average) marginal effect of the structural and the cyclical 
variable of interest (i.e. real total credit growth), as well as the (average) marginal effect of the cyclical 
credit variable for different levels (i.e. 0 or 1) of the structural real estate variable considered. 
Table 17 
Average marginal effects from logit models with structural indicators (p-values shown 
between brackets) 
 Best OP logit 
Best OP + 
DSR 
Best OP + 
bank 
leverage 
Best OP logit 
(reduced) 
Best OP + 
DSR 
(reduced) 
Best OP + 
bank 
leverage 
(reduced) 
Average marginal effect       
Real total credit growth 0.0075 
(0.000) 
0.0050 
(0.003) 
0.0056 
(0.000) 
0.0072 
(0.097) 
0.0016 
(0.270) 
0.0055 
(0.000) 
DSR Q4  0.0395 
(0.108) 
  0.0617 
(0.004) 
 
Bank leverage Q4   0.0567 
(0.0009) 
  0.0550 
(0.011) 
Average marginal effect of 
real total credit growth at: 
      
DSR Q4=0  0.0062 
(0.001) 
  0.0046 
(0.011) 
 
DSR Q4=1  0.0033 
(0.101) 
  0.000 
(0.988) 
 
Bank leverage Q4=0   0.0024 
(0.061) 
  0.0020 
(0.134) 
Bank leverage Q4=1   0.0131 
(0.000) 
  0.0127 
(0.000) 
 
High bank leverage is associated with a higher probability of a real estate-related banking crisis 
occurring. The bank leverage ratio has a statistically significant marginal effect on the probability of 
upcoming real estate-related distress periods, in line with the graphical analysis. This is true for both 
samples on the basis of which the model is estimated. In both cases, countries exhibiting bank 
leverage falling in the fourth quartile of the cross-country distribution have approximately a 5.5% higher 
chance of experiencing a real estate-related banking crisis. Furthermore, a high bank leverage ratio 
increases the marginal effect of real total credit growth.  
Evidence on the marginal effect of high levels of the debt service ratio is mixed. In fact, 
comparing columns 2 and 5 of Table 17, no clear-cut conclusions can be drawn, as also reported in 
Chart 57. 
The predictive power of models including the structural indicator dummies is at least as good 
as that of the logit model. Table 18 presents the results of the logit analysis performed using the set 
of dummies representing the structural features of countries’ real estate markets. The evaluation 
statistics reported at the bottom of the table reveal that the predictive ability of models including 
structural indicator dummies is at least as good as that of the reference logit model: in all cases, the 
AUROC is at least as high as 0.947. Furthermore, the models’ performance in terms of true and false 
positive rates is very similar.  
The analysis of the marginal effects confirms the insights of the earlier graphical analysis.  
Table 19 presents the estimated marginal effects of real total credit growth and the structural 
indicators, as well as the different marginal effect of real total credit growth for different levels of the 
                                                          
62  Even though the predictive ability of the model does not significantly improve when adding structural variables (probably because 
the reference logit model is the best in terms of AUROC), the latter can still have a significant direct and/or indirect effect on the 
probability of entering into a vulnerable pre-crisis period.    
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structural indicators considered. The results reveal that the LTV ratio, the contribution of housing taxes 
to the marginal cost of owner-occupied housing and the share of new lending granted at a variable rate 
have a statistically significant marginal effect on the probability of forthcoming real estate-related 
banking crises.  
More specifically, high LTV levels are associated with a 6.4% higher vulnerability to real estate-
related distress events (statistically significant at the 10% level). Furthermore, compared with 
countries with average LTV ratios below the 66th percentile of the cross-country distribution, in high 
LTV countries the marginal effect of real total credit growth on real estate-related financial stability risks 
is 0.75% higher.  
A smaller contribution of housing taxes to the marginal cost of housing increases the 
vulnerabilities related to real estate-related distress events.63 This implies that the tax treatment of 
housing matters for financial stability: in particular, low taxation of RRE properties leads to a 4.4% 
increase in the probability of experiencing a real estate-related crisis in the near future. In addition, an 
advantageous tax treatment of housing reinforces the marginal contribution of real total credit growth. 
In countries with lower housing taxation, stronger credit growth developments increase the probability 
of financial instability by almost 1%. 
A large share of variable rate mortgage loans in new lending seems to have a negative marginal 
effect on the probability of upcoming distress related to the real estate sector. This result looks 
somewhat counter-intuitive, since floating mortgage loan rates are sometimes thought to amplify the 
link between property prices and interest rates and therefore exacerbate the pro-cyclicality of the real 
estate market. However, the effect of the share of variable rate loans crucially depends on the 
evolution of market interest rates. If, during a bust phase, monetary policy tries to offset the economic 
slowdown by lowering interest rates, variable rate loans might actually dampen the pro-cyclicality of the 
real estate market (see also Section 3.1). 
 
Table 18 
Results of logit models with dummy variables for structural characteristics 
 
Best OP 
logit 
Best OP + 
LTV 
Best OP + 
DTI 
Best OP + 
Taxmarg 
Best OP + 
ConVAT 
Best OP + 
Varmort 
Best OP + 
Matur 
Real total credit growth 0.166*** 0.140** 0.211*** 0.169*** 0.205*** 0.216*** 0.204*** 
Bank credit to GDP 0.049*** 0.058*** 0.054*** 0.059*** 0.054*** 0.059*** 0.054*** 
RRE price to rent 0.037** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.040*** 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.044*** 
Money market rate 0.426*** 0.519*** 0.497*** 0.496*** 0.530*** 0.528*** 0.490*** 
Inflation -0.302** -0.414*** -0.407*** -0.355** -0.431*** -0.398*** -0.400*** 
LTV  0.879      
LTV*Real total credit growth  0.051      
Debt to income   0.665     
Debt to income*Real total 
credit growth 
  -0.087     
Tax on housing    1.189    
Tax on housing*Real total 
credit growth 
   0.044    
Construction VAT     -0.716   
                                                          
63  This indicator takes a value of 1 when a country exhibits a contribution of housing taxes to the overall housing cost below the 33rd 
percentile of the cross-country distribution. 
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Table 18 
Results of logit models with dummy variables for structural characteristics 
 
Best OP 
logit 
Best OP + 
LTV 
Best OP + 
DTI 
Best OP + 
Taxmarg 
Best OP + 
ConVAT 
Best OP + 
Varmort 
Best OP + 
Matur 
Construction VAT*Real total 
credit growth 
    -0.078   
Variable rate mortgage loans      -0.602  
Variable rate mortgage 
loans*Real total credit growth 
     -0.112*  
Maturity       0.321 
Maturity*Real total credit 
growth 
      -0.087 
Residential investment        
Residential investment*Real 
total credit growth 
       
Constant -10.224*** -11.619*** -11.294*** -11.999*** -11.151*** -11.853*** -11.135*** 
Number of observations 1573 1573 1573 1573 1573 1573 1573 
TPR 0.981 0.962 0.981 0.952 0.962 0.962 0.962 
FPR 0.203 0.196 0.201 0.204 0.156 0.170 0.182 
Relative usefulness (θ=0.5) 0.778 0.765 0.780 0.748 0.806 0.792 0.779 
AUROC 0.947 0.947 0.947 0.948 0.949 0.953 0.948 
 
 
Significance code: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
Table 19  
Average marginal effects (p-values shown between brackets) 
 
Best OP 
logit 
Best OP + 
LTV 
Best OP + 
DTI 
Best OP + 
Taxmarg 
Best OP + 
ConVAT 
Best OP + 
Varmort 
Best OP + 
Matur 
Average marginal effect        
Real total credit growth 0.0075 
(0.000) 
0.0061 
(0.001) 
0.0064 
(0.001) 
0.0070 
(0.000) 
0.0077 
(0.000) 
0.0074 
(0.000) 
0.0066 
(0.000) 
LTV  0.0640 
(0.069) 
     
Debt to income   -0.0100  
(0.825) 
    
Tax on housing    0.0808 
(0.014) 
   
Construction VAT     -0.0522 
(0.127) 
  
Variable rate mortgage loans      -0.0548 
(0.059) 
 
Maturity       -0.0226 
(0.586) 
Residential investment        
Average marginal effect of real 
total credit growth at: 
       
LTV = 0  0.0045 
(0.026) 
     
LTV = 1  0.0120 
(0.000) 
     
DTI = 0   0.0086 
(0.007) 
    
DTI = 1   0.0049 
(0.043) 
    
Taxmarg = 0    0.0054 
(0.004) 
   
Taxmarg = 1    0.148 
(0.000) 
   
ConVAT = 0     0.0097 
(0.000) 
  
ConVAT = 1     0.0029 
(0.136) 
  
Varmort = 0      0.0097 
(0.000) 
 
 ESRB 
Report on residential real estate and financial stability in the EU, December 2015 
Links between national market characteristics and real estate risks 85 
Table 19  
Average marginal effects (p-values shown between brackets) 
 
Best OP 
logit 
Best OP + 
LTV 
Best OP + 
DTI 
Best OP + 
Taxmarg 
Best OP + 
ConVAT 
Best OP + 
Varmort 
Best OP + 
Matur 
Varmort = 1      0.0021 
(0.135) 
 
Matur = 0       0.0088 
(0.002) 
Matur= 1       0.0041  
(0.102) 
 
3.3 Conclusions and possible way forward 
The analysis presents preliminary evidence that structural features of real estate markets are 
relevant for financial stability. Initial results highlight the role of features such as high LTV ratios, a 
favourable tax treatment of housing, and high levels of bank leverage as positively affecting the 
vulnerability of countries to real estate-related distress events. High shares of new lending granted at a 
variable rate, instead, decrease the probability of upcoming distress events.  
However, the role of structural market features in shaping the real estate cycle is not easy to assess, 
for three reasons: first, because they can have either a direct or indirect effect on other structural and 
cyclical variables; while direct effects are easier to measure, indirect ones are more difficult to 
disentangle; second, because the relevant phase of the cycle where their amplifying/mitigating role 
appears is not yet clear; and third, because their effect can be direct or indirect, mitigating or 
amplifying, in different phases of the cycle. 
While structural market features may indirectly influence cyclical developments in the build-up phase, 
they are likely to directly influence the depth of the crisis. Imbalances and structural developments 
prevailing during the upturn phase are more likely to influence the resilience to a negative shock, rather 
than influencing the likelihood of that shock occurring. Future research is needed to analyse more 
closely the depth of real estate-related banking crises, as well as the role of cyclical and structural 
characteristics in shaping them.  
Conducting a rigorous analysis on structural real estate and mortgage market features crucially relies 
on the availability of comparable data. Currently, time series related to lending standards 
(e.g. mortgage loan maturities, the share of fixed/variable rate mortgage loans in the outstanding stock, 
debt-to-income ratios) are largely not available. Closing existing data gaps is therefore essential for the 
monitoring and the analysis of structural developments.  
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4.1 Introduction 
The macroprudential toolkit related to real estate markets can be divided into three categories 
(or “stretches”): income stretch, collateral stretch and banking system stretch.65 The “income 
stretch” category comprises LTI, DSTI and DTI limits as well as amortisation requirements. Such 
instruments are often complemented with sensitivity tests (e.g. interest rate assumptions to calculate 
debt service costs). The instruments considered in the “collateral stretch” category are LTV limits and 
amortisation requirements. Amortisation requirements are included in two stretches as they affect the 
repayment burden (and are thus related to income) and also bring down the LTV ratio over time (and 
thus affect the collateral stretch). Instruments addressing “banking system stretch” comprise sector-
specific capital-based requirements such as increasing risk weights or underlying parameters for real 
estate-related exposures.66 
The instruments complement each other as they differ in their effectiveness in curbing the 
financial cycle and in the way they can act as system buffers in a downturn situation (see 
Section 4.2). Additionally, a combination of income stretch instruments and collateral stretch 
instruments may also be a way to mitigate leakage (see Section 4.3).  
In the EU, a range of real estate instruments have been implemented in the past 2-3 years  
(Table 20).67 As real estate market cycles and credit cycles differ at the country level, it is too much of a 
generalisation to say that most countries implemented these instruments in response to the crisis. 
Indeed, some of these countries did not experience a crisis in 2007-08.  
Some of the regulations have been designed or calibrated specially to cope with risk stemming 
from foreign currency lending (e.g. in HU, PL, RO) or interest rate risk (e.g. in UK, NO). Also, 
other measures not dealt with in this report have been implemented in a number of countries, such as 
bans on unhedged foreign currency (FX) lending (e.g. AT, HU, PL) or funding requirements (e.g. HU). 
                                                          
64  Prepared by a team coordinated by Katrine Graabæk Mogensen (Danmarks Nationalbank) and comprising Christian Castro 
(Banco de España), Jelena Cirjakovic (Banka Slovenije), Dragan Crnogorac (European Banking Authority), Krzysztof Gajewski 
(Narodowy Bank Polski), Christian Glebe (Deutsche Bundesbank), Sten Hansen (Finansinspektionen), Steffen Lind 
(Finanstilsynet), Rhiannon Sowerbutts (Bank of England), Katharina Steiner (Oesterreichische Nationalbank) and Luminita 
Tatarici (Banca Naţională a României).    
65  An in-depth description of most of these instruments, including their transmission channels as well as legal and institutional 
considerations stemming from CRD IV/CRR, can be found in ESRB (2014). 
66  In the EU, the legal basis for such requirements is formed by Articles 124-164 and Article 458 of the CRR and Pillar 2 requirements. 
For a detailed description of the legal basis, see ESRB (2014). Instruments related to income and collateral stretch are based on 
national legislation. 
67  The country-specific findings of this report rely, inter alia, on the responses to a survey on the concepts and definitions of 
macroprudential real estate instruments carried out within the ESRB membership. No distinction is made between whether 
instruments are introduced as hard measures or as “soft law” (i.e. best practice recommendations) and the table is not necessarily 
exhaustive on the measures taken, especially before the recent financial crisis. For example, in Norway the authorities set a 
voluntary DSTI requirement in a mortgage lenders’ code of conduct in 2006 before using the macroprudential instruments more 
actively (Salim and Wu, 2015). Another example is the minimum standards on foreign currency lending implemented by the 
Austrian authorities in 2013 which affected mortgage loans to a large extent (Financial Market Authority, 2013).    
 
Section 4 
Lessons for tackling risks stemming from the residential 
real estate sector64 
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Such instruments are not specific to the real estate sector, but they may have an important bearing on 
the build-up and materialisation of real estate-related systemic risks. 
Table 20 
Use of macroprudential instruments related to the real estate market and year of introduction 
    Income stretch Collateral stretch Banking system 
stretch 
Country Cluster 
No. of 
instruments 
LTI, DTI and 
DSTI limits 
Affordability 
requirement 
Amortisation 
requirements LTV limit 
Sectoral capital 
requirements 
AT 2 0      
BE 1 1     2013 
BG 5 0      
CZ 5 1    2015  
CY 3 2 2013   2003  
DK 2 3  2012 20001 2015  
DE 2 0      
EE 4 3 2015  2015 2015  
ES 4 0      
FI 3 2  2010  2016  
FR 1 0      
HU 5 2 2015*   2010  
HR - 1     2014 
IE 4 4 2015 2012  2015 2007 
IT 1 0      
LT 5 3 2011  2011 2011  
LU 3 1     2012 
LV 5 1    2007  
MT 4 1    2014  
NL 2 3 2013  2013 2012  
NO - 2  2011  2010  
PL 3 3 20144  2014 2014  
PT 2 0      
RO 5 2 2004   2004*  
SE 2 22   20152 2010 2007 
SI 5 0      
SK 5 3 2015  2015 2014  
UK 3 2 2014 2014    
Total number of countries  
using instruments:  20 10 5 63 16 5 
 
 
Notes: Grey rows indicate that the country experienced a real estate crisis in the 1990s or during the global financial crisis starting 
in 2008 according to the real estate crisis database (Table 11 in section 2.3.1). Clusters refer to the pre-crisis country clusters as 
identified in Section 1.4. No clustering results are available for HR and NO. 
1 The rule came into force before 2000, but the exact year is unknown. 
2 Proposal has been put on hold. 
3 Excluding Sweden (see note 2). 
4        Latest  modification. Initially, limits were introduced in 2011. 
* Asterisk denotes regulations that specifically account for FX risk in their design, either at the time of introduction or later on. 
Source: Survey on the design of instruments (excluding sectoral capital requirements) conducted among ESRB membership 
(2015). 
 
There are differences in the type of macroprudential action taken between the country clusters 
identified in Section 1 (Table 21). Measures relating to income stretch are most commonly used by 
countries from cluster 5. These countries do not use any sectoral capital requirements. The most active 
use of LTV restrictions can be observed among countries from clusters 3 and 5. Countries from 
clusters 1 and 3 have not implemented amortisation requirements. However, there is no clear link 
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between each cluster’s structural characteristics and the macroprudential actions taken by countries in 
each cluster. Actions taken will, for example, also depend on the stage of the financial cycle in each 
country. 
Table 21 
Percentage of countries in each cluster using a given instrument (July 2015) 
Instrument Income stretch Collateral stretch Banking system 
stretch 
Cluster 
LTI, DTI and DSTI 
limits 
Amortisation 
requirements LTV limit 
Sectoral capital 
requirements 
1 (shorter loan maturities, mid-range 
LTVs, low indebtedness) 
 
20% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
20% 
2 (longer maturities, moderate LTVs, 
high indebtedness) 
 
17% 
 
50% 
 
50% 
 
17% 
3 (mid-range maturities, higher LTVs, 
higher indebtedness) 
 
40% 
 
20% 
 
80% 
 
20% 
4 (longer maturities, lower LTVs, high 
indebtedness) 
 
33% 
 
0% 
 
67% 
 
33% 
5 (short maturities, quite high LTVs, low 
household indebtedness) 
 
63% 
 
38% 
 
75% 
 
0% 
 
4.2 Selection of instruments 
The operation, or the strength, of transmission channels between the real economy and banks’ 
exposures to real estate can be influenced by the use of macroprudential instruments.68 Other 
real estate market-related policies (e.g. tax or structural policies) also impact the transmission channels 
and can amplify or dampen the effects of the instruments. 
A combination of instruments seems to be the most suitable and comprehensive response to 
vulnerabilities stemming from excessive credit growth and leverage related to residential real 
estate as the instruments address different risks and channels. Chart 58 illustrates the set of 
selected instruments around the three stretches that may involve vulnerabilities for the financial 
system. There is no particular sequencing applicable to the use of the stretches, and the instruments 
can be used on a stand-alone basis or in combination. Capital-based instruments in the bottom of the 
triangle may be the most effective in directly enhancing resilience, whereas restrictions related to 
income and collateral stretches are comparatively more effective in curbing the financial cycle (ECB, 
2015b). Income stretch instruments are likely to be the most constraining in the build-up phase, 
whereas the collateral buffer also contributes to system resilience in a downturn. Capital-based 
instruments can be applied to both the stock and flow of new loans, whereas measures from the other 
two stretches can typically be applied only for new loans. A combination of instruments may also be a 
way to deal with some leakage problems, as leakage from one stretch can be captured by another 
stretch. 
In practice, a combination of instruments, even if not applied simultaneously, is the rule rather 
than the exception, in particular for collateral and income stretch instruments. Only in four 
Member States is the use of an LTV limit not combined with a requirement related to borrowers’ 
                                                          
68  For a detailed description of the transmission channels, see ESRB (2014).  
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income stretch (Table 20). Amortisation requirements, being more dependent on the specificities of 
mortgage lending, are less common and were perceived as a structural intervention.   
Effective communication is likely to be a key element when applying several instruments at the 
same time. This allows the regulator to refer to reasons for the chosen combinations, e.g. different 
sources of risk or a potential for leakage. 
Chart 58 
Instruments by stretches related to real estate lending 
 
 
Source: Expert Group on Real Estate 
 
4.2.1 Income stretch instruments 
“Income stretch” instruments can dampen the build-up of systemic risks resulting from 
excessive credit growth and leverage. Credit growth could be dampened by restricting the loan 
amount relative to the income of the borrower. LTI, DTI and DSTI ratios are by definition targeted in the 
sense that they only affect those borrowers or credit standards of institutions that will result in the most 
stretched conditions, hence shaping the tail of the distribution, in contrast to general restrictions on 
credit growth. An amortisation requirement will increase the DSTI and thus reduce the affordability of 
home ownership for borrowers with a limited repayment capacity. 
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The instruments may also increase the resilience of the financial system to the extent that lower 
debt service ratios reduce ex ante the PDs of households.69  
The immediate net effect of income requirements could put downward pressure on house 
prices. The introduction of an income requirement may reduce the demand for real estate by reducing 
the ability to borrow of households that depend on credit, and can therefore put downward pressure on 
house prices. A house price decline increases the LGDs of the existing stock of lending and thus 
reduces banks’ resilience. Therefore, such instruments should preferably be introduced and/or 
tightened during the build-up phase when real estate prices are increasing. 
4.2.2 Collateral stretch instruments 
“Collateral stretch” instruments limit the impact of materialising risks by enhancing borrowers’ 
own buffers in case of stress or default. By building up buffers up front (LTV) or over time 
(amortisation requirements), they work as a cushion before losses reach banks’ balance sheets or 
before consumption is scaled back. These instruments work ex post by mitigating the effects of the 
materialisation of risks in real estate exposures. They can thus help to address risks rooted in property 
markets, particularly in relation to property prices and changes in valuation, which may crystallise in 
different LGDs. Working in the other direction, lower LTVs can result in reduced capital holdings (under 
both the IRB and standardised approaches) because lower LTV loans have lower RWs and thus lower 
capital requirements.  
An LTV cap may also dampen credit growth by preventing a loosening of credit standards in 
the build-up phase. An LTV cap will restrict the obtainable loan amount of some borrowers and/or the 
amount banks may offer for a given level of the borrower’s own funds, and thus tends to dampen 
excessive credit growth and leverage, helping to prevent a loosening of lending standards. However, 
the dampening effect on the credit cycle may be limited as existing homeowners are less likely to find 
the cap binding, as house prices are typically increasing in the build-up phase.  
A restriction on borrowers’ ability to obtain credit will reduce demand for real estate and tends 
to put downward pressure on real estate prices. The ultimate impact on real estate prices, however, 
is not clear-cut. Construction and new supply of housing may fall as demand is reduced, potentially 
dampening the downward pressure from reduced demand. Note also that the subdued demand may 
relate to dwelling size, and that the price per square metre (the basis of real estate price statistics) can 
remain unchanged. In addition, while the long-run effect on banks’ resilience of an LTV cap, 
amortisation requirement or maturity requirement is expected to be positive, it can be negative in the 
short run as a house price reduction will increase the LTVs on existing loans and thus increase LGD. 
Therefore, such instruments should preferably be introduced and/or tightened during the build-up 
phase when real estate prices are increasing. 
                                                          
69  For instance, it has been demonstrated in Lithuania that higher debt service ratios can be associated with a higher share of 
households with overdue mortgage payments (see Bank of Lithuania, 2015).   
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4.2.3 Banking system stretch instruments 
“Banking system stretch” instruments aim to limit the impact of materialising risks by 
enhancing the loss-absorbing capacity of banks. A common instrument here is a macroprudential 
sectoral capital-based requirement. Sectoral capital-based tools can be used to target risks in the real 
estate sector directly.70 As such, these instruments can help to enhance resilience in the banking 
sector, in particular in countries where large direct losses related to real estate lending are considered 
to be a risk. If risks are expected to materialise in a way that results in losses more broadly via the 
effect on the real economy, that could indicate the need to use general capital requirements such as 
the countercyclical capital buffer or the systemic risk buffer. 
Increased capital requirements on real estate exposures might also have a dampening effect on 
credit growth by shaping banks’ risk-taking incentives. Instruments that require banks to hold 
more capital in relation to real estate exposures will incentivise them to reduce the supply of credit to 
home buyers or increase interest rates on real estate loans to cover the costs of the additional capital 
requirement, which can also lead to a reduction in credit for real estate purposes. However, this effect 
is thought to be of secondary importance.71 Higher capital requirements incentivise banks to increase 
capital and/or reduce lending to the least profitable and perhaps also least resilient real estate buyers – 
both reactions will lead to greater bank resilience. However, there could also be a crowding-out of other 
types of lending which offer less promising returns than real estate lending (ESRB, 2014). 
4.2.4 Country experiences  
The implementation of new macroprudential measures following the crisis and efforts to 
operationalise the macroprudential framework have been accompanied by more work on the 
efficiency of instruments. Crowe (2011) finds evidence in favour of the beneficial impact of 
macroprudential measures (e.g. LTV limits) in addressing housing booms,72 but the evidence on RWs 
is not clear-cut. Kuttner and Shim (2013) find that instruments such as RWs and limits on credit growth 
have little or no detectable effect on the housing market. Other measures, including those in the 
income and collateral stretch categories (DSTI and LTV), do appear to slow housing credit growth 
down, with clearer-cut evidence on the effect of the DSTI in econometric studies. Cerutti et al. (2015) 
argue that addressing a real estate boom requires a mix of policies (macroprudential, monetary, fiscal), 
but they place macroprudential policy in the first line of defence, given its capacity to take into account 
the specific features of real estate markets. 
The experience with income and collateral stretch instruments shows they had a somewhat 
dampening impact on credit growth and borrowers’ resilience. Initially, Romania used explicit 
limits (in 2004): a DSTI limit of 30% for consumer loans and 35% for mortgage loans, and an LTV limit 
of 75% for mortgage loans. Later, Banca Naţională a României moved from explicit DSTI caps to 
recommendations to credit institutions on how to establish their own maximum values according to 
                                                          
70  Broader capital-based tools such as the countercyclical capital buffer and the systemic risk buffer can also help to contain risks 
from this sector (particularly when excessive credit growth is explained by a sharp accumulation of real estate exposures). These 
instruments are outside the scope of this report. 
71  See e.g. ESRB (2014) and ECB (2015b). 
72  Nevertheless, the results should be interpreted with caution because only a few countries in the analysis have time variation in 
maximum LTVs (limiting the time dimension) and the estimated elasticities from panel studies capture mostly the divergence in 
levels across countries in the samples (i.e. the cross-sectional dimension). 
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their specific credit risk and accounting for stress, such as shocks on interest rates, FX risk and income 
risk. Neagu et al. (2015) investigate the efficiency of these measures in curbing credit growth and 
maintaining the quality of the loan portfolio and find that: (i) the impact of regulation on credit growth 
ranges between 3 and 11 percentage points in the first quarter after implementation, but gradually 
fades away and nears zero after five quarters after implementation, and (ii) the episodes of easing 
regulation are associated with an increase in the NPL ratio (for both consumer and housing loans) and 
with higher sensitivity to macroeconomic developments (such as developments in the unemployment 
rate).  
There is also evidence of the effectiveness of the differentiated and time-varying use of an 
instrument. For instance, South Korea’s experience with macroprudential instruments started in 2002, 
with the implementation of an explicit LTV limit (60% for speculative areas), differentiated further by 
loan maturity and value. An explicit DSTI cap was first introduced in 2005 and set at 40% for housing 
loans granted by banks in speculative zones if the borrower was single or the borrower’s spouse had 
debt. LTV and DSTI instruments were calibrated differently by taking into account several 
characteristics: (i) LTV limits were related to loan maturity, housing prices and the location of the 
property, and (ii) DSTI caps were set in accordance with borrower characteristics, housing prices and 
the location of the property. LTV caps were adjusted several times between 2002 and 2014 and took a 
value between 40% and 70%, while DTI caps were set between 40% and 75%. Empirical studies73 
show that macroprudential tools contributed to the stabilisation of housing markets and kept the credit 
expansion under control. Nevertheless, Kim (2013) raises the point that the effectiveness of 
macroprudential instruments was also supported by real estate lending specificities (e.g. the large 
share of short-term bullet mortgage loans) and that the measures were prone to leakages.  
The experience with banking system stretch instruments (in particular higher RWs) shows a 
less clear picture as regards their effectiveness in curbing credit growth. This supports the view 
that they would be comparatively more efficient for making the banking sector more resilient. Bulgaria74 
increased the RWs in 2005 conditioned on the LTV level, with a 50% RW set for mortgages with an 
LTV ratio below 70% (down from 80% previously) and a 100% RW otherwise. In April 2006 the RW for 
mortgage loans used in the calculation of the capital adequacy ratio was effectively raised, by lowering 
the LTV ratio from 70% to 50%. Evidence suggests this was ineffective in stopping the boom in asset 
prices and limiting the associated post-bust damage to the financial sector (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2011). In 
March 2006, Estonia increased RWs for housing loans from 50% to 100% to slow down the growth of 
housing loans. As a response, the banks (the majority of them were foreign-owned) decided to 
increase capital by attracting subordinated liabilities from parent banks instead and continued their 
lending (Eesti Pank, 2006, Sutt et al., 2011). This is in line with the general conclusions of Dell’Ariccia 
et al. (2011). 
4.3 The importance of the effective design of macroprudential instruments75 
The design and explicit definition of a policy measure are crucial for an instrument’s 
effectiveness. Important elements are clear and explicit definitions as regards collateral valuation, the 
                                                          
73   Akinci, O. and Olmstead-Rumseyy, J. (2015), Kim, C. (2014) and Kim, C. (2013). 
74  Bulgaria was not among countries that contributed to the survey on the concepts and definitions of macroprudential real estate 
tools carried out for the purpose of this report.  
75  Some parts of this section refer to the survey on concepts and definitions of macroprudential real estate tools carried out for the 
purpose of this report, which does not cover all EU Member States.  
 ESRB 
Report on residential real estate and financial stability in the EU, December 2015 
Lessons for tackling risks stemming from the residential real estate sector 93 
level of aggregation, the degree to which the instrument is binding and possible exemptions. Most 
notably, leakages and unintended side-effects, such as the reinforcement of a downturn, can be 
addressed. 
When dealing with systemic risk from real estate markets, policy-makers have to decide not 
only on which instrument to use and when, but also how to design it. Careful design is essential 
to achieve the goal of reducing systemic risk, while at the same time minimising distortions to the 
economy. Both the choice of the instruments (see Section 4.2) and their design are affected, among 
other things, by the structural characteristics of national real estate markets (see Section 1).  
Instrument design is a crucial component for the effectiveness of a measure.76 One of the main 
aspects of instrument selection and design should be avoiding/limiting leakage and unintended side-
effects. By defining the instrument metrics in a comprehensive way, incentives to circumvent the rules 
can be mitigated.77 In this respect, a combination of instruments (a “package”) and careful design of 
each element complement each other and could address some of the leakages.  
Different approaches to instrument design are being used. The design of instruments varies on 
aspects such as exemptions granted, whether or not to cover all the loans taken out by a borrower, the 
type of income to be included, the degree to which the measure will be binding, and whether the 
instrument may be adjusted over the cycle.  
Member States differ with respect to the degree of detail of their measures. In some cases, less 
detailed rules are preferred for reasons of data availability or monitoring (e.g. without a credit register it 
might be difficult to monitor borrowers’ total indebtedness). In other cases, authorities may opt for very 
precise definitions. This limits the scope for discretion and “creativity” in interpreting the rules, but may 
be overly burdensome. The effectiveness of a measure should be the guiding principle. The central 
question is to find the optimal degree of complexity. Examples of very detailed regulation can be found 
in some Asian countries, e.g. LTV limits in Hong Kong or South Korea.78 Instrument design, however, 
is no panacea and it may be too much to ask to avoid all possible kinds of leakage. 
A proportionate cap is an innovation that exempts part of the loan portfolio from a limit. The use 
of such “speed limits” can increase the flexibility of policy-makers and regulated entities. These caps 
give banks some flexibility in their lending, acknowledging that there might be cases where it might be 
justified to grant loans not respecting the cap, thereby also reducing incentives to circumvent them.79 
Such design can be helpful at an early stage of the financial cycle when the cap is not yet binding, 
lessening also potential political costs from constraining some borrowers’ credit. It also increases the 
number of policy variables as the share that can exceed the cap can be varied by the policy-maker. 
The discretion to determine who is allowed to exceed the limit is left to the bank. Proportionate caps 
have been recently introduced in several Member States (e.g. CZ, EE, IE, NO, SK, UK).80 New 
Zealand has made use of them since October 2013. The country recently presented a proposal with 
                                                          
76  Crowe et al. (2011) also find that a careful design of macroprudential measures is the key to avoid circumvention and regulatory 
arbitrage, thus improving their effectiveness.  
77  The definition can for example take into account the regulatory perimeter. For example, in Romania, the instruments have been 
adjusted in order to better contain the systemic risks and to limit the circumvention since the first introduction of DSTI and LTV 
caps at the end of 2003 (see Banca Naţională a României, 2014, chapter 7.1). 
78  See, for example, Hong Kong Monetary Authority (2011) and Igan and Kang (2011).   
79  In New Zealand, one reason for a “speed-limit” LTV was to avoid leakages because the speed limit raises the uncertainty around 
the payoffs to unregulated lenders entering the market (see Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2014). 
80  It has also been introduced in Norway (see https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/regulation-on-requirements-for-residential-
mortgage-loans/id2417372/). 
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added flexibility, as not only the cap is differentiated but also the share of the portfolio that can exceed 
the limit across sectors/regions (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2015).    
Other types of exemptions and differentiations are also used when designing instruments, 
especially collateral stretch ones. Exemptions can be motivated by: (i) the need to target the rules at 
a specific market segment and/or to target according to how different groups may be impacted by the 
regulation (e.g. an LTV cap is likely to be less constraining for existing house owners than for first-time 
buyers in the build-up phase81), (ii) recognition that under some circumstances exceeding limits is 
acceptable within predefined boundaries (e.g. exemptions from LTV limits for insured loans), and 
(iii) the need to preserve competition and mobility in the market (exemption for switcher mortgages or 
mortgages with arrears82).  
Granting exemptions can be a key element in instrument design to avoid reinforcing downturn 
effects. For example, refinancing risk can force borrowers to sell their house or become trapped with 
their existing lender if they are subject to negative income or house price shocks when the initial period 
of rate fixation is shorter than the loan maturity. This could lead to further downward pressure on house 
prices or cuts in consumption. Consideration should therefore be given to design features that can limit 
such side-effects. A number of countries have already used exemptions to this effect in the design of 
their instruments by allowing for the refinancing or transferability of existing lending. 
When housing supply is inelastic, excluding construction lending or lending for new houses 
from the application of instruments could be considered. Such an exemption was applied by New 
Zealand83 but not by the Member States surveyed for this report. On the other hand, policy-makers 
should take into account that when lenders and borrowers expect rising prices, an exemption for 
construction lending may induce speculation, which could then amplify a subsequent downturn. 
Income and collateral stretch instruments are by their very nature targeted. Such instruments 
only affect those borrowers or credit standards of institutions that will result in the most stretched 
conditions, hence shaping the tail of the distribution.  
While there is a strong case to use standardised definitions for instruments outside the 
CRR/CRD IV at the national level, this is less obvious at the European level. 84,85 Standardised 
definitions – not necessarily levels – within a country are warranted to safeguard a level playing field86 
and to minimise the regulatory burden and are also justified because the market has the same 
structural characteristics. But standardised definitions across countries might prevent tailoring the use 
of instruments to the characteristics of the national market. For example, there may be country-specific 
reasons (e.g. tax or legal reasons) why an income-related instrument is better defined relative to gross 
                                                          
81  Other economic policies can serve the purpose of protecting some groups from being adversely affected, e.g. structural/social 
policies such as social housing or state subsidies. 
82  Alternative Repayments Arrangement or other options agreed with a borrower, the purpose of which is to resolve a borrower’s 
pre-arrears or arrears situation (Central Bank of Ireland, 2014). 
83  Reserve Bank of New Zealand, “Framework for Restrictions on High-LVR Residential Mortgage Lending”, 2014. 
84  In many cases, instruments are caps on metrics that could also serve as indicators, for example the LTV ratio. Therefore, 
instrument concepts can be close to indicator concepts. Since this section covers instruments, however, arguments are made 
from the instrument perspective. 
85  Real estate instruments from CRR/CRD IV such as increased risk weights are already standardised to a wide degree. Therefore, 
the discussion is focused on tools outside the CRR/CRD IV such as LTV caps. 
86  All institutes have to report the same data and satisfy the same regulation. 
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or net income. On the other hand, different definitions can be an obstacle to reciprocity. Furthermore, a 
cross-country comparison of the use of instruments hinges on comparable concepts.  
Another design aspect is whether to set a fixed level for the instrument or to vary it over the 
cycle. Macroprudential instruments are often used in response to new developments, but they could 
also be implemented at fixed levels that are not intended to be varied over time. Such an approach 
would create a more predictable environment for the targeted institutions, minimise the risk of inaction 
bias, and lessen the risk of pro-cyclicality resulting from implementation lags. On the other hand, using 
static levels carries the risk that they do not keep pace with new market developments, could create a 
“comfort zone” for policy-makers and could be more difficult to communicate, if introduced in a stable 
environment. Table 22 elaborates further on the pros and cons of such an approach.  
Table 22 
Pros and cons of introducing static levels of instruments over the financial cycle 
Pros Cons 
 Creates stable, predictable policy, 
reducing the costs to banks of 
operationalising new credit 
standards 
 Minimises the risk of policy-maker 
inaction bias and lessens the risk 
of pro-cyclical amplification (e.g. 
risks of implementation lags for 
countercyclical measures)  
 Promotes awareness when 
assessing risks, with the potential 
drawback of reducing the 
incentive for institutions to make 
their own, more prudent, 
assessments  
 Establishes a norm that can 
incentivise more conservative 
choices by borrowers about 
indebtedness  
 The impact on constraining imprudent credit 
growth or house price bubbles may decline 
over time87 
 Difficult to estimate the appropriate level to 
minimise systemic risks through the cycle88   
 Potentially more prone to leakages over time89   
 Risks creating a “comfort zone” for policy-
makers, as risks could accumulate close to 
the tail of the distribution90 
 Difficult to communicate and explain, 
especially in a stable environment (“disaster 
myopia”) 
 
Changing the limits of collateral- or income-related instruments over the cycle is seen as a valid 
option by almost half of the Member States that apply such instruments. In the case of interest 
                                                          
87  Neagu et al. (2015) find that for Romania the incremental impact of the prudential measures on bank lending is significantly 
reduced after one year, and it is close to zero after two years. 
88  Sánchez (2015) addresses the issue of over-regulation: “Excessive regulation may hinder the development of the financial 
system, damaging long-term economic potential, something especially harmful for countries suffering from low financial 
penetration.” 
89  In the case of New Zealand, Rogers (2014) finds that the temporary nature of the measures and the way of constructing them 
(as a speed limit) might reduce the leakages associated with this type of measure. On the other hand, imposing a fixed level 
may allow lenders more room to adjust to the “new normal”. 
90  Caps could also be interpreted as a signal of levels deemed tolerable by the prudential regulator. 
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rate sensitivity and amortisation requirements, authorities are less inclined to adapt them to cyclical 
movements. 
Policy measures should be introduced in a sufficiently timely manner to act preventively, being 
mindful of the lags in transmission mechanisms. This reflects the prudential nature of 
macroprudential policy and the fact that income and collateral stretch tools can typically only be applied 
to new loans. Whether this favours one approach over the other depends on country-specific 
characteristics, the nature of the risk and these lags. In any case, as risks evolve and experience is 
gained, the need to adjust instruments or introduce further measures may arise. The use of real estate-
related measures is most likely going to be a dynamic process where experience with the tools feeds 
back into the selection and design process.  
4.3.1 Income stretch instruments 
Key aspects of the design of income-based instruments are income definitions and how 
interest rate risk is accounted for. There are differences across countries regarding whether gross or 
net post-tax income is used. In most countries, stable sources of net income are taken into account. 
However, the practical experience is that in some circumstances authorities allow less stable sources 
of income to be included in the definition (Table 23). Three Member States explicitly allow rental 
income from letting property to be included.91 
Table 23 
Income-related instruments: selected design features 
Design feature Answers 
Type  DSTI (CY, EE, HU, LT, NL, PL, RO, SK) 
 LTI (IE, UK) 
 DTI (none) 
Income  Income type: net, monthly (EE, HU, LT, PL, RO, SK), gross, yearly (IE, 
NL, UK*) 
 Mandatory deductions: none (EE, HU, IE, UK), other financial 
obligations (LT, PL), cost of living (NL, PL, SK) 
 Income verification: mostly on the basis of documents issued by an 
employer or tax authority 
 Unstable sources of income can be included (usually up to banks’ 
discretion) 
 Rental income from letting property can be included (EE, HU, LT) 
 
 
Note: The number of countries in brackets may not always add up to the total number of countries using a given instrument as 
shown in Table 1 because: (i) for a number of questions, countries could choose more than one answer, and (ii) some 
countries did not provide answers to all questions or did not reply to the survey 
* The FPC has flexibility in the choice of the income concept, currently gross income is used. 
Source: Survey on the design of instruments (excluding sectoral capital requirements) conducted among ESRB membership 
(2015). 
 
                                                          
91  As Article 125(2)(b) of the CRR stipulates that exposures are only fully and completely secured by mortgages on residential 
property if ”the risk of the borrower shall not materially depend upon the performance of the underlying property or project”, one 
has to be careful in considering rental income from the respective mortgage. 
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In principle, the numerator instruments that relate borrower obligations to income should take 
into account the overall indebtedness of the borrower. Some countries (IE, UK) have chosen to 
implement an LTI where the numerator is a single mortgage loan. This choice was partly motivated by 
the lack of a fully operational credit register that would allow monitoring of borrowers’ overall 
indebtedness. In Ireland, once the credit register has been fully established, the authorities will 
consider implementing a DTI cap - an instrument that, according to the survey for this report, no 
country has yet implemented.  
The design of income stretch instruments needs to take into account possible leakages. If rules 
are binding, borrowers and lenders may try to overcome them, for example by lengthening loan 
durations to decrease monthly debt servicing burdens or by switching to financing from a non-bank 
financial institution. Table 24 lists possible options to deal with common pitfalls of income stretch 
instruments. 
 
Table 24 
Leakages matrix: income stretch 
Instrument Leakage/pitfall Possible options 
LTI, DTI, DSTI, 
affordability 
requirements 
Longer duration  Amortisation assumptions or requirements 
(maturity cap) 
 DTI/LTI instead of DSTI 
Increase in non-
bank lending 
 Regulation referring to a product or borrower, not 
institution 
 Extending the regulation to non-bank financial 
institutions 
Sensitivity to interest 
rate changes 
 LTI/DTI instead of DSTI 
 Interest rate stress tests 
Sensitivity to interest 
rate changes 
 LTI/DTI instead of DSTI  
 Interest rate stress tests 
Teaser rates  No deferred or rising payments  
 Regulation over the whole period of the loan 
Lax stress 
assumptions 
 Institutions should conduct their own stress tests 
and should consider regulatory assumptions as a 
minimum standard 
Amortisation 
requirements 
High monthly 
repayment burden 
 Combined use with DSTI 
 
Low levels of interest rates increase the amount of credit that can be granted to a customer for 
a given income, but if rates rise some borrowers may no longer be able to service their debt. 
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Such risk is commonly addressed by using additional interest rate stress (sensitivity) tests when 
determining borrowers’ creditworthiness. Sensitivity tests can be used as a part of affordability tests or 
DSTI limits.  
Amortisation requirements are often used in combination with DSTI caps. Since institutions may 
attempt to overcome DSTI limits by extending the maturity of loans, the majority of Member States that 
have DSTI limits in force have also implemented amortisation requirements. The maximum maturity 
period varies between 30 years (e.g. EE, SK) and 40 years (e.g. LT) (see Table 25). In some countries, 
the maximum amortisation period for the loan is higher than the maximum period that can be taken into 
account for calculating creditworthiness.  
Addressing the risk of evading DSTI caps through longer-dated loans is not the only motivation 
for introducing amortisation requirements. Such requirements can be a response to rising durations 
for which mortgages are granted, or to rapid household credit growth. In the Member States surveyed, 
the average maturity of post-crisis mortgage loans is nearly 24 years in countries that do not have 
maturity caps in force and 22.5 in those that have implemented such restrictions. Amortisation 
requirements need not be expressed in terms of maturity; they can also be specified in terms of 
amortisation rates. For example, the Swedish FSA has proposed annual amortisations of 2% for loans 
with an LTV ratio above 70%, and amortisations of 1% for loans with an LTV ratio between 50% and 
70%.92 A similar proposal has been put forward by the Norwegian government (Finansdepartementet, 
2015). 
 
Table 25 
Amortisation requirements: selected design features 
Design feature Answers 
Type Maturity cap (EE, LT, PL, SK), amortisation requirement (DK, NL, SE, SK) 
Loans covered Total loan (DK, EE, LT, PL, SK), part of the loan (DK, NL), individual 
amortisation scheme (DK) 
Maturity caps 30 years (EE, SK, for LT from 1 November 2015 onwards), 35 years (PL), 40 
years (LT) 
 
 
Note: The number of countries in brackets may not always add up to the total number of countries using a given instrument as 
shown in Table 20 because: (i) for a number of questions, countries could choose more than one answer, and (ii) some 
countries did not provide answers to all questions or did not reply to the survey. 
Source: Survey on the design of instruments (excluding sectoral capital requirements) conducted among ESRB membership 
(2015). 
 
                                                          
92  On 23 April 2015 the Swedish FSA (Finansinspektionen) put the implementation on hold owing to an unclear legal mandate. On 
20 May 2015 the government announced its ambition to provide the necessary legal support for Finansinspektionen. 
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Table 26 
Sensitivity tests: selected design features 
Design feature Answers 
Type of stress test Interest rate (DK, FI, IE, LT, NO, PL, SK, UK)  
FX (PL)  
LGD/PD (LU) 
Assumptions for 
interest rate 
increase 
2 percentage points (IE, SK), 3 percentage points (UK), 4 percentage points 
(PL), 5 percentage points (LT, from 1 November 2015 onwards) 
Exemptions Stress tests are applied only when interest rate refixing period is shorter than 
maturity (SK) 
Mortgage loan has a fixed rate for its full maturity; 5% of mortgages in terms 
of value are allowed to be issued with a DSTI of up to 60% (LT*) 
Timing Structural intervention (LT, LU, NO, PL, SK), temporarily applied (NO)  
 
 
* Exemption is valid from 1 November 2015. 
Note: The number of countries in brackets may not always add up to the total number of countries using a given instrument as 
shown in Table 20 because: (i) for a number of questions, countries could choose more than one answer, and (ii) some 
countries did not provide answers to all questions or did not reply to the survey 
Source: Survey on the design of instruments (excluding sectoral capital requirements) conducted among ESRB membership 
(2015). 
 
4.3.2 Collateral stretch instruments 
Key aspects of the design of collateral-based instruments include valuation approaches and the 
coverage of the instrument. 
Table 27 
LTV ratio: selected design features 
Design feature Answers 
Numerator All actually disbursed new loans (sometimes credit lines as well) secured by a 
mortgage, irrespective of purpose (purchasing, renovating) or type of property 
(OOH, BTL – exception: SE, only OOH*) 
Denominator 
(valuation) 
Market value of the property (DK, EE**, FI, HU, IE**, LT, NL, NO, PL, RO, 
SE), transaction value of the property (EE**, IE**, NO, SK), mortgage lending 
value (NO, SK) 
Aggregation Collateral level (DK, EE, HU, LT, SE, SK), loan level (FI, NL, PL, RO), 
borrower level (IE, NO) 
Timing LTV at origination (EE, FI, HU, IE, LT, NL, NO, RO, SK), LTV updated for 
repayment, etc. (PL); applies usually from the date the contract is signed or 
the date when it becomes effective 
 
 
* The regulation of the housing market in SE effectively means that a BTL market is not economically viable.  
** The lower of the market value and the transaction price. 
Note: The number of countries in brackets may not always add up to the total number of countries using a given instrument as 
shown in Table 20 because: (i) for a number of questions, countries could choose more than one answer, and (ii) some 
countries did not provide answers to all questions or did not reply to the survey. OOH stands for owner-occupied housing 
and BTL for buy to let. 
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Ideally, the valuation of collateral should allow for little discretion and exclude cyclical 
elements. Housing valuations tend to be pro-cyclical. Using less cyclical measures (e.g. a prudent 
valuation or mortgage lending value) could ensure that the instrument acts as a natural stabiliser. The 
crucial point is that institutions should have little discretion in determining the value. Otherwise, 
collateral valuations might be overvalued, particularly in times of excessive optimism. The majority of 
Member States surveyed used market values for LTV (Table 27). The mortgage lending value (MLV), 
where, among other things, long-term sustainable aspects of the property value are taken into account, 
is used by two countries.93 94  
In some non-European countries (Korea, New Zealand), LTV limits are designed and calibrated 
to take into account regional differences in housing markets. The aim is to address problems 
arising in selected areas of the country (regional hot-spots, e.g. big cities) that are often a result of 
speculative activity. Such design can take the form of stricter LTV limits for purchasing a property in 
selected areas (Korea) or lower exemptions (“speed limits”, e.g. New Zealand95). The result of 
supplementing an LTV limit with, for example, an LTI limit may in effect be that lending in larger cities is 
more constrained than in other parts of the country as house prices are typically relatively higher in 
larger cities. 
The design of instruments that are based on the value of real estate needs to take into account 
closely related regulation (for example, with respect to covered bonds) to minimise the 
compliance burden. First, macroprudential instruments based on the value of collateral should ideally 
have the same valuation method to achieve comparability. Second, if there are rules and methods for 
the valuation of properties in the pool of covered bonds for determining capital requirements or in 
property tax legislation, there may be advantages in these also being used in macroprudential 
instruments. 
Increasing the value of collateral is one of the possible leakages that should be addressed in 
the design of collateral stretch instruments. Other possible leakages include topping up the loan 
(by taking out an unsecured loan at another institution to comply with the LTV requirement) or splitting 
up the loan (borrowing from multiple lenders). Table 28 lists possible ways to deal with such leakages 
and pitfalls.  
Table 28 
Leakages matrix: collateral stretch 
Instrument Leakage/pitfall Possible options 
LTV 
Topping up  DSTI/DTI rule 
 Verifying the source of the borrower’s deposit 
 Broadening the definition of the numerator  
Splitting up  Maintaining a credit register or mortgage register 
Increasing the value 
of the property 
 Using the lower of the market value of the 
property and the value assessed by the appraiser 
                                                          
93  For example, in Germany, the MLV is used for the valuation of collateral underlying a covered bond-type asset pool (“Pfandbriefe”). 
The MLV is based on a prudential assessment of the long-term value of the collateral without taking speculative elements into 
account. 
94  The EBA is developing regulatory technical standards for rigorous criteria for the assessment of the mortgage lending value (see 
Article 124(4)(a) of the CRR). 
95  http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/regulation_and_supervision/banks/consultations/Response-to-submissions-21-august.pdf 
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4.3.3 Banking system stretch instruments 
Five Member States use specific RRE instruments related to banking system stretch  
(Table 20).96 Three countries made changes to the capital requirements for real estate loans, but using 
different implementation measures. As an example, Belgium introduced in 2013 higher RWs for 
mortgages for IRB banks as a response to rising house prices and rapid mortgage lending growth. In 
April 2014, the Belgian authorities notified the ESRB of their intention to maintain higher RWs in 
accordance with Article 458 of the CRR.97 
4.4 Calibration of real estate instruments 
4.4.1 Calibration principles 
A wide array of methods, involving varying degrees of complexity and data intensity, can be 
used to help to calibrate macroprudential instruments. Expert judgement is critical when setting an 
instrument, but this judgement may be usefully informed by such methods (Chart 59).  
Chart 59 
Calibration methods according to complexity 
 
 
Source: Expert Group on Real Estate 
 
 
Member States take many different approaches to the calibration of instruments. The selection of 
macroprudential real estate instruments and their calibration is first and foremost a national 
responsibility.98 Given the very specific national characteristics of real estate markets outlined in 
Section 1 of the report, the use of different approaches seems warranted.  
                                                          
96  The design of sector-specific capital requirements is governed by the CRR and was hence not included in the survey for the 
purpose of this report.   
97   See also Section 4.4 for the Swedish experience with the calibration of RWs. 
98  For countries participating in the SSM, the SSM Regulation (Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013) provides 
that the ECB should be consulted on intended macroprudential policy measures within CRR/CRD IV. Also, if deemed necessary, 
the ECB can apply higher requirements for capital buffers and apply more stringent measures aimed at addressing the risks 
(referred to as “topping-up power”) under Article 5.2. The obligation to notify the ECB or topping-up power does not apply to 
instruments implemented at national discretion, such as LTV, LTI and DSTI measures (ESRB, 2014). 
Simple with low data requirements Complex with high data requirements
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A combination of calibration methods seems to be a promising approach to gauge the potential 
impact of the policy measure from different perspectives. If different calibration methods point to 
somewhat different settings, judgement will be needed.99 Even if different methods lead to similar 
indications regarding the level of the chosen instrument, it may be necessary to take a more 
conservative stance on the instrument’s level to better reflect the systemic risks; this was, for example, 
the approach followed in Sweden in its deployment of risk weights.100  
The specific risks to be addressed with the use of an instrument are highly relevant for its 
calibration. For example, the calibration of an LTI or DSTI cap should differ depending on whether the 
instrument primarily targets the borrowers’ and/or the lenders’ resilience. Empirical evidence shows 
that in some countries, consumers will cut expenditure considerably rather than default on their 
mortgages. As a result, if the aim of the policy measure is to limit potential negative effects of 
household indebtedness on the economy more broadly, rather than exclusively to limit future defaults 
in the event of a downturn, a different calibration may need to be chosen. The calibration of LTV caps 
could also reflect the heterogeneity of default risk across classes of borrowers, such as first-time 
buyers and second and subsequent buyers (see also Section 4.3 on granting exemptions).101 Another 
objective could be to dampen pro-cyclical dynamics in credit and housing markets or to strengthen the 
resilience of the banking sector via capital requirements. A sequencing of objectives might be 
necessary.102  
The timing of implementation during the cycle affects calibration. If macroprudential instruments 
are set to insure against a build-up in real estate risk, then this may involve a different calibration 
compared with setting a policy later in the financial cycle. In the latter case, the short-term costs of the 
same calibration may be higher – as it would be immediately binding – which might lead to a somewhat 
looser calibration being chosen.103   
A cost-benefit analysis is important, but work on that topic in the field of macroprudential 
policy is still in its relative infancy. The use of an instrument is likely to bring about costs (e.g. higher 
borrowing costs or smaller mortgage loans for some borrowers). In the long run, the benefits should 
outweigh the costs. However, assessing the net benefit of macroprudential policy still remains 
uncharted territory. In particular, most macroprudential policies have been implemented only recently 
so that it is too early to evaluate their full impact, and often the costs tend to be more easily identified 
(particularly by industry) than the benefits, which may only accrue over time. There is though some 
preliminary evidence that real estate measures (e.g. LTV limits) – also combined with tax measures – 
have helped to reduce the build-up of leverage in the housing sector (Morgan, Regis and Salike, 2015; 
Salim and Wu, 2015). Regular monitoring of key mortgage and housing market indicators should be 
standard procedure in the ex post monitoring of policies’ effectiveness, which might trigger a 
subsequent adjustment in the measures (IMF GMPI database, 2013). One way to approach an ex ante 
                                                          
99  For example, the Swiss authorities highlight the need for more discretion in the decision on the instrument in case of a 
heterogeneous picture of the situation on the domestic mortgage and real estate market (see IMF GMPI Survey, 2013). 
100  The Swedish FSA used historical information, stress tests, international comparisons and qualitative assessment for the 
calibration of RWs. Different methods lead to similar indications for the level of the chosen instrument, namely setting higher RWs.  
101  Kelly, O’Malley and O’Toole (2015) find for a cross-section of Irish mortgages in 2003 that first-time buyers have lower default 
rates than second and subsequent buyers. While the default risk increases linearly with the LTV at origination up to an LTV of 
85%, it increases sharply above this threshold. The default rate of first-time buyers is 45% lower at an LTV of 80-85%. The 
relationship between default rates and LTI is more linear. 
102  For example, Irish macroprudential policy decided to first target the resilience of banks and households to financial shocks and 
then to dampen pro-cyclical dynamics between property lending and housing prices (Central Bank of Ireland, 2014).    
103  For example when there is no house price/credit boom, one could set a DTI limit of 5 because the banks are not (yet) lending at 
very high income stretches, so it is not binding. But if the limit is only being implemented once house prices are booming, one 
may have to set a DTI limit of 6 as credit is already being granted at higher income stretches, hence the calculated cost of the 
policy would be greater.  
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analysis of policies’ net benefit is to work towards estimations of the transmission channels of the 
instruments and to use examples of best practice in other countries or interpret the benefit as avoiding 
the “cost of non-action”. The latter can be approximated by the costs of a real estate crisis in other 
countries. It should also be considered who bears the cost of (non-)action. 
Leakages will affect the calibration and also the design. If an instrument is prone to leakages or 
only applies to a subset of institutions (e.g. only banks headquartered within a specific country), the 
work of Bianchi and Bengui (2014) suggests that macroprudential actions can still be effective but the 
calibration may need to be tighter to have a similar effect. However, the more binding the instrument, 
the more likely agents are to find ways to avoid it. Calibration and design issues therefore interact.  
Structural features of real estate markets or the economy and the interaction with other policy 
areas should be considered. For instance, the tax deductibility of mortgage interest and/or longer 
repayment periods for mortgages is likely to have an effect on the proportion of lending affected by a 
given limit.104 The simultaneous existence and interaction of various policy measures (also) targeting 
real estate markets and/or indebtedness – whether they be macro- or microprudential measures, or 
monetary policy or tax and structural policies – should also be considered in the calibration of 
macroprudential instruments. In addition, the interaction with different credit standards matters (Dietsch 
and Welter-Nicol, 2014).  
4.4.2 Calibration methods 
Some specific calibration methods are outlined below, starting with simpler hands-on approaches and 
going on to look at more academic methods. Box 4 illustrates the use of some of these methods for a 
number of Member States.  
a) Descriptive analysis. A necessary first step is understanding the real estate market and its 
financing structure, as an important basis for expert judgement (e.g. see the case study on Romania in 
Box 4). 
Pros: simple; suitable for any real estate instrument and for developing a common understanding of 
risks in the national market; regular monitoring is important for potentially adjusting the policy measure. 
Cons: does not allow a simultaneous impact of developments in policy and real estate markets, e.g. on 
lending volumes, to be disentangled. 
b) International benchmarking. Other countries’ experience can serve as a benchmark for domestic 
action, after taking cross-country differences in structural and dynamic characteristics into account. A 
selection of best practices could be based on similarities of these characteristics. International 
experience and academic studies can be helpful in identifying critical thresholds for instrument 
                                                          
104  Tax deductibility may incentivise a borrower to take the maximum mortgage possible and then save elsewhere. Repayment and 
amortisation does not happen over time and therefore borrowers will have an incentive to have the highest LTV they can (and not 
change it). This leads to more concentrated LTV limits. 
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calibration.105 Annex 3 provides an EU-wide overview of macroprudential measures already 
implemented, which features widespread use of LTV and LTI/DSTI tools.106 
Pros: simple; suitable for any real estate instrument and for developing a common understanding of 
best practices; easy communication of role-model countries; might serve as a substitute for a lack of 
information/data at national level; might complement econometric approaches to calibration. 
Cons: does not take into account country-specific macrofinancial circumstances;107 peer-group 
comparisons should be updated regularly as other countries might move forward with their own 
policies; difficult to implement when a dynamic approach is desirable; most case studies are relatively 
recent ones, which makes it difficult to judge the effectiveness of instruments.  
c) Crisis costs. As one element, costs of bank recapitalisations following housing market crises can 
be related to the risk-weighted assets of banks. This can give a first indication of capital needs in case 
of a crisis and of the capital required to increase the resilience of the banking system. In addition, 
public guarantees (on mortgage portfolios) may point to potential systemic risks and costs if these 
guarantees are drawn. Information from indicators signalling the build-up and materialisation of 
systemic risks in the real estate sector (e.g. real estate prices) may also be useful when calibrating 
activation and deactivation rules associated with different instruments. 
Pros: particularly suitable for sectoral capital requirements (balance sheet instruments); easy to 
communicate; same approach might be followed for the calibrations of aggregate capital requirements; 
useful to get a feeling of the potential minimum thresholds for instruments. 
Cons: need to be narrowed down to address specific risks and losses stemming from the real estate 
sector exclusively; disentangling other sources of risk and the multiple effects occurring during a 
banking crisis may not be easy in practice; backward-looking - prior experience is not necessarily 
representative of how losses may occur in a future downturn. 
d) Crisis prevention – stress-test approach. Stress tests can also guide calibrations by providing 
estimates of losses under different scenarios and parameter values.108 
Pros: more complex but well-developed methodology and experience with stress testing (tools in place 
in many countries); allows simulations of scenarios which may be difficult to capture in a formal 
theoretical model; suitable for any real estate instrument as stress tests can be undertaken at the bank 
and household level (microeconomic stress tests); suitable for adjustment.  
                                                          
105  For example, the Central Bank of Ireland (2014) points out that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision defines a high 
LTV as greater than 80%. In addition, Article 125 of the CRR requires that banks hold higher capital against certain residential 
loan exposures with an LTV higher than 80%. Such indications can serve as a first benchmark. 
106  See also Crowe et al. (2011) for a review of countries’ experiences with a number of measures to address real estate risks. 
107  For instance, in countries where savings in assets other than houses are associated with preferential treatment, e.g. pension 
savings, households may be less inclined to also put their savings into their houses from a life-cycle perspective. Whether the 
resulting higher LTVs (following lower down payments or less amortisation) are associated with higher systemic risk relative to 
countries with lower LTVs is likely to depend on a multitude of factors. 
108  For example, the Central Bank of Ireland (2014) applied its loan loss forecasting models to simulate loan losses, had LTV ratios 
been lower. Although such an analysis does not account for feedback loops (e.g. between tighter lending standards, mortgage 
credit growth and house prices), it provides a first (though underestimated) indication of the potential impact of an LTV cap. 
Another example is provided by the Norwegian central bank (Andersen, 2013), which used historical default and loss data, 
stress tests and other data to estimate what the average risk weight should be. 
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Cons: stress tests may not take into account all the relevant issues; may be subject to some arbitrary 
assumptions for the scenarios; not easy to disentangle feedback effects; data requirements are high. 
e) Credit cycle approach. Excessive credit growth in boom times can lead to a build-up of risks and 
consequently result in excessive credit cuts during the bust. Linking LTVs/LTIs and DSTIs/DTIs to 
movements in the credit cycle allows for a better understanding of the impact of these ratios on 
excessive credit growth. In addition, impulse response functions can be used to analyse the impact of 
caps on LTVs/LTIs or DSTIs/DTIs on credit series to learn more about alternative thresholds (e.g. 
Albacete et al., 2014). As with the early warning approach, cross-country or country-specific studies 
can be used.  
Pros: reasonably simple to do basic analysis; suitable for LTV/LTI or DSTI/DTI limits and sectoral 
capital requirements; mixture of rule-based and discretionary approach possible; targets credit 
expansion more directly; aims to tackle the source of credit-driven banking crises; estimation can be 
constantly updated. 
Cons: difficult to define thresholds for excessive developments; needs agreement on credit cycle 
definitions (e.g. which credit aggregates should be targeted) and measurement (e.g. statistical filters or 
alternative techniques used to calculate equilibrium or long-run credit levels); lack of data in countries 
without enough observations on full credit cycles. 
f) Structural models. For example, credit risk portfolio models (e.g. on residential housing loans) 
applied at an aggregate level might be used to calculate the potential effects of LTV/LTI and DSTI/DTI 
caps on credit losses (e.g. Harrison, 2009; Andersen, 2013; Montes, 2013). These types of models can 
be used to calibrate both PDs and LGDs, and are therefore informative for the calibration of risk 
weights. The estimates of the losses can then be integrated into stress-test analyses which would allow 
for consideration of alternative scenarios. In addition, one could measure the contribution of loan 
portfolio segments to total portfolio losses and thus gauge the riskiness of different sub-portfolios (e.g. 
portfolios according to LTV or DSTI characteristics). The results can give an indication of optimal levels 
for LTV/DSTI caps. Dietsch and Welter-Nicol (2014), for example, find that portfolio credit risk in the 
French credit market is close to the 100% LTV and 35% DSTI thresholds, which is near to the levels of 
the internal guidelines often used by banks. The combination of both instruments can be effective in 
keeping the total portfolio credit risk in check.  
g) DSGE models. For example, Quint and Rabanal (2013), though their work is still in a relatively early 
stage of development, may also help to guide calibrations for LTV/LTI and DSTI/DTI limits.  
Pros: complex; suitable for any real estate instrument; data requirements are high; well founded in 
economic theory; allows an integrated view; permits a better articulated representation of key 
transmission channels.  
Cons: some assumptions may be unrealistic or difficult to calibrate; the use of general equilibrium 
models in financial stability is still in an early stage; take time to calibrate; more suitable for steady-
state level rather than adjustments. 
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Box 4  
Country examples of calibration methods 
The calibration of LTV and DSTI limits in Romania 
In the case of Romania, the calibration method was a hybrid approach that combined both qualitative 
and quantitative analyses. The qualitative assessment looked at potential upside and downside risks 
associated with such measures (e.g. the costs of circumvention via granting of loans by unregulated 
institutions, extension of maturities, promotional loans, etc.). The quantitative analysis relied on a set of 
key metrics: (i) risk indicators (NPL ratios by type of loan, income, currency, LTV bucket and maturity), 
(ii) the share of exposures by sub-portfolio (outstanding stocks and flows) and associated growth rates, 
and (iii) real estate market developments. The analysis of NPLs by several categories (LTV buckets, 
categories of income, vintages, etc.) was very informative. The most recent regulation in Romania has 
proposed different levels of LTV caps by type of borrower (hedged vs. unhedged) and by currency. 
This distinction was made based on the evidence of different repayment behaviours, and because 
mortgage loans in foreign currency exhibited higher NPL ratios. 
The authorities later moved from explicit DSTI caps to requiring credit institutions to establish their own 
maximum values according to their specific credit risk and after accounting for a stress scenario, such 
as shocks on interest rates, exchange rate risk and income risk (see Neagu et al., 2015).  
The calibration of LTI and interest rate stress in affordability requirements in the UK 
In the UK, the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) examined evidence from the period before the 
financial crisis and noticed that UK households with gross DSTIs in excess of around 40% were more 
likely to experience payment difficulties. In previous stress episodes, such as the early 1990s, payment 
difficulties had arisen at much lower DSTIs. As an approximate guide, at a mortgage rate of 7%, DSTIs 
in the range of 35-40% are roughly equivalent to LTI ratios of around 4.25-4.75 for a 25-year mortgage. 
An LTI limit was preferred to a DSTI limit as the latter would also require a mortgage term limit.  
The FPC also considered measures to tackle risks related to variable rate mortgage loans. In response 
to a recent mortgage market review, many lenders said they had already been using a stressed 
interest rate assumption of around 7% in their affordability tests for mortgages. This implied a “stress” 
of 2½ to 3 percentage points relative to current mortgage rates, compared with an increase implied by 
current market expectations of around 2¼ percentage points. The prescribed stress of 300 basis points 
was calibrated to avoid any relaxation in this level and to ensure that a prudent level was applied by all 
institutions. 
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After the breakdown of the communist system in the 1990s, Poland managed to create from 
scratch a market economy and a simple and effective banking sector relying on large universal 
banks. At the same time, the long-run housing policy was oriented towards owner-occupied housing 
(OOH) and housing loans. However, the development of mortgage loans was hindered by high inflation 
(19.9% in 1996 and 7.3% in 1999) and the lack of know-how.  
In the 1990s OOH was financed with double indexed mortgage loans and (mostly in USD) loans 
denominated in foreign currencies (FX). This was the introduction of FX lending to the financial 
market. As the economic transformation had started with a strongly undervalued Polish zloty (PLN), 
the currency appreciated continuously in later periods. Consequently, consumers had a low perception 
of the FX risk and FX lending became popular. After 2000, the mortgage market developed only with 
decreasing inflation and increasing economic growth and income. Migration to large cities started. 
Against the background of high inflation and a high mortgage interest rate for PLN loans, Polish banks 
started, with the help of their foreign owners, to issue FX-denominated mortgages. They were mostly 
denominated in CHF – the cheapest available currency at that time.   
Consumers expected house prices to rise after the EU accession and the demand for new 
housing rose amidst a very small developer market, and as a result house prices started to rise 
in 2003. Loan disbursements and house prices accelerated further in 2005. During the period 2005-07 
house prices and the amount of outstanding mortgages doubled. Banks wanted to sustain the 
mortgage demand by easing credit granting conditions, especially for the income buffer.  
The fast increase of mortgages in connection with rising house prices prompted the Financial 
Supervision Authority (FSA) to react. Since July 2006, Recommendation S has forced banks issuing 
FX-denominated loans to calculate the mortgage affordability of their clients in the following way: they 
assume a PLN loan (with higher interest rates) and have to increase the mortgage value by 20% in the 
calculation. In 2007 the RW for the part of the FX-denominated loan with an LTV lower than 50% was 
increased from 35% to 75%. At the same time, the RW for this part of PLN loans was lowered to 35%. 
In both cases the RW for the part of the loan that corresponds to 50-100% of the LTV remained the 
same and stayed at 100%. In June 2012 the RW for them was increased to 100%, irrespective of the 
LTV level. The version of Recommendation S that came into force in June 2014 forbids granting FX-
denominated loans to consumers who cannot hedge against the FX risk, thus who do not have a 
permanent income in the currency of the mortgage. 
The regulations introduced in 2006-07 were not well accepted, neither by banks, nor by 
consumers, nor by a large fraction of politicians. After criticism, the location, structure and tasks of 
the FSA were changed in 2008. This strongly affected the effectiveness of its work. After 2008, the 
banking sector started to curb FX lending at its own initiative. As it was forbidden to grant FX-
denominated loans to customers with an income in a different currency, banks finally started to grant 
only PLN loans.  
Even though there were significant house price increases in the largest cities in Poland, the 
scale of the problems caused was too small to cause any harm to the housing sector and the 
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financial sector. A significant part of the FX-denominated loans was financed by foreign banks owning 
the domestic banks with short-term FX swaps. Those banks sustained the financing of their 
subsidiaries. Thus the main effect of FX shocks was the growing demand for PLN-denominated 
deposits and the growth of their interest possibly balancing the FX shock. In the following years the 
FSA made banks open long-run credit lines between domestic banks that issued FX loans and their 
parent banks, in order to decrease the liquidity risk. The disequilibrium in the housing market was 
absorbed over the following years. The last remaining effect of the boom were large portfolios of CHF-
denominated loans, which amount to around CHF 40 billion or 10% of GDP and 11% of banking sector 
assets. 
A current analysis of the banking sector performed by Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP) and the 
FSA shows that the regulations improved the quality of this loan portfolio significantly. The 
quality of FX-denominated loans was better than that of PLN loans. Later on, FX shocks did not alter 
their quality significantly. One important determinant of this outcome is the fact that Recommendation S 
forbids banks to grant FX-denominated loans to those households that could not afford PLN loans, a 
practice they applied earlier.  
Other factors making the FX-denominated loan portfolio so resilient to shocks were their 
interest rate type, the current economic situation of EU countries and the actions of their 
central banks amidst the economic crisis in Europe. The most common mortgage form was a 
mortgage with a fixed mark-up and an interest rate indexed to the LIBOR. The FX shock was 
cushioned by the drastic reduction of the LIBOR, when central banks loosened their monetary policy to 
deal with the economic problems. As a consequence the CHF/PLN exchange rate and the interest rate 
level moved in opposite directions, and the increase of the debt service was wiped out by the fall in 
interest rates. For most clients the costs of the FX-denominated mortgages were lower than those for 
PLN loans, which had an impact on the quality of those loan portfolios.  
Another test came in January 2015 when the Swiss National Bank (SNB) removed the 1.20 floor 
on the Swiss franc against the euro, which resulted in an unprecedented appreciation of the CHF 
against the PLN. This happened during an election period. So far, the FX-denominated loan portfolio 
has performed well. However, the FSA has taken steps to make the absorption of this shock easier. 
They recommended various possibilities to the banks: to take the negative LIBOR interest rate into 
account for the indexing of the mortgage rate; to allow a cost-free change of the FX-denominated loan 
for a PLN loan at the current NBP rate; to lower the spread during FX transactions that are used to pay 
back the loan; to no longer ask for additional insurance when the LTV exceeds 100%; to allow for a 
break in the service of the debt; and to allow the mortgage period to be extended.  
The Polish banking sector is highly capitalised and passed a stress-test scenario assuming that the 
CHF equals PLN 4.5 or even 5. The FSA offers an alternative solution to the problem. It allows the 
denomination of the loan to be changed from CHF to PLN, and the distribution of the costs equally 
between the bank and its client. This process may last until the loan is repaid. It can be assumed that 
most lenders will not use this option as they expect an appreciation of the PLN in the long run. 
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Chart 61 
Monthly repayment of CHF housing loans (in 
PLN) versus PLN housing loans (housing 
purchased in the specified year) and LTV 
level in January 2015 
(percentage) 
 
 
Sources: NBP and FSA. 
Notes: The lines represent the ratio of a FX mortgage 
repayment and the repayment of a comparable 
mortgage taken out in PLN at a given time. The bars 
indicate the LTV of each cohort at the end of January 
2015. 
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Chart 60 
Housing loan receivables (PLN billions), 
regulations and house prices in the seven 
biggest cities 
 
(PLN/ 1 sq. m.) 
 
 
Sources: NBP and FSA. 
Notes: The brown and blue lines represent the 
outstanding housing mortgage in FX and PLN, 
respectively. The orange line shows the house prices 
in the seven major cities. The vertical lines indicate 
the introduction or modification of Recommendations 
S and T, Regulation U and other regulations. 
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The clustering was done for a pre-crisis period (taking 2007-08 data) and a post-crisis 
period (2012-13). 
Country coverage 
EU countries excluding Croatia (as there were almost no data available). 
2.1 Imputation 
In clustering, missing data are problematic (as clustering is based on distance measures). Therefore 
we applied imputation. The imputation was done with the software program R. 
The applied imputation algorithm follows the following steps: 
1) extract variables with full observations; 
2) compute matrix correlations for all variables and find variables with complete observations which are 
best correlated with missing values (Chart 62) 
3) generate linear regression models: check whether R2 is OK and whether the individual model has a 
good fit in terms of the missing observations. 
 
 
Documentation on clustering of countries  
based on their structural features 
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2.1.1 Correlation 
Chart 62 
Correlation matrix pre- and post-crisis 
 
 
 
 
2.1.2 Regression models: imputed variables 
The following regression models were applied: 
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑥𝑖  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) + 𝜀 
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Table 29 
Variables in the regression model used to impute data (suffix “_pre” means pre-crisis period 
and “_post” means post-crisis period) 
Dependent variable Independent variable R2 
taxmarg_pre taxmarg_post, OM_pre, rinv_average 0.88 
mortloans_pre mortloans_post, LTV_pre, matur_pre 0.62 
convat_pre convat_post, LTV_pre, rinv_average 0.84 
debtinc_pre OM_pre 0.90 
LTV_pre LTV_post,convat_post,rinv_average 0.44 
taxmarg_post taxmarg_pre, OM_post, hown_post, rinv_average 0.90 
mortloans_post mortloans_pre, OM_post, hown_post, rinv_average 0.65 
debtinc_post OM_post 0.82 
matur_post matur_pre, OM_post, debtinc_post 0.58 
LTV_post LTV_pre, OM_post, debtinc_post, rinv_average 0.41 
 
This table captures only non-cyclical variables. The variable rinv_average to measure the strength of 
housing supply was used over the whole sample period as the share of residential investment in GDP 
changes only gradually.  
2.2 Standardisation 
After imputation we did a classical standardisation (X minus the mean for X, divided by the standard 
deviation of X). 
2.3 Clustering 
Applied method: 
Hierarchical approach – Ward’s linkage 
Performed in Stata version 13.1 
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The following tables present an overview of real estate-related measures taken by EU/EEA countries. It 
is challenging to determine exactly when a measure is taken with a macroprudential purpose. 
Therefore, the tables follow the ESRB’s broad interpretation of “measures of macroprudential interest” 
rather than “macroprudential measures”. 
Table 30 
LTV in the EU and Norway 
Country Level 
(baseline) 
Remarks Cyclicality and 
exemptions 
Implementation 
date 
Cyprus 70-80% 80% for financing the primary permanent residence 
of the borrower, and 70% for all other property 
financing cases. 
N/A 4 December 2013 
Denmark 95% Home buyers are generally required to make a down 
payment of at least 5% when purchasing a home.  
N/A N/A (in process) 
Estonia 85% LTV limit is 90% if guaranteed by KredEx. Up to 
15% of the amount of new housing loans issued in a 
quarter are allowed to breach the limit. Exemptions 
for mortgages in arrears. 
Structural and 
cyclical  
1 March 2015 
Finland 90-95% LTV of 90% (95% for first-time house buyers) by 
law. Cap can be tightened by 10 percentage points 
by Finnish FSA.  
Cyclical, cap 
can be 
tightened 
1 July 2016 
Hungary 45-80% Limits are differentiated according to currency of 
loan (HUF - 80%, EUR - 60%, other currencies - 
45%). Exemptions for switcher mortgages, 
mortgages in arrears and loans under a certain 
threshold. 
Structural and  
cyclical  
1 January 2015 
Ireland 70-90% Proportionate LTV limits of: 80% for non-first-time 
buyers (FTBs); 90% for FTBs of properties up to 
EUR 220,000; a sliding LTV limit based on property 
value for FTBs over EUR 220,000. To be exceeded 
by no more than 15% of the value of new lending for 
primary homes. Buy-to-let (BTL) loans with LTV 
greater than 70% should be no more than 10% of 
the value of new BTL loans. Exemptions for 
switcher mortgages, mortgages in arrears and 
negative equity. 
 9 February 2015  
Latvia 90% 90% for residential mortgage lending; 95% for loans 
supported by a state guarantee under the Law on 
Assistance in Resolution of Dwelling Issues. The 
LTV requirement is set in the Law on Consumer 
Rights' Protection, but Latvijas Banka can issue a 
recommendation on the appropriate LTV level.  
N/A July 2014 
Lithuania 85% Exemptions for switcher mortgages and low loan 
amounts. 
Structural  1 September 2011 
Malta 70% Continuation of practice since 2008 for exposures 
secured by mortgages on residential property and 
attracting a risk weight of 35% not to exceed 70% of 
the market value of that property. 
 N/A (EBA notified) 
Netherlands 103% 
(->100%) 
 
LTV limit for new mortgage loans decreases 
stepwise by 1 percentage point per annum from 
106% in 2012 to 100% in 2018. Exemptions for 
switcher mortgages, negative equity and loans for 
energy-saving renovations. 
Structural  1 January 2012 
Norway 85% Supervisory guidelines for prudent residential 
mortgage lending practices specify that the LTV 
should not be more than 85%.  
Structural and 
cyclical  
1 December 2011 
Poland 90%  
(->80%) 
 
For residential real estate: 2014 - 95%, 2015 - 90%, 
2016 - 85% (90%)*, 2017 - 80% (90%)* 
*If the part above the cap is insured or collateralised 
with funds on a bank account, or government or 
NBP securities. 
Structural  1 January 2014 
Romania 60-95% 85% for local currency-denominated loans, 80% for 
FX loans granted to hedged borrowers, 75% for 
EUR-denominated loans granted to unhedged 
borrowers, 60% for other FX loans granted to 
unhedged borrowers, and 95% for loans in the 
Prima Casă programme. Exemptions for first-time 
Structural  31 October 2011 
 
Overview of the use of real estate-related instruments  
in the EU/EEA 
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Table 30 
LTV in the EU and Norway 
Country Level 
(baseline) 
Remarks Cyclicality and 
exemptions 
Implementation 
date 
buyers with loans secured partially or totally by the 
state. 
Slovakia 90-100% Recommendation: LTV of new loans should not be 
more than 100%. Volume of new loans with LTV of 
90-100% should not exceed given share of total 
new loans. The proportionate LTV limit is gradually 
tightened over time (from 25% until 30 June 2015 to 
10% from 1 January 2017 onwards). Exemptions for 
non-topped-up loans and building societies. 
Structural  1 November 2014 
Sweden 85% Exemptions for switcher mortgages. Structural and 
cyclical  
1 October 2010 
 
 
Source: ESRB (2015). 
 
Table 31 
LTI and DSTI in the EU and Norway 
Country Type Level 
(baseline) 
Differentiation Cyclicality and 
exemptions 
Implementation 
date 
Cyprus DSTI 35-60% Limited to the lower of: (a) 35% (60%) of the 
borrower’s total monthly income or (b) the 
difference between the total monthly income and 
the total monthly expenditure for low(high)-income 
borrowers.  
 4 December 2013 
Estonia DSTI 50% Of borrower’s net income. Up to 15% of the 
amount of new housing loans issued in a quarter 
is allowed to breach the limit. Exemptions for 
mortgages in arrears. 
Structural and 
cyclical  
1 March 2015 
Hungary DSTI 10-60% The cap is differentiated according to the currency 
of the loan (HUF, EUR, other currencies) and the 
net income of the borrower (<=/ > HUF 400,000). 
De minimis exception for very small loans. 
Exemptions for switcher mortgages and 
mortgages in arrears. 
Structural and 
cyclical  
1 January 2015 
Ireland LTI 3.5 New housing loans with LTI greater than 3.5 
should not be more than 20% of the aggregate 
value of new housing loans. Exemptions for 
switcher mortgages and mortgages in arrears. 
Structural and 
cyclical  
9 February 2015 
Lithuania DSTI 40% Of borrower’s net income. Certain exemptions are 
introduced effective 1 November 2015 (see 
Section 4, Table 26).  
Structural  1 September 2011 
Netherlands DSTI 10-38% Limited to the lower of: (a) 35% (60%) of the 
borrower’s total monthly income or (b) the 
difference between the total monthly income and 
the total monthly expenditure for low(high)-income 
borrowers.  
Structural  2013 
United 
Kingdom 
LTI 4.5 Of borrower’s net income. Up to 15% of the 
amount of new housing loans issued in a quarter 
is allowed to breach the limit. Exemptions for 
mortgages in arrears. 
Cyclical  1 October 2014 
 
 
Source: ESRB (2015). 
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Table 32 
Loan maturity and amortisation in the EU and Norway 
Country Type Level 
(baseline) 
Differentiation Cyclicality Implementation 
date 
Estonia Mat. 30 years Up to 15% of the amount of new housing loans 
issued in a quarter are allowed to breach the limit.  
Structural and 
cyclical 
1 March  
2015 
Lithuania Mat. 40 years For new loans. Structural 1 September 2011 
Netherlands Amor. 30 years New mortgage loans are only tax-deductible when 
they are amortised within 30 years. 
Structural 1 January 2013 
Slovakia Amor.  Loans with (partial) deferred payment of interest 
or principal should not be granted. Specified 
exceptions are allowed. 
Structural 1 March 2015 
 Mat. 30 years For new housing loans. No more than 10% of new 
loans can exceed this limit. 
  
Poland Mat. 35 years  Structural Beginning of 2014 
Sweden Amor. N/A Need for new mortgage loans to repay at least 2% 
of loan per year until LTV is 70% and thereafter at 
least 1% of the loan until the LTV is 50%. 
N/A N/A (on hold) 
 
 
Source: ESRB (2015). 
 
Table 33 
RWs and LGDs in the EU and Norway 
Country Type Differentiation Implementation 
date 
Belgium RW 5 percentage point add-on to the risk weights applied by banks that use the IRB 
approach to mortgage loans to Belgian residents covered by residential real 
estate in Belgium. 
8 December 20131 
Croatia RW Stricter definition of residential property for preferential risk weighting (e.g. owner 
cannot have more than 2 residential properties, exclusion of holiday homes, need 
for occupation by owner or tenant). 
1 January 2014 
Luxembourg RW Institutions using the standardised approach for credit risk need to apply a risk 
weight of 75% to the part of the mortgage loan exceeding 80% of the value of the 
real estate object. 
1 July 2013 
Norway LGD 
RW 
Increase minimum EAD weighted average LGDs for retail exposures secured by 
residential real estate in Norway from 10% to 20%.  
Tighter requirements for residential mortgage lending models.  
 
1 January 2014 
1 January 2015  
(in process) 
Sweden RW 
(Pillar 
2) 
A risk weight floor of 25% (previously 15%) for Swedish mortgage loans by IRB 
banks. 
8 September 2015 
 
 
Note: 1Continuation of a measure (but now under CRD IV/CRR) that was already applicable. 
Source: ESRB (2015). 
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